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History

Theodore Roosevelt and the Negro in the Age of Booker T.
Washington, 1901-1912 (188 pp.)
Director*

William B. Evans

One of the most troublesome issues that Theodore Roose
velt faced as President was the so-called *Negro Problem."
In his effort to deal with it he alternately pleased and
angered Negroes and Southern whites, liberals and conser
vatives , extremists and moderates.
During his first administration Roosevelt attempted to
reform the Republican party in the South by appointing
Gold Democrats and black Republicans to patronage positions,
He secured Booker T. Washington as advisor on Southern and
Negro policy and appointed blacks to office who had the
stamped approval of Washington. White Southerners were
offended by Roosevelt’s actions and directed virulent
criticism at the President, Roosevelt invited Washington
to dinner at the White House, thus directly insulting
the South. He followed with two controversial episodes*
the appointment of William D. Crum to the Coilectorship
of the Port of Charleston, South Carolina,and closii^ the
post office at Indianola, Missi^M]^i,Tollowing^^he^arced
resignation of Mrs. Minnie Cox, the Negro postmistress,
Attempting to assuage a hostile Southern white popula
tion, Roosevelt stressed sectional reconciliation during
his second administration. In 1905 he toured the South
without making reference to lynching, disfranchisement,
or "Jim Crow." He was noticably silent following the
Atlanta race riots in 1906 and in the same year he sum
marily dismissed lo? black soldiers from the Ü.S. Army
for the alleged participation in the "Brownsville Affair."
And in 1912 Roosevelt entered the presidential race as
leader of the Progressive Party and established a "lily
white" party in the South,
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CHAPTER I
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE NEGRO»
INTRODUCTION
One of the most critical periods in American race rela
tions occurred at the turn of the Twentieth Century.

Histori

ans have given this period the savory title of the "Progressive
Era."

While being a time of enlightenment and zealous reform,

it v/as an era of pervasive and militant racism.

In the South,

where ninety per cent of the Negro population lived, black Ameri
cans were subjected to physical violence,, segregation, economic
exploitation and disfranchisement.

Southern racist doctrines,

expressing the innate inferiority of the black race, had gained
wide acceptance and were further expounded by such negrophobes
as James Vardaman of Mississippi and Benjamin Tillman of South
Carolina.

Northern leaders acquired a racial philosophy "akin

to their southern counterparts," the difference being that
1
northern racism was often "circumspect, more subtle."
Partieularly in the South, Progressivism was "for whites only."

2

■‘On the racial attitudes of Northern progressives see
David VI. Southern, The Malignant Heritage » Yankee Progressives
and the Negro Question, 1901-1914^ (Chicago» Loyola University"
3? * s s ; " i 9 S 9 7 T ---------

-----

^C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913
(Baton Rouge * Louisiana State UniveriTEy""Press', 195ÏT» pu. 369395.

2

Theodore Roosevelt occupied the White House during this
turbulent era in race relations.

Throughout his eight years

in office, no issue plagued him as much as the so-called "Negro
Problem."

Each approach he took toward a possible solution

alternately pleased and angered blacks and Southern whites.
As leader of the Republican party, Roosevelt wished to main
tain the historic bond between the Negro and the party in an
effort to build a strong organization in the South.

He real

ized that it was among the eleven former Confederate states
that the party was weakest.

Each of his predecessors had

failed to build a respectable party organization there, owing
much to the racial attitudes of white Southerners which pre
vented the acceptance of Negroes as political partners.

What

Roosevelt desired was a party of both black and white Republi
cans.

The difficulties involved in this prospect troubled

Roosevelt as much as they troubled each Republican president
prior to his administration.^
—
_—
_ _

;

For detailed discussion of the Republican party and the
Negro prior to Roosevelt's presidency see Vincent P. DeSantis,
Hirshson. Farewell to the Bloody Shirti Northern Republicans and
the Southern Negro,“T8t7^1093 (Bloomington* 'Indiana Univers
Press, 1 9 6 2 ); Rayford W. Logan, The Betrayal of the Negro» From
Rutherford B. Kayes to Woodrow WTIson (New York/ iPHe Macmillan ‘
Co., I 9W * 19637; Paul H. Buck,**fîïe"H'oad to Reunion, 1865-1900
(Bostons Little, Brown and Co., Î337TI
~

3
The racial crisis of the Progressive era had its origins
in the years following Reconstruction.

In

President Hayes

initiated a policy of reconciliation toward the South by remov
ing the last Federal troops from South Carolina and Louisiana.
In an effort to unite the nation and eliminate any sectional
strife that existed throughout Reconstruction, he restored ''home
rule** to Southern white Conser'/atives,

In effect, Hayes aban

doned the Southern Negro and the Republican party acquiesed its
role as **champion'* and "protector" of black political and civil
ri^its.

The Negro was no longer considered a "ward of the nation.
/>
Ke became,a "ward of a dominant race" in the South.
Kayes
believed that his course of action would ultimately contribute
to the emergence of a strong Republican party in the South.
Though the Bourbon leadership promised to protect the Southern
Negro, it was not considering the existence of a two-party battl.a in the South,

Determined to keep the Southern leadership

white and Democratic, conservative "redeemers" united behind
the banner of "white supremacy" and placed the foundation for
a solid Democratic South,
In subsequent efforts to gain position in the South, Re
publican leaders resorted to "bloody shirt" tactics, stressing
the unlawful actions committed against Negro suffrage rights
by Southern leaders.

Throughout the 113880*s and I890*s Repub-

^ incent P. DeSantis, "The Republican Party and the
Southern Negro, 1877-1897," Journal of Hagro History, XLV
(April, I960), 71-87.

4
lican statesmen reiterated their desire to build a strong
party in the South but the results were negative.

Whatever

strength the party held in the South by 1900 was the result
of those Republicans who promulgated the belief that the party
would gain strength only by existing as a "lily white" party.
They believed that this would be the only possible method of
combating the Democratic majority in the South,
The Southern Bourbons who secured the reigns of govern
ment in the South professed to be sincere in their attempts
of protecting the Negro's rights.

However, they believed that

this would best be achieved under conservative white hegemony.
Southern Democrats were more interested in industrializing and
urbanizing their section than restoring the antebellum, slavocracy.

To achieve this industrial "utopia" it was necessary

to eliminate any signs of racial tension.

The "Prophets" of

the New South, needing capital and labor from the North and
from Europe to reconstruct their economy, preached nationalism
and advocated the protection of Negro rights.

Northern capi

talists and their major spokesman, the Republican party, wel
comed this opportunity to fulfill the promises agreed upon in
the Compromise of 1877.

Further more, they took comfort in

the fact that the new Southern leadership was bent on preserving the recently won rights by Southern blacks.^

But to what

C

•'George M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind;
The Debate on Afro-American Character and D e s t m y , I8l7-19l¥
(lew îforkT Harper and Row, Inc., 1971)» pp’ 190-227. For the
details of Northern capitalist involvment in the Compromise of
1877 see C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction; The Compromise
of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction (Boston; Little, Brown and

C0.T195TTT
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extent were these Southern "redeemers" willing to protect the
Negro?
Southern conservatives, such as Wade Hampton and Henry
Grady, believed that the Negro was progressing in the areas
of economics and education.

The Negro would continue to pro

gress but only under the benevolent guardianship of those
spokesmen for the "new order. "

Since the Negro was acquiring

property and education, his vote was no longer a menace.

He

would now naturally align himself with the more conservative
whites.

But during the I880*s this "neopaternalist school of

thought" came under attack.

On one side were the extreme

racists and race-baiting politicians of the South who argued
that the Negro had not progressed but had degenerated since
emancipation.

To these Southern negrophobes, the only oppor

tunity for progress for the Negro was under the institution
of slavery.

On the other extreme Southern liberals contended

that it was impossible for the South to have free and honest
government as long as blacks were denied their right of public
6
equality.
It was during the l890*s that the Southern conservative
leadership became seriously threatened.

The rise of agrarian

radicalism in the I880*s culminated in the Populist revolt of
the 1890*3.

6

Populist spokesmen expressed the kinship of com-

C.
Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New
York» Oxford University Press,' ’19^5) » PP. 13^7» Fredrickson,
pp. 2 1 6 -2 2 ?.

6
mon grievances and common oppression between Southern blacks
and poor Southern white farmers in an effort to gain black
support for overthrowing the conservative control of the South►
Realizing the potential success that Populists would enjoy
with their appeal to the Negro vote. Southern conservatives
resorted to crys of "Negro domination" and its ultimate chal
lenge to white supremacy.

They enlisted negrophobe elements -

fraud, intinidation, bribery, violence and terror - to secure
their control of the South.

Southern Populists, upon defeat,

placed the blame for their failure on the Negro,

Southern

blacks quickly became the scapegoats for the disruption in
Southern politics in the 1890*s.

The end result was disfran

chisement in Mississippi in I89 O, South Carolina in 1895» and
Alabama in 19 OO.

Devices such as the Poll tax and Grandfather

clause were effectively used to eliminate voting by blacks and
poor Southern whites.

Contrary to the belief that disfranchise

ment would improve race relations, its implementation in white
supremacy campaigns in the South raised race hatred to a dan
gerous pitch.

Lynching and one-sided race riots often resulted

from racist propaganda.

As 0. Vann Woodward has asserted, lynch7
ing became "an increasingly Southern and racial phenomenon."
The decade of the 1890*s further witnessed the economic

and social relegation of the Negro,

Subjected to the binding

poverty of the Southern sharecropping system and the use of such
^Woodward, Origins of the New South, pp. 351-352.

7
devices as "crop-lien** and ’’convict leasing,” blacks were forced
to the bottom of the Southern caste system.

Their social status

declined as the result of ”Jim Crow" laws, judicial sanction of
the doctrine of "separate but equal” in a Supreme Court ruling
in 1896 (Plessy vs. Ferguson) and disfranchisement in I898
(Williams vs. Mississippi).
paternalism of the l880*s.

Southern Negrophobia replaced the
No longer considered to be progres

sing, the Negro was thought to be degenerating.

Under slavery

he was considered to be "docile and subordinate 1" now he was
an "uncivilized beast," who had reverted to savagery and threat
ened to contaminate white civilization.
By the turn of the century Southern racism was more ex
treme and Northerners were becoming increasingly indifferent.
Ultraracist nbooks (Thomas Dixon's The Clansmen, Charles Car
roll's The Negro A Beast, and Robert W. Shufeldt's The Negro*
A Menace to American Civilization) reflected Southern opinion
that blacks were inferior, immoral, and criminal,^

The popu

larity of social Darwinism, with its theories of "survival of
the fittest” and the "preservation of favoured races" lent
scientific support to the belief that the Negro was degenerating
and would become extinct through the process of evolution and
9
the "struggle for existence" between the races.
O
On Southern Negrophobia see Fredrickson, pp. 256-282»
Woodward, Origins of the New South, chapters XII and XIII;
Woodward, The Strange Career 6 F j'lm Crow, pp. 49-95.
o
For discussion of Social Darwinism and its application
to the racial climate see Fredrickson, pp. 228-255; Richard Hof.
stadter. Social Darwinism in American Thought (Philadelphia*
University of PennsylvanTa^Tress , ’1 944 )', pp. 170-200,

8

Against the background of rising prejudice, discrimina
tion and deteriorating race relations, a majority of Southern
blacks continued to follow the advice offered by paternalists*
to strive for moral and economic development through industrial
education, racial solidarity and self-help; to eschew politics
and the demand for civil rights.

This was essentially the

philosophy also expressed by Booker T. Washington and respon
sible for his acceptance among Southern whites and Northern
philantropists as the leading Negro spokesman,

Washington's

ideas accorded with the climate of opinion at the time and
assured his eminence among the "best class" of Southern whites.
The rise of Washington to national prominence was the one note
of optimism admidst a hostile environment for the black com
munity.

Through a conciliatory and accomodating approach, he

was able to penetrate circles that were inaccessible to Negroes
at that time.

Most significant was his selection by Theodore

Roosevelt as presidential advisor on Southern and Negro policy.
Roosevelt's choice of Washington reflected the racial
attitude that the former Rough Rider held on his ascension to
the presidency.

He was in substantial agreement with Washing

ton's overt expressions of accomodation and self-help.

He

wrote in 1900* "It has always seemed to me that the salvation
of the Negro lay in the development of the Booker Washington
theory, that is, in fitting him to do ever better industrial

work."^®
Theodore Roosevelt to L. J. Moore, February 5» 1900,
Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 vols.
(Cambridge* Harvard University &ress, 195^), 11 ,"*p. 11 &9.

9
Roosevelt's racial views were consistent with those North
ern and Southern liberals who agreed with the vast majority of
white Southerns on the inferiority of the Negro but sincerely
believed that the race was progressing under the benevolent
white guardianship of the "best class" in the South,

Writing

to the novelist Owen Wister, Roosevelt concurred with the author
that "as a race and in the mass / “NegroesJT* are altogether in
ferior to the whites" and asserted that he would never ask "the
average Negro to be allowed to vote."

However, he wished that

the "occasionally good, well educated, intelligent and honest
colored men and women be given the pitiful chance to have a
little reward, a little respect, a little regard if they can
by earnest useful work succeed in winning it."

11

He denied the

possibility of Negro extinction, declaring that the black man
"was here to stay and could neither be killed nor driven away."
"The only wise and honorable and Christian thing to do is to
treat every black man and every white man strictly on his merits
as a man, giving him no more and no less than he shows himself
12
worthy to have,"
This "merit system" in race relations was
essentially what one historian has called Roosevelt's "great
13
rule of righteousness."
^^Roosevelt to Owen Wister, April 27» 1906, Letters « V,
p. 228,
l^Roosevelt to Albion Tourgee, November 8, 1901, Ibid,.
Ill, pp. 190-191.
13

George Sinkier. The Racial Attitudes of American Presi
dents : From Abraham Lincoln to Theodore Roosevelt (Garden City,
N.Y.Ï Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1972), p. 4-l8.

10

Southern recalcitrance on racial matters made the Negro
problem more difficult for Roosevelt.

He continuously blamed

his inability to act effectively in the South during his presi
dency on race-baiting politicians and Southern extemists.

He

stated to Lyman Abbott, editor of Outlook, that these men acted
as "grown up and often vicious children" on the Negro question.
"They shriek in public about miscegenation," Roosevelt later
commented, "but they leer as they talk to me privately of the
colored mistresses and colored children of white men whom they
know.
Roosevelt dissented from Southern extremist opinion that
the Negro had degenerated since emancipation, describing this
belief as "the veriest nonsense,"
whole become better.

"/“The Negro_J7 has on the

Among the Negroes of the South when

slavery was abolished there was hot one who stood as in any
shape or way comparable with Booker Washington."

Expressing

his admiration for the Negro educator, Roosevelt added: "I do
not know a white man of the South who is as good a man as Booker
Washington today.
1il
Roosevelt to Lyman Abbott, October 29, 1903» Letters.
Ill, p. 186.
^^Roosevelt to Owen Wister, April 27» 1906, Ibid., V,
p. 227.
^^Ibid., pp. 226-227.

11
The one exception to Roosevelt*s “great rule of righteous
ness” was in race mingling or social equality.

In his concep

tion of race, he believed that the white-skinned, Englishspeaking Anglo-Saxon was the most superior being racially and
c u l t u r a l l y . A s a strong proponent of Kipling's “White Man's
Burden” Roosevelt realized that it was the responsibility of
the Caucasian to lend assistance to the backward races of the
world.

Thus, he advocated a benevolent imperialism abroard

and a paternalistic approach at home.

Southern extemists mis

interpreted his accomodating policies toward the Negro as an
effort to establish social equality? an assertion that he em
phatically denied.

Writing to Grenville Dodge, Roosevelt de

clared : ”I wish to emphasise that we are not fighting for social
equality, and that we do not believe in miscegenation? but that
we do believe in equality of opportunity, in equality before
the l a w . R o o s e v e l t viewed the problem as how to tiain “the
backv/ard race so that it may enter the possession of true free
dom, while the forward race is allowed to preserve unharmed the
high civilisation wrought by its forefathers."

He realized that

the uplifting of the Negro would be difficult and take time ;
but most significantly he was aware that black advancement must
be made compatible with the Southern ban on "social intermingling
^^Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, 4 vols.
(New York* G. P. Putnam's Sons, I W ? , 1891, l39^7~Î91?), I, see
Chapter one entitled "The English Speaking People.”
18
Rooseve3.t to Grenville Dodge, November l4, 1904, quoted
in Sinkier. Racial Attitudes of American Presidents, p. 400,

12
of the race."

It was apparent to "all reflecting men," that
19
"racial purity must be maintained."
During his formulâtive years Roosevelt had little first

hand contact with black Americans.

He became a "vigorous

Republican partisan" and his early sympathetic statements on
the Negro were more aligned with the party position than a
20
profound personal conviction.
As a member of the Civil Ser
vice Commission he had occasion to face the "Negro problem"
and promulgated the belief in offering "equal and exact justice
to all."

21

As governor of New York he seriously considered

the problem of "doing justice to and getting good results from
the colored race.,.."

He appointed a few Negroes to office

and strongly supported the Elsberg bill which ended racial
22
segregation in New York schools.
Roosevelt’s presidency, regarding his relationship with
the black community, can be divided into two periods.

During

19
Theodore Roosevelt, Tho Works of Theodore Roosevelt,
20 vols.» Hermann Hagadom, ed. CNew Y ork i Charles' Scribner *s
Sons, 1925), XVIII, pp. 463-465.

20

Richard B. Sherman, The Republican Party and Black
Americat From McKinley to Hoover, 1896-1933 iCharlottesvillei
University Tress of V i r ^ n i a , 1973), PP. 23-24.
^^Roosevelt to Alexander Monroe Dockery, May 24, 1894,
Letters, I, p. 381.
22

Roosevelt to William Henry Lewis, July 26, 1900, Letters,
II, pp. 1364-1365; Roosevelt to T. Thomas Fortune, March 27,
"
1899, Ibid., pp. 972-973» William Henry Harbaugh, Power and
Responsibility; The Life and Times of Theodore Hoosevelt'TWew
York; Farrar, Straus and cJudahy, 196Ï), p. 129; G. Wallace
Chessman, Governor Theodore Roosevelt; The Albany Apprentice
ship, 1898 -190 ^ (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1965),
p. 242.
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his first administration he made a sincere effort to do justice
and provide the opportunity to black Americans for political
participation.

He resisted attempts to establish "lily white"

Republicanism in the South by appointing William D. Crum, a
Negro doctor, to the collectorship of the Port of Charleston,
South Carolina, and defied southern criticism by standing firm
on his belief in a "Square Deal" for all men.

In 1903 Roose

velt closed the Indianola, Mississippi, post office when white
citizens refused to accept the appointment of a Negro postmis
tress.

And throughout his term in office he refused to apolo

gise to the South for inviting Booker T. Washington to dinner
at the White House.
Roosevelt*s second administration coincided with extreme
anti-Negro sentiment in the South and his policy was directed
toward a reconciliation of the South with the rest of the nation.
In 1905 he made a tour of the South with the purpose of winning
the affections of the white population which he had alienated
during his first term of office.

He relegated Negro protection

and political and civil rights to the last of his priorities.
He refused to intervene in the Atlanta Race Riots of 1906 and
in the same year he dismissed three companies of black soldiers
from the United States Army for alleged participation in the
Brownsville Affair,

Finally, in 1912 Roosevelt excluded Southern

black delegates from participating in the Progressive Party Con
vention.

This reversal of policy towards the black community

signified the importance to Roosevelt of sectional reconcilia
tion.

CHAPTER II
DINNER AT THE WHITE HOUSE: THE EMERGENCE OF
BOOXER T. WASHINGTON AS POLITICAL ADVISOR
When Theodore Roosevelt became President following the
assassination of President William McKinley on September
1901, he assumed the most responsible and prestlgous public
office that existed in the nation.

Confronting Roosevelt at

this time was the problem of securing his nomination in 1904.
He had become President by accident but wished to gain the
office in his own right.

To achieve this goal, he had to

assure himself enough Republican delegate support.

With the

death of McKinley, Roosevelt inherited title to both the of
fice and the Republican organisation.
great powers was his alone."
belonged to Marcus Hanna,^

The office "with its

The organization, "for the while,"
The powerful Senator from Ohio was

the chairman of the Republican National Committee and was be
lieved to be by many, including Roosevelt, an aspirant for the
Republican presidential nomination in 1904.
Roosevelt was well aware that, in order to secure
enough delegates, he had to gain the support of Southern Re
publicans.

Hemna had a powerful hold upon the Negro delega-

^John M. Blum, The Republican Roosevelt (Cambridge: Har
vard University Press, 1954s reprint ed., New York: Atheneum,
1967), p. 38.
14

1$

tiens in the South and it was the President's primary objec
tive to bring together black and white Southerners v/hile de
stroying the Reconstruction political machines which supported the Senator.

Ey the use of federal appointments, Roose

velt hoped to achieve his goal.

To assist him the President

obtained Booker Ï. Washington as one of his chief advisors
for Southern and Negro p o l i c y . T h r o u g h o u t Roosevelt's terms
of office, and particularly during his firsk administration,
the President's relationship with the black community was
conducted through Washington.
The contrasts between these two men are so great that
it seems almost impossible that they would jointly influence
American society at the turn of the century.

Roosevelt was

b o m into the white aristocracy of New York in l8f8.

The

ancestry of his family traces back to the pre-Revolutionary
era in American history.

His father's forebears were of

Dutch descent and for more than "seven generations from
father to son one of them was b o m on Manhattan Island."^
His mother, Martha Bulloch, was a native of Georgia and traced
her lineage through the aristocracy of Georgia and South
^Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, A Biographv
(New York I Harcourt, Braci~and” Co.T 193^7, pp. 393^3^4%^
^Theodore Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Theodore
Roosevelt (New York» Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913)» P» li
Prl^ie, p. ?.

16
Carolina back to England.

Washington, in comparison, came

from slave ancestry and placed the site of his birth ”near
a cross-road post office called Kale's Ford ^VirginiaJ7,
and the year was 1858 or 1859."

Washington knew little of

his ancestry except that on his mother's side they "suffer
ed in the Middle Passage on slave ships from Africa to Ameri
ca" and knew nothing of his father, not even his name.'^
Roosevelt enjoyed the very best personal education and
supervision that aristocratic America could offer.

His ex

periences were broadened by two trips to Europe before his
fifteenth birthday.

Upon returning home from his second

trip, his parents paved the way for his entrance into Har
vard in 1876 ,

Under the liberal curriculum pioneered by Pres

ident Charles W. Eliot, "Teedie" was able to explore the di
verse interests that attracted him during his youth.

Wash

ington, being a slave on the Burrough's plantation in Frank
lin County, Virginia, was not offered the opportunity of an
early education.

In his autobiography he declared* "I had

no schooling whatever while I was a slave, though I remember
on several occasions I went as far as the schoolhouse door
with one of my young mistresses to carry her books.
^Booker T. Washington, Ug Prom S l a v e y * An Autobiogra
phy (New York* Doubleday and Co., 'Inc. , Ï9Ô1* reprint ed.,
New York* Bantam Books, 1970), p. 1. Washington's most re
cent biographer places his birth in the Spring of 1856 , see
Louis R. Harlan, Booker T. Washington* The Making of a Black
Leader, 1856-1901 (New YôrkT~ÔxF5rd~üniversItÿ~Press, 19'f^J*
p. 3•
^Washington, Ug From Slavery, pp. 4-5.
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These incidents left a deep impression on the mind of young
Booker and it was not until he came under the influence of
General Samuel Chapman Armstrong and Hampton Institute that
his visions of receiving an education became a reality.
In public life the contrasts between these two men were
equally striking.

Roosevelt became a Republican because of

his aristocratic background and his disillusionment over the
Democratic politics exemplified by Tammany Hall and the Tweed
Ring of New York.

He entered New York politics with a sense

of dedication and a strong desire to bring to public life a
disinterested honesty of purpose.^

At this same time Washing

ton was deeply engaged in his work at Tuskegee Institute, prom
ulgating the social philosophy of self-help and economic de
velopment.

Though seldom declaring any political affiliation»

he was a Republican for the same reason most Afro-Americans
wereI the Republican î^rty was the party of Lincoln, the par
ty of freedom, the party responsible for upholding the doctrine
of racial equality.
Roosevelt and Washington shared some common traits that
formed the base of their association.

As Louis Harlan asserts;

Both were self-made men, though in different senses,.,.
Both were pragmatists, willing to sacrifice mere princi
ples for the sake of power, and yet each had a strong sense
of personal mission. Each saw himself as a practical re
former with a constructive goal in mind, as much opposed
to the militant blacks and the "men with the muckrake" as
Blum, The Republican Roosevelt, p. 9t Richard Hofstadter. The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It
(New York"* Xifred A . îüiopf, IncT, Vintage Books,
pp.215-17-
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to the entrenched white supremacists and "malefactors of great
wealth." Both were direct and plain-spoken and thought of
his work in terms of high moral purpose, but, when the occa
sion called for ruthless action, could decide and act in his
own interest.'
The most significant factor which brought Roosevelt and
Washington together was their shared convictions concerning
the American Negro and his plight in a white society.

Wash

ington's Atlanta Speech in 1895 was attuned to Roosevelt's
thinking on racial matters.

In that speech, delivered before

a majority of Southern whites at the Cotton States and Inter
national Expositions, the Negro educator delighted his audi
ence by revealing his opinion that the position obtained by
the Negro following the Civil War was a mistake.

Washington

urged the black man to "cast down / ”his__7 bucket by making
friends in every manly way of the people of all races by whom
^he__7 is surrounded."

He urged the colored people of the

South to "cast down their buckets in agriculture, mechanics,
in commerce, in domestic service, and in the professions."
He urged whites, too, to "cast down their buckets" among the
eight million blacks "whose habits you know, whose fidelity
and love you have tested in days when to have proved treach
erous meant the ruin of your firesides."

"The wisest among

my race," declared Washington, "understand that the agitation
of questions of social equality is the extremest folly."
^Harlan, p. 506.

He
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stated that if Southern whites would only concede to the Ne
gro the chance of self-improvement through education and eco
nomic opportunity, they would be surrounded in the future as
in the past by "the most patient, faithful, law-abiding, and
unresentful people that the world has seen."

Washington

reached the climax of his address by acknowledging Southern
segregation sentiments by stating:

"In all things that are

purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one
as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress."^
The concilatory tone of Washington's address brought
wholehearted approval from the Southern press and the Tuskageean was pronounced "the new Negro leader."

The New Orleans

Picayune called Washington a "prominent" and "sensible" man
and the Charleston News and Courier referred to him as "one
of the great men of the South."

They continued:

"His skin

is colored, but his head is sound and his heart is in the
right place,"

The Atlanta Constitution declared that Wash

ington was a "sensible and progressive negro educator" and
called his speech the "hit of the day.
The Negro press reaction was ambivalent.

The Chicago

Conservator and the Indianapolis Freeman endorsed Washington's
Davidson Washington, ed.. Selected Speeches of Book
er T. Washington (New York; Doubleday, Doran à M 'Co., Inc.,
T§3^) t pp. 31-37; Washington, Up From Slavery, pp. 153-15^^.
^Quoted in Rayford W. Logan, The Betrayal of the Negro;
From Rutherford B. Hayes to Woodrow' Wilson C ^ w York; The Macm 1ITah Üo ., 19_$47 l963), p. 2Bl".
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plea to take the economic approach to racial advancement.

In

turn, other newspapers expressed disagreement with the Negro
educator’s "compromise.”

W. Calvin Chase, editor of the

Washington Bee stated that Washington "said something that
was the death to the Afro-American and elevating to the white
people.**

The Atlanta Advocate asserted that Washington was

"so representative of the Negro that his hat flies off the
moment a small red headed white newsboy is introduced to
him...."

The editorial continued*

"We doubt if the Tuske-

gee normal school will receive any benefit from Prof. Bad
Taste’s sycophantic attitude but there is no doubt in our
minds that his race will suffer..
Criticism from his own race did not alter Washington’s
view on racial matters.

He was convinced that the only way

the Negro could advance in American society and simultaneous
ly keep racial tensions in the South to a minimum was through
education, racial solidarity, and economic self-help.

His

social philosophy was embraced by both Southern whites and
Northern philanthropists, whom he depended upon for financial
support for Tuskegee Institute.

Washington also received en

couragement from Presidents Cleveland and McKinley.
l^Quoted in Harlan, pp. 225-226.
^Washington met with Cleveland during the Atlanta Expo
sition and served in a minor advisory capacity during McKin
ley’s administration. See Harlan, p. 224; Thomas R, Cripps,
"The Lily White Republicans, the Negro, the Party, and the
South in the Progressive Era," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Universi
ty of Maryland, 1967), pp. 48-96.
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Washington first net Theodore Roosevelt when the latter
was governor of New York.

They discussed what should be done

by a President in the South.

As Roosevelt later commented*

"We agreed that in the Gulf and South Atlantic States, where
... there is no real Republican organization ... the thing to
do would be to recognize Democrats; to try to appoint men of
high character - Republicans where they were available. Demo
crats where they were not; and to appoint a very few colored
men of high character - just enough to make it evident that
they were not being entirely proscribed.
Upon Roosevelt’s election as Vice-President, Washington
offered his congratulations and Roosevelt urged the Negro ed
ucator to visit him the next time he came north and give him
advise on race m a t t e r s . W a s h i n g t o n took the first train
north and conferred with the Vice-President.

During their

conference Roosevelt expressed his desire to become President.
The Negro leader assured him that he would provide a helping
hand among Black Republican leaders and Roosevelt, in turn,
promised "to help not only the Negro, but the whole South,
should he ever become president.
Theodore Roosevelt to James Ford Rhodes, December 15,
1 9 0 4 , Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University PressT%93^)»
vol. IV, p. 1 0 7 2 .
^^Roosevelt to Booker T, Washington, November 10, 190 O,
cited in Harlan, p. 305.
Emmett J. Scott and Lyman Beecher Stowe, Booker T,
Washington: Builder of a Civilization (Garden City, N.Y.7
Doubleday, Page, and CoT, 19l6^, pp. 1 6 9 , 31^-315.
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Roosevelt had been planning a trip South to visit his
mother's home in Georgia and extend his travels to Tuskegee.
On September 1^, 1901 his plans were abruptly changed with the
assassination of President McKinley.

On the very day that he

took the oath of office, Roosevelt wrote to Washington*
I write you at once to say that to my deep regret
my visit south must now be given up. When are you coming
North? I must see you as soon as possible. I want to
talk over the question of possible future appointments
in the south exactly on the lines of our last conversa
tion together.... ^-5
When Washington received this message from the President
he confessed that "it caused me some misgivings."

He had

tried hard to avoid becoming involved in any political activi
ty for fear of endangering his work at Tuskegee, but a call
ing from the President could not be "lightly put aside.
Upon Washington's arrival at the White House, Roosevelt im
mediately outlined to the Negro leader his ideas with respect
to appointments in the South, emphasizing his determination
to appoint only the best qualified men, including Democrats
where Republicans could not be found.
wrote*

As Washington later

"^Roosevelt^ repeated and emphasised his determiha-

^^Roosevelt to Booker T. Washington, September l4, 1901,
Letters, III, p. 149.
^^Booker T. Washington, "My Larger Education, Being Chap
ters From My Experience" in The Booker T, Washington Papers «
Louis R. Harlan, ed., (3 vols, to date)7 vol. I TÏÏi~~Autobio
graphical Writings (Urbana* University of Illinoii~Press, 1972),

pThWT
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tion to appoint / “men of the highest character_J7 ... regard
less of political influences or political consequences.”
Washington urged the appointment of both Negro Republicans
and conservative Democrats,

The President stated that he did

not propose to appoint a large number of Negroes to office in
the South but when he did appoint one he would be '‘not only
a man of ability, but of character - a man who had the con17
fidence of his white and coloured neighbors.”
Further, he
promised to appoint well-qualified blacks to offices in the
1A
North as well, which delighted Washington.
Returning to Tuskegee, Washington discovered that the
judgeship for the Middle District of Alabama had just becomes
vacant through the death of the incumbent. Judge John Bruce.
This presented an opportunity to initiate the policy of ap
pointing qualified men to federal posts, as outlined by the
President.

Washington sent his secretary, Emmett J. Scott to

the White House with a letter recommending the appointment of
ex-Govemor Thomas G. Jones, a white conservative Democrat,
for the vacant position.

The Negro leader described Jones as

the best qualified man for the office.

"He is a Gold Democrat,

and is a clean, pure man in every respect," wrote Washington.
"He stood up in the Constitutional Convention and elsewhere

ITlbid.
1A
On this idea of the Présidentes, Louis Harlan asserts
that Washington "silently filed ^ i t _ % away as his ticket to
a bargain of mutual interest with the Northern black profes»
sional elite, the "Talented Tenth.*" See Harlan, Booker T,
Washington, p. 3 0 7 .

zk

for a fair election law, opposed lynching, and he has been
outspoken for the education of both races.

He is head and

shoulders above any of the other persons who I think will
19
apply for the position.”
The President, upon reading Washington's letter, was
concerned as to whether Jones had supported William Jennings
Bryan in either I896 or 1900.

Scott informed him that the

ex-Govemor supported McKinley in both elections.

Roosevelt

then questioned Scott on the knowledge of this fact and the
secretary told him of a letter wherein Jones stated to Wash
ington that he was "without political ambition because he had
opposed Bryan...."

The President then requested to hear di

rectly from Washington on the matter and Scott hurried off a
telegram assuring the Tuskegeean that Roosevelt already had
decided to appoint Jones.

20

Washington wired "the whole truth" to Scott on the same
dayI

"Party voted for Palmer and Buckner (Gold Democrat Tick

et) and supported them strongly in ninety six but in order to
have influence in defeating Bryan's nomination went into Dem
ocratic primaries in nineteen hundred, voted for him but made
no addresses, he has strongly and openly supported McKinleys
iq
^Booker T. Washington to Theodore Roosevelt, October 2,
1 9 0 1 , in Scott and Stowe, Booker T. Washington, p. 50,
20
Emmett J. Scott to Washington, October 4, I 9 0 1 , Ibid.,
p. 5 1 .
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expansion policy, was president of sound money club in ninety
six."21
The following day Scott waited for three hours to see
the President.

When finally invited in, he immediately hand

ed Roosevelt the letter from Washington.
study," Scott reported,

"His face was a

"He was greatly surprised to learn

that the Governor voted for Bryan."

Roosevelt replied to

Scott; "Well, I guess 1*11 have to appoint him, bât I am aw
fully sorry he voted for Bryan,"

The President and Scott then

discussed Dr. William D. Crum, a prominent Negro doctor from
Charleston, South Carolina.

Scott told Roosevelt that the

doctor was a "clean representative character and that he was
favorably considered by /"Benjamin^/ Harrison for the Charles
ton postmastership..,."

Roosevelt found that the position

Washington has advocated for Crura had been filled, but he told
Scott to inform Washington that he would consider Crum for any
other vacancy that might occur.

(The appointment of William

Crum to high office would later become a cause celebre in
Roosevelt's first administration),

Scott asked Roosevelt what

message he should relay to his boss concerning the appointment
of Jones.

"Tell Mr. Washington without using my name that par

ty will most likely be appointed - in fact I will appoint him pp
only don't make it that strong by wire," replied the President.
^Washington to Scott, October 4, 1901, in Harlan, Booker
T. Washington, p. 3 0 9 .
22c
'Scott to Washington, October 5» 1901, in Scott and
pp. 53 -5 4 . For the Crum affair sea chapter IV.
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A few weeks later, while on tour of Mississippi, Wash
ington received word that the President wished to confer with
him once again.

At the completion of his business he headed

for the Capital and soon arrived at the home of Whitefield
McKinlay, a real estate broker and one of Washington's clos
est friends.

There he found an invitation to dinner at the

White House at eight o'clock that evening.

At the appointed

time Washington arrived at the White House and proceeded to
dine with the President, his wife, his daughter Alice, and
his three sons.

Also present at the dinner was one of Roose

velt's old friends, Phillip B, Stewart, a Colorado mining and
utilities executive.~

After dinner Roosevelt and Washington

talked at considerable length concerning plans the President
had about the South.

At the end of the evening Washington
o

/l

boarded a train and headed for New York.
Southern sentiment toward Washington, prior to his sec
ond conference with Roosevelt, was very favorable.

The con*i-

èiîitpry tone of his speeches were met with astounding applause
and his work at Tuskegee was viewed with equal admiration.
When news arrived about the appointment of Governor Jones to
the Judgeship in Alabama, Southern whites expressed further
approval, even when they were later notified that Washington
^Roosevelt frequently discussed the political situation
in Colorado with Stewart and had gone on hunting trips in the
Colorado Rockies with. See Blum, pp. 40-41; Letters, II,p. l46n,
Washington, "My Larger Education,* in The Booker T. Wash
ington Papers, vol. I, pp. 443-444.
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was responsible for it.

However, Booker T. Washington was

still a Negro and Negroes did not sit down to dinner with a
white man and his family, especially when that white man hapens to be the President of the United States.

The frenzied

wave of racism that was sweeping the South at the turn of the
century was abetted by news of the Washington-Roosevelt din
ner.
The morning following the dinner Washington noticed that
the New York Tribune mentioned briefly his dinner with the
President the previous night.

He gave little thought to the

m a t t e r . H o w e v e r , only a few days passed before news of the
dinner appeared in the Southern press and initiated a “storm
of controversy.”^^

The New Orleans Times Democrat wrote»

"When Mr. Roosevelt sits down to dinner with a negro he de
clares that the negro is the social equal of the white man."
The New Orleans Daily States called the dinner "a studied in
sult to the S o u t h . S o u t h e r n editors suddenly discovered
that Rooseveltism means "nigger supremacy."

The New Orleans

^^Ibid., p. 444.
Willard B. Gatewood has focused on the dinner as an
example of Roosevelt's ability to provoke controversy. How
ever, he concentrates on the Southern mythology surrounding
the affair rather than its significance concerning Roosevelt's
Southern policy and his association with Washington. See Gate
wood , Theodore Roosevelt and the Art of Controversy» Episodes
of the White Rouse^ Ÿears (Mton Rouge» Louisiaha "State universTty^ress, 1^7977 PP» 32-61.
^^Quoted in the New York Times, October 19» 1901.
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Picayune called the President “the worst enemy to his race of
any white man who has ever occupied so high a place in this
republic."

The Richmond Times stated that the incident “means

the President is willing that negroes shall mingle freely with
whites in the social circle - that white women may receive
attentions from negro men; it means that there is no racial
reason in his opinion why whites and blacks may not marry and
intermarry, why the Anglo-Saxon may not mix negro blood with
28
his blood."
On the lighter side, the Raleigh Post offered
this poetic gesture:
Booker Washington holds the boards The President dines a nigger.
Precedents are cast aside Put aside with vigor;
Black and white sit side by side,
As Roosevelt dines a nigger,
While general disapproval was voiced throughout the South,
some moderate opinions were expressed.

The Raleigh News and

Observer, calling the incident a radical departure from social
custom, nevertheless declared:

"A man's home is his castle,

whether it be a home in the White House or in a humble cabin.
He has the right to choose his guests, and to sit down at his
28
The most detailed account of Southern press reaction
to the dinner is Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., "Dinner at the White
House: Theodore Roosevelt, Booker T. Washington, and the South,"
Tennessee Historical Quarterly, XVII (June, 1958), 112-130.
^^Quoted in Mark Sullivan, Our Times, the United States
1900-1925, 6 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner*s Sons, 1926"),
III, p. 135.
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own table with whomsoever he pleases to invite to break bread
with,him."30

To a majority of Southerners, however, breaking

bread with a black man was stretching the metaphor a bit too
far.
Southern editors expounded upon the political implica
tions that were involved with the dinner, realizing that
Roosevelt had just handed them ammunition to combat any Repub
lican invasion of the South.

Josephus Daniels, editor of the

Raleigh News and Observer and later Woodrow Wilson's Secre
tary of the Navy, declared that the dinner "is not a prece
dent that will encourage Southern men to join hands with Mr.
Roosevelt" and the Memphis Scimitar stated that the President
had shattered "any expectation that may have arisen from his
announced intention to make the Republican party in the South
respectable.

He has closed the door to any accessions of

Southern white men to the Republican ranks,"
While the dinner episode was receiving harsh criticism
from the Southern press, it was being viewed favorably in the
North.

In fact the Southern reaction was the primary source

of concern to Northern editors.

The New York Press described

the outraged Southerners as the "arrogant old plantation strain,"
30^uoted in Literary Digest, XXIII (October 26, 1901),
pp. 486-487.
------31lbid.

30
The Boston Transcript stated that "the hysterical and horrorstriken Southern Shriekers" were the victums of "old ingrain
ed p r e j u d i c e . T h e Northern press was quick to point out
that Booker Washington had previously been entertained by
many dignitaries in Europe, including Queen Victoria at Wind
sor Castle, and that he was viewed as one of the most eloquent
men of his day.
Perhaps nowhere else was Roosevelt’s entertaining of
Booker Washington at the White House applauded so loudly as
in the black community.

The dinner incident served as a frag

ment of hope admidst the rising tide of disfranchisement and
discrimination at the turn of the century.

The Washington

Bee, one of the most prosperous Negro newspapers published
at the time of the dinner, best expressed the sentiments of
Black America*
The Southern Democrats hoped and expected to blarney
the President so as to continue unrestrained in their wick
ed reign of terror and proscription against the coloured
race. They are shocked, boiled, smitten, and exasperated.
In one fell swoop Mr. Roosevelt has smashed to smithereens
their fondest idol. They are fuming with dire imprecations
against him, and all because he took a meal of victuals
with a coloured gentleman who had been entertained by the
nobility of England, and the best people of America. 33
The Cleveland Gazette was another Negro publication that ex
pressed admiration for Roosevelt’s action and condemnation of
^^Ibid., p. 487.
33,Quoted in John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom*
A History of American Negroes (New York; Random House, Vintage
Books, 1947,
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Southern reaction but its editor, Harry C. Smith, was quite
skeptical to the effects it would have on Booker Washington,
According to Smith, the incident was "perfectly right and
proper," but he predicted that Roosevelt’s entertaining of
Washington would "eventually prove the latter's undoing" as
far as his educational work was concerned.

He felt that the

Southern white people, bound by prejudice, were "vindictive"
and would punish some one for the social distinction con
ferred upon Washington and the race by the President.
continued*

Smith

"Privately or rather sectionally, / “Southern

whites_/ will quietly work upon Washington and his great
school.

Some years will elapse before the effect will be

noticed in a general way.

This is to be regretted as much as

the president’s action in inviting the Afro-American to dine
and counsel with him is to be commended.
For the next few years every racial disturbance that
Occurred in the South was traced back to the Roosevelt-Washington dinner.

White Southerners deeply felt that the dinner

created restlessness and discontent among the Negro population,
Roosevelt’s attempt at "social qquality" became the sole rea
son why race riots broke out in Louisiana in 1901, why four
Negroes were burned at the stake in Statesboro, Georgia in
1 9 0 4 , and why a shortage of domestic servants persisted in the

3^Cleveland Gazette, October 26, 1 9 0 1 ,
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S o u t h . S o u t h e r n Democrats expressed opinions akin to Sena
tor Benjamin Tillman, when the South Carolinian asserted that
“entertaining that nigger will ... necessitate our killing a
thousand niggers in the South before they l e a m their place."
And young white Southerners were heard singing a new song;
Coon, coon, coon,
Booker Washington is his name;
Coon, coon, coon.
Ain't that a measly shame?
Coon, coon, coon.
Morning, night, and noon,
I think I'd class Mr. Roosevelt
With a coon, coon, coon.3?
Roosevelt was both surprised and chagrined by the hys
teria that persisted in the South.

"I suppose you have been

amused," Roosevelt wrote to Phillip Stewart, "at finding that
our innocent dinner to Booker T. Washington has not only be
come a national but an international affair."

The President

thought that it "seemed entirely obvious and natural" to show
^^Gatewood, Theodore Roosevelt and the Art of Controversy,
p. 3 6 .
^^Quoted in Eric P. Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny;
A History of M o d e m American Reform (New York; Random House,
V intage^Books, 193^»~T535TT~P» 137
37samuel R. Spencer, Jr., Booker T. Washington and the
Negro's Place in American Life (Bostoni^Little, Brown and Co.,

m5TTp7T35.
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the Negro educator "a little ordinary c o u r t e s y . B o o k e r
Washington represented, in the eyes of the President, the
type of black man who should

be afforded the same opportuniG

ties extended to white Americansr he was
est character and ability."

a man

of"the high

However, Booker Washington, in

the eyes of Southern whites,

was still a Negro

and therefore

should not be treated on the

same social scale

oroffered the

same opportunities as white Americans.

Roosevelt, lacking

insight into the problem, refused to acknowledge this primary
fact and laid the blame directly on the outraged Southerns
white population.

What is apparent is that Roosevelt failed

to see that his invitation to Washington was a deliberate
assault to their convictions.

He expressed his view on the

matter in a letter to his friend, Henry Cabot Lodge*
The Booker T. Washington incident was to me so much
a matter of course that I regarded its sole importance as
consisting in the view it gave one of the continued exis
tence of that combination of Bourbon intellect and intol
erant truculence of spirit, through much of the South,
which brought on the Civil War. If these creatures had
any sense they would understand that they can't bluff me.
my policy of appointing—
iti AC _
decent men to office in their localities.

^Theodore Roosevelt to Phillip B. Stewart, October 25t
1 9 0 1 , Letters, III, p. 182. A French paper exclaimed that the
affair produced a scandal "from one end of America to the other'
and a leading French journal, Journal des Debats headed their
leading editorial "line Tempete autour d^un Negre." See Mercer
Cook, "Booker T. Washington and the French," Journal of Negro
History, XL (October, 1955). 319-323.
^^Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, October 28, I 9 0 1 ,
Letters. Ill, pp. l84-l8j.
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Shortly after the initial reactions to the dinner,
slight alterations to the story appeared in print.

Northern

and Southern apologists for Roosevelt issued their own ver
sion of the dinner.

Their claim was that it was not a dinner

that the President invited Washington to but a luncheon.

The

story went that the President invited the Tuskegeean for a
conference and in the middle of their talk a servant walked
in with a lunch tray for Roosevelt.

Rather than interrupt

their conversation, the President ordered the servant to bring
a tray for Washington so they could continue their conference
through lunch.

This altered version gained wide acceptance

among Republicans in the South.

It seemed entirely plausible

for a busy President to impulsively invite the spokesman for
the black community to share lunch with him, especially when
no ladies were present.

The story also became popular because

Southerners often referred to the noon meal as either dinner
kQ
or lunch, and to the evening meal as supper.
Both Roosevelt and Washington avoided publishing their
account of the dinner.

It was not untiUWashinp:ton published----

his autobiographical tract, ^

Larger Education in 1911 that

the actual account became known.

However, the luncheon ver

sion had gained such wide acceptance by 1911 that Washington's
story had little effect as a corrective.
40Gatewood, pp. 32-61. Contemporary historians and pub
licists relied on the luncheon version in assessing the epi
sode, thus explaining the popularity it received during and
after Roosevelt's presidency.
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Contrary to Southern claims, there were precedents for
the White House dinner.

In 1900 at Albany, Governor and Mrs.

Roosevelt "ôordially greeted" a black delegate to the state
federation of women's clubs at a reception, after she had been
snubbed by her white fellow members,

Also while Governor,

Roosevelt invited William H. Lewis, a black lawyer and a
classmate of Roosevelt's at Harvard, to spend the night.

And

finally, Roosevelt had entertained Booker Washington earlier
at Oyster Bay.
In consequence of the dinner at the White House, both
Roosevelt and Washington received threats against their lives.
The drawer of Emmett Scott's desk was full of letters threat
ening the life of the Negro leader.

One incident occurred a

few weeks following Washington's return from the White House.
A black man, hired by a group of white men in Louisiana to
assassinate Washington, was hurt jumping off a train before
arriving at the Tuskegee station.

The town had no hospital

for Negroes so he was taken to the Institute hospital where
doctors and nurses proceeded to care for him.

Amazed by the

help he received, the man became ashamed of himself, refused
1^2
to carry out his commission, and confessed the whole plot.
Harlan, Booker T. Washington, p. 312; Henrÿ F, Pringle,
"Theodore Roosevelt and the Soutn,** Virginia Quarterly Review,
IX (January, 1933), 14-23.
h-2
Basil Mathews, Booker T, Washington; Educator and In
terracial Interpreter (Cambridgei Harvard University "Press,
T943T reprint ed.. College Park, Md.t McGrath Publishing Co.,
1948), pp. 233 -2 3 4 .
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The controversy over the Roosevelt-Washxngton dinner
and the hostile attitude of the South toward the President
persisted during the next three years.

The dinner was men

tioned in Southern opposition to the appointment of the Negro
doctor, William D. Crum, as Collector of Customs in Charleston,
South Carolina and to Roosevelt*s closing of the post office
in Indianola, Mississippi in 1903» when white citizens intimi
dated the Negro postmistress, Mrs, Minnie Cox,

In 190% two

peddlers from Chicago were arrested in Indianola for distribu
ting "obscene photographs" among the Negro population of the
town..

The "photographs" were pictures of Roosevelt and Wash

ington dining together, surrounded by banners proclaiming
EQUALITY.

The Maryland political campaign of 1903 witnessed

the reiteration of the dinner when Democrats issued campaign
buttons showing Roosevelt and Washington sitting together at
dinner.

Advocates of Negro disfranchisement used the dinner

as part of their campaign and James K. Vardaman of Mississippi
referred to the incident on several occasions between 1901
and 1 9 0 9 .*^
%3

Gatewood, p. %3- Another incident that related to the
dinner occurred in 190%. Lew Dockstadter, a minstrel known for
his political monologues, filmed a short skit in front of the
Capitol steps that comprised of a *take off" on Roosevelt*s re
lationship with Booker Washington, Dockstadter, famous for his
portrayal of blackface, dressed as the Negro leader and stagger
ed, as if drunk or ill, along the walkway. A fancy carriage,
drawn by spirited horses and outfitted with a coachman and foot
man in White livery including red, white and blue cockades, stop
ped alongside the black man. The man inside, dressed as Roose
velt in frock coat and silk hat, proceeded to lend assistance.
The black man was helped into the carriage, given a cigar, and
the carriage rode away with the two men embracing affectionately.
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What Theodore Roosevelt hoped to do in the South when
he became President in 19 OI appeared to be shattered with one
move.

Hoping to establish a real Republican Party in the South,

he failed to realize that the racial passions of white Southern
ers, aggravated by Reconstruction, had not subsided.
was not disliked in the South,

Roosevelt

Prior to his administration.

Southerners were too firmly committed to the Democratic Party
and too suspicious of Republicans to even pay close attention
to Republican presidents.
ent.

However, Roosevelt seamed differ

His dynamic character and tremendous vigor was admired

throughout Dixie,

His charge up San Juan Hill reminded the

South of the gallantry shown by Confederate officers in the
Civil War.

Perhaps most significant, Theodore Roosevelt could

boast proudly of his southern heritage.

He pleased the South

further when he announced his intentions of appointing the
best qualified men to federal positions, including Gold Demo
crats, and initiating this policy with the appointment of
Judge Thomas Jones in Alabama.

But when he proceeded to in

vite a Negro to dinner at the White House, he had made his
first serious blunder.
The skit quickly assumed "sinister political overtones" and
rumors spread that the Democratic party had paid Dockstadter
four million dollars for the use of the film in the 1904 Presi
dential campaign. Soon Dockstadter became the subject of in
vestigation by the Secret Service and several city police de
partments. The minstrel's film was confiscated and destroyed
with the approval of President Roosevelt. See Willard B. Gate
wood, "Theodore Roosevelt and the 'Kinetoscope Fakes': An In
cident in the Campaign of 1904," Mid-America, XLIX (July,

1967), 190- 199.
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Roosevelt received greater condemnation for the incident
than Booker Washington.

Several years following the dinner

Washington gave an illustration of the contempt that Southerners held for the President,

Writing in 1911, the Negro edu

cator told about a trip he made through Florida some weeks
after his dinner at the White House.

With news that Washing

ton was aboard the train, a group of people gathered at the
Gainsville station to greet him.

Among the group was a white

man, whose dress and manner seemed to reveal him to be a small
farmer.

The man entered the train and cordially shook hands

with Washington.

'*! am mightly glad to see you," the farmer

confessed to the Tuskegeean.

"I have heard about you and I

have been wanting to meet you for a long while."

Washington

was pleased at the man's remarks and the farmer continued to
compliment hims

"Say, you are a great man.

est man in this country!"
but the farmer insisted:
country."

You are the great

The Negro leader mildly protested
"^es, sir, the greatest man in this

Washington told the man that he felt President Roose

velt was ÿhe greatest man in the country and the farmer re
plied:

"Huh!

Roosevelt?

I used to think that Roosevelt was

a great man until he ate dinner with you.

That settled him

for me."
Washington's popularity in the South did decline, however.
The Southern press continued to attack him, not because of his
work at Tuskegee, but because he had the insolence to sit down
^^Washington, "My Larger Education," pp. 446-44?.

and eat a meal in the White House.
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Southerners also attacked

him because he was suddenly the chief "referee for patronage"
in the South for President Roosevelt.
Roosevelt never realized why the South held such con
tempt toward him.

On one occasion he wrotei

"I really felt

melancholy for the South at the way the Southerners behaved
in the matter."

Despite his conviction toward the incident,

Roosevelt never asked Booker T. Washington to dinner again
and he later confessed his uncertainty over the matter.
The President's difficulties with the South did not
cease with the White House dinner.

In December, 1902, he

appointed the Negro doctor, William D. Crum, as Collector of
Customs for the Port of Charleston, South Carolina and in
January, 1903 he closed the Indianola, Mississippi Post Office
when white citizens of the town forced the Negro postmistress
to resign.

Both incidents brought further criticism from

the South and moved Roosevelt closer to the realization that
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"the Negro Proble# always ye have with you,"
^•^Theodore Roosevelt to Lucius Nathan Littauer, October 24,
1901, Letters, III, p. 181.
^^Roosevelt to Owen Wister, April 27» 1906, Ibid., V.,
p. 227.
^^Paul H. Buck, The Road to Reunion, 1865-1900 (Boston;
Little, Brown and Co., 1937)» p. 2ÏÏJI

CHAPTER III
THE INDIANOLA POST OFFICE AFFAIR*
DEFENSE OF THE NEGRO AND THE LAW
While the South yisls responding hysterically to his en
tertaining of Booker T, Washington at the White House, Theo
dore Roosevelt was acting upon the policy that he and the
Negro educator had agreed to* appointing men of character and
fitness to office in the South.

The appointments would go to

Democrats where Republicans could not be found, and to a few
upright colored men and women of "property and character"
who had the stamped approval of Washington.
In regards to Negro appointments, Roosevelt was deter
mined to remove those black officeholders who were commonly
associated with the old Reconstruction regimes and those who
were connected with the machine of Mark Hanna and working for
the Senator's nomination in 1904.

On the recommendation of

Washington, the President appointed a majority of Gold Demo
crats and ex-Confederate soldiers to Southern patronage posi
tions.

This delighted the South and caused prominent citizens

to apply for various offices.

To Southern whites, the,Presi

dent's appointment policy indicated a chance of removing ail
Negroes from political office in the South,

However, Roose

velt was not considering this for he was aware that slighting
the black community would result in the loss of support in
40
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the North as well as in the South.
Roosevelt made two appointments of Negroes in the South
that became the source of conflict between the President and
white Southerners.

In South Carolina he appointed William

Crum, and in Mississippi he reappointed Mrs. Minnie M. Cox to
the Post Office in Indianola.

Both appointments, occurring

simultaneously, provoked a wave of protest and became contro
versial issues during the President's first administration.
In Mississippi, Roosevelt found the Republican organi
zation "utterly rotten" and thought that it was impossible
to rejuvenate the party with the existing leadership,^

On

the recommendation of Booker T. Washington, he selected Edgar
S. Wilson as United States Marshal for the Southern District
of Mississippi in Januairy, 1902.

Wilson was an able journal

ist, editing several newspapers and serving for twelve years
as Mississippi correspondent of the New Orleans Daily Pica
yune.

He was a Democrat but in 1896 refused to support Wil

liam Jennings Bryan for President emd turned to the PalmerBuckner ticket, joining the ranks of Gold Democrats.

He was

the bother-in-law of Mississippi Governor Andrew H. Longino,
2
assisting him to that position in 1899.
^Theodore Roosevelt to Carl Schurz, December 24, 1903»
Elting E. Morison, ed.. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt,
8 vols. (Cambridge* Harvard University fress, 19^2), ill,p. 68l
^Roosevelt to Edgar S. Wilson, January 4, 1902, Letters,
III, p. 2l6ï The New York Times, January 10, 1902; Willard B.
Gatewood, Theodore Roosevelt and the Art of Controversy (Baton
Rouge* Louisiana”State University Press, 1970}, p. 66.
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Roosevelt was enthused over Washington's recommendation
of Wilson.

He had been informed that both Wilson and Governor

Longino were men "who had endeavored to put a stop to lynch
ing and to a division of the educational fund" in Mississippi.
To the Presidents Wilson was the man he "could trust to recom
mend ... good people for the offices" in that state.^

Wash

ington reassured Roosevelt* "Mr. Wilson is not only keeping
in mind the putting of first class men in office but also ...
the bringing about of such conditions as will not injure the
party and the support which you should have from Mississippi.
The more I see of him the more I am convinced of his wisdom
4
and unselfishness and his great power for good,"
Both the North and the South praised the selection of
Wilson as "patronage referee" in Mississippi.

It was viewed

in the North as an indication that Roosevelt was not about to
appoint unfit Republican officeholders.

In the South, the

appointment signified that the President was keeping his word
in appointing Gold Democrats to office.

To the black communi

ty, however, the appointment of Wilson was looked upon as an
effort to formulate a lily-white Republican party in the South.
The Boston Guardian declared* "The scheme to give the federal
offices in the South to white Democrats rather than to color
ed Republicans on the part of a Republican administration and
^Roosevelt to John Graham Brooks, November 13, 1908,
Letters, VI, p. 1346.
^Booker T. Washington to Roosevelt, December 24, 1901,
quoted in Gatewood, p. 6 7 .
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to thus build up a white man's party there is a policy which
meets the opposition of the entire Negro race.”^

The Cleve

land Gazette asserted* *‘In carrying out that new southern
policy b o m under the McKinley administration. President
Roosevelt seems to *Out-Herod Herod."

In vainly trying to

build up a Republican party in the south he is slowly but
surely disrupting the portion of the party that is the back
bone of northern republicanism - namely, its Afro-American
contingent,
In Mississippi, the most outspoken black man against
the appointment of Wilson was James Hill.

Hill was the most

prominent Negro Republican in the state and for years had held
various offices.

Roosevelt failed to reappoint him to any

office and his duties in the state were handed over to Wil
son.

Angered at this move. Hill attempted but failed to block

Wilson’s confirmation in the Senate and then launched an antiRoosevelt movement among Mississippi Republicans "in the hope
of securing a delegation to the national convention in 1904
which would oppose the President's nomination,"^
The appointment of Wilson, together with the removal of
Hill, led many Mississippi whites to the conclusion that Roose
velt would eliminate all Negroes from office in their state
and consider prominent white citizens to replace them.

This

^Boston Guardian, July 26, 1902.
^Cleveland Gazette, February 1, 1902.
^Cleveland Gazette, February 15» 1902; Gatewood, p. 68.
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conclusion resulted in an affair that became one more issue
of controversy in the Roosevelt administration.

In the town

of Indianola* white citizens erroneously concluded that the
time had arrived to replace the Negro postmistress with a
white citizen.

However, Roosevelt had purposely reappointed

the woman because she was a person of “property and outstand
ing character" and he was determined to keep her in office,
despite the hostile reaction he was to receive from the South,
Mrs. Minnie M. Cox, a quiet and sophisticated Negro
woman, had held the postmastership in Indianola for several
years.

She was first appointed by Benjamin Harrison when no

white Republican in the area qualified for the office.

Fol

lowing the Democratic administration of Grover Cleveland, she
was again appointed by McKinley in I897 and on January 25»
1900 the office was raised from fourth-class to third-class

status, elevating it to a presidential office.

In 19 OO Mrs.

Cox began a four-year term under a commission signed by McKinley.

8

The postmistress and her husband, Wayne W. Cox, a pos

tal employee in the railway mail service, were among the most
prominent citizens in Indianola.

Both attended college, Mrs.

Cox receiving a teacher's certificate from Fisk University
and her husband graduating from A l c o m University.

Their ed

ucational qualifications and their allegiance to the Republi
can party was manifest in their positions in government ser^Gharles Fitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, December 11, 1902,
in "Resignation of the Postmaster at Indianola, Miss*.',House Doc
uments , 57 Gong., 2d sess. Doc. no. 422, vol. 92, ser. no. 433T,
p. 21 (hereafter cited as "Resignation of the Postmaster").
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vice.

Mrs. Cox was one of only five Negroes who had held a

presidential third-class office.^
The white citizens of Indianola had gained the impres
sion that in the dispensation of federal patronage certain
Democrats would be recognized where suitable Republicans could
not be found» a direct result of Roosevelt's Southern policy
in Mississippi.

Their eyes now focused upon the post office

and Mrs, Minnie Cox.

Relations between the postmistress and

her white patrons had been quite good for the past ten years
but suddenly the community discovered they had an "obnoxious
nigger postmaster."

Those individuals who desired the office

for themselves or for relatives started to raise the question
of "nigger domination" In the hope of causing a vacancy in the
post office.

Mrs. Cox's presence was now a "menace to white

civilization."^^
The manner in which Mrs. Cox conducted her office, prior
to the deterioration of relations with the citizens of Indian
ola, was praised by her patrons and postal officials.

Charles

Fitzgerald, Post Office Inspector for the area and a native of
Mississippi, made several visits to Indianola and reported that
the office was "excellently conducted" and that Mrs. Cox was
"couteous and efficient and render/"ed_% the patrons a satis
factory service."

He noted that the postmistress even extended

9"The Indianola Case," Outlook LXXIII (January 24, 1903),
p. 188; Gatewood, p. 64.
^^Fitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, December 11, 1902, in
"Resignation of the Postmaster," p. 21.
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her services to include assuming the responsibility of cover
ing delinquent rent payments with her own funds "in order to
avoid friction with her white patrons.
In the spring of 1902 several prominent citizens of
Indianola submitted applications to Postmaster-General Henry
C. Payne and President Roosevelt for consideration in the
Indianola postmastership.

The most persistent candidate for

the position was A,B. Weeks, the brother-in-law of Indianola
mayor, J.L. Davis.

Weeks stated that because he was finan

cially hurting, that he was white, and that he shifted his
allegiance to the Republican party in I8 9 6 , he should be ap
pointed postmaster.

He declared that Mrs. Cox should be re

placed because it was unfair "that one family should have
/~two federal_y offices, especially

when theyJ7 are wealthy.

Weeks continued submitting letters to the President and the
Post Office Department, assuring them that the people of In
dianola no longer wished the services of the Negro postmistress
and were determined "to make ^ h e r _ y resign or give up the
office in some way."

He concluded* "They only do this because

she is colored." •
llpitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, December 15# 1902, in
"Resignation of the Postmaster," p. 22.
^^A.B. Weeks to Theodore Roosevelt, April 7» 1902, Ibid.,
p. 8.
^^A.B. Weeks to J.L. Bristow, September 19# 1902, Ibid.,
p. 10.
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Late in September, 1902 the white citizens of Indianola
became alarmed over another incident involving racial matters.
It seemed that a Negro porter of Cohn’s Brooklyn Bridge Store
named Burnet was alleged to have shown “misconduct** toward a
young lady, also employed in the store.

Burnet had proved

himself very useful as a salesman in the store, selling goods
to Negro customers.

For this he was permitted to act as clerk,

which brought him in close contact with the young lady.

He

became “unduly inflated with his own importance“ and became
“habitually discourteous“ toward her.

She advised her friends

of the man’s behavior and the word spread throughout the town.
This inflamed the white citizens against the Negro to such an
extent that a public meeting was called to take action.

When

the meeting ended, the townspeople voted to banish the porter
immediately and to also notify Dr. J.G. Fulton, a Negro physi
cian, that he had until January 1, I903 to leave town.^"*^

Ful

ton had recently set up practice in Indianola to treat Negro
patients.

By doing so he had taken those patients away from

several white doctors of the community.

It was evident that

Pulton, like the Coxes, had become “too prosperous“ and there
fore had to leave town,^^
l^Charles Fitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, December 15»
1 9 0 2 , in “Resignation of the Postmaster,“ p. 22.
^%heodore Roosevelt to John Graham Brooks, November 1 3 ,
19 O 8 , Letters, VI, p. 134?; Gatewood, pp. 71-72.
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The Negro porter Burnet left Indianola immediately and
Fulton* as mentioned* was given until January 1 to arrange his
business interests.

A second public meeting was called in op

position to the order given to Dr, Pulton.

A vote was taken

and it was decided, 45 to 37» that Fulton should remain, if
he so desired.

Believing that an outraged minority could

easily become very threatening. Pulton decided that it would
be in his best interest to leave Indianola,

At the meeting,

attention was called to the fact that a Negro was postmaster
and it was stated that "this condition should not be longer
tolerated."
once.

It was moved that she be ordered to resign at

By expression of a majority, Mrs. Minnie Cox was order

ed ^o vacate her office by January 1, 1903.^^
Wayne Cox, husband of the postmistress, immediately
wrote Post Office Inspector, Charles Fitzgerald, requesting
"a talk about the 'Indianola Affair.*"

Cox believed that he

could handle the situation by attempting to work out some
arrangement so that his wife would retain her post until the
expiration of her commission in 1904.

Writing to Fitzgerald,

he stated I "I thought at first, after the 'heat* I could man17

age the affair, but now I am afraid not." ' Fitzgerald wrote
Mayor Davis of Indianola, asking whether there was any truth
l^Fitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, December 15, 1902, in
"Resignation of the Postmaster," pp. 22-23.
^^Wayne W, Cox to Charles Fitzgerald, November 18, 1902,
Ibid.. p. 19.
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to the story that "certain citizens ... have banded together
and intimidated Minnie M. Cox ... to agree to tender her re
signation. "

The Mayor replied that he had no knowledge of

any "parties, citizens or others" who have "intimidated Mrs.
Cox into tendering her resignation."

However, he was inform

ed that a sentiment existed in the community that a change
should be made in the post office management and when Mrs,
Cox was informed through her husband, she offered to vacate
her position.

The Mayor concluded*

Considering the fact that fully five-sixths of the
mail handled by the post-office at this place is sent and
received by the white patrons of the office, it strikes
me that the people have acted in a very exemplary manner
to this time, and considering the further fact that she
has acted as postmistress for years, and that she as post
mistress, and her husband as mail clerk, have made money
and are now in easy circumstances, and that she finds the
people and patrons generally desire a change in the admini
stration, it seems to me that it is the part of wisdom on
her part and the best way out of an unpleasaht outcome of
the matter for her to resign, as it seems she has agreed
to do,18
Following the receipt of Mayor Davis* letter, Fitzgerald
travelled to Indianola to investigate the matter.

Both the

Mayor and the Sheriff of Indianola reassured the Inspector
that "the people would prefer to see the office discontinued
before submitting to a negro postmaster any longer."

And if

Mrs. Cox persisted in retaining the office, they "could not
i8
Fitzgerald to J.L. Davis, November 23, 1902t Davis to
Fitzgerald, November 29, 1902, Ibid,, pp. 19-20.
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guarantee her protection from v i o l e n c e . F i t z g e r a l d con
cluded that the Indianola assembly was actually a mob gather
ed together for an unlawful purpose.

He reported that the

meeting was not a mob in the sense that it was composed of
"the riffraff of the community," it was "'the mob of gentle20
men,* but a mob nevertheless."
On December 9» 1902, Mrs. Minnie Cox wrote Fitzgerald
stating that "if I don't resign, there will be trouble and
cause the town to lose post-office facilities."

"This is my

home, and I feel a deep interest in the town and its people.
Under the circumstances in a few days I will tender my resig
nation."

Two days later Fitzgerald received another message

from Wayne Cox, expressing agreement with his wife's decision,
but requesting the Inspector "to frame

his y report so;that

those that /~have_7 caused this unpleasantness will not pro
fit by it."21
Fitzgerald called upon B.C. Humphreys, the district at
torney and Congressman-elect from the Indianola area, hoping
to reach a settlement of the troubles of the post office.
l^Fitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, December 15» 1902», Ibid.,
p. 24.

ZOlbid.
^%innie M. Cox to Fitzgerald, December 9» 1902; Wayne
W. Cox to Fitzgerald, December 11, 1902, Ibid., pp. 20, 25.
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Humphreys conferred with several citizens of the town and re
ported back to Fitzgerald.

He found that "the race prejudice

,.. is running too high just now in Indianola to be checked or
curbed by a simple resort to reason."

The district attorney

feared that the authorities in Washington would resort to
abolishing the post office, thereby punishing "many good peo
ple for an offense which they have not committed."

Indianola

was the county seat of Sunflower County, Mississippi, with
some 1200 to 1500 inhabitants,

"It is a very serious matter

to deprive a community as large as Indianola of postal facilities," asserted Humphreys.

22

Whatever pressures were applied by Humphreys, Fitzgerald,
or Edgar Wilson, they were to no avail.

The white citizens

of Indianola were determined to have Mrs. Cox removed as post
mistress and replaced by a "respectable" white member of the
community.

The Post Office Department continued to receive

letters from A.B. Weeks and other citizens of the town, re
questing to be considered for the position.

On December 4-,

Mrs. Minnie Cox submitted her resignation to President Roose
velt, to be tendered on January 1, 1903 or "as soon thereafter
as my successor can be appointed and qualified.

Fitzgerald

ZZp.G. Humphreys to Fitzgerald, December 22, 1902, Ibid.,
pp. 26-27.
^^Minnie M. Cox to Theodore Roosevelt, December 4, 1902,
Ibid., p. 20.
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followed Mrs. Cox's resignation with his own decision on the
Xdianola affairt
It is certain if the Department yields in this case
it will be the beginning of interminable trouble, for it
will encourage outbreaks of this kind in the comparative
ly few communities in this State where we have negro post
masters ....
We have before us the unpleasant spectacle of the
Constitution and laws of the United States being trampled
under foot by a community, and to meet the exigencies of
the case is quite a problem because of its peculiarity.
I would, in the interest of a peaceful solution of
this question, and at the same time a dignified mainten
ance of the laws and authority of the United States and
the Post-Office Department, recommend that the resignation
of the postmaster at Indianola, Miss., tendered under
duress, be accepted January 1, 1903,
and discontin
uance of the post-office at Indianola, Sunflower County,
Miss.24
Fitzgerald's report was forwarded to Postmaster-General
Henry C. Payne and referred to the President.

Roosevelt and

Payne conferred on what course to take in the Indianola affair.
It was, indeed, a unique circumstance facing the President.
His appointment policy in the South was primarily aimed at
receiving delegate support in 1904.

However, the affair raised

the question of individual rights as well as the authority of
the Federal government.

Indianola presented an opportunity

to test whether a community could force out an officeholder
appointed by the Executive and also whether the Federal Govern
ment was powerless to interfere in the race problem.

Roosevelt

refused to accept Mrs. Cox's resignation and followed Fitz^^Fitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, December 15, 1902, Ibid,,
p. 25.
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gerald’s recommendation by closing the Indianola Post Office
on January 2, 1903.

The President specified that the office

was suspendedr not abolished, since it was situated in a
county seat of government and thereby entitled to postal facil
ities.

The post office would still exist and the postmistress,

Mrs. Cox, would continue to draw her salary and whenever she
could resume her duties, postal service would then be restored.
All mail that was destined for Indianola would be routed to
Greenville, located thirty miles from town.^^
The citizens of Indianola were disturbed over the clos
ing of the post office but were convinced that their represen
tatives in Congress, Senators Anselm J. McLaurin and Harando
D. Money, would have postal service quickly restored.

If not,

they were willing to allow the post office **to remain closed
until doomsday” just as long as they were rid of the Negro
postmistress.

Inspector Fitzgerald was sent to Indianola

to "protect the Government property and funds" that were at
the office.

When he arrived he found "the populace deeply

stirred, yet on the surface everything was quiet and orderly."^7
^ ^ h e New York Times, January 3, 1903î Henry C. Payne
to J, Holmes Badcer, W.B, Martin, and A.B. Smith, January 2,
1903 , in "Resignation of the Postmaster," p. 31; Gatewood,
p. 77.
^^Indianola Enterprise, January 1 6 , 3 0 , 1903, quoted in
Gatewood, p. 77,
^^charles Fitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, January 6 , 1903,
in "Resignation of the Postmaster," p. 27.

5^
The atmosphere was still too menacing for Minnie Cox and on
January 5 she left Indianola to stay with friends in Birming
ham.

It was reported by a post office official that he over

heard a man from the town state that "if that woman should go
back and take charge of the post-office she would get her neck
pO
broken inside of two hours."
As would be expected, there was a mixed reaction in the
press to Roosevelt's closing of the post office in Indianola.
The moderate New York Tiroes chastized the President for lack
ing the knowledge that he "cannot lawfully punish an entire
community for the offenses of some of its members."

Insinu

ating that his action was part of his political strategy to
secure his nomination in 1904, the Tiroes asserted that the
incident "was certainly an act of gross injustice ,.. and was
not the statutory procedure indicated in such cases and we
cannot resist the conviction that it was a highly impolitic
act."^9

In the South, the incident sparked an outburst against

the President comparable to that which followed his famous din
ner with Booker T. Washington in 1901.

In the eyes of white

Southerners, Roosevelt was a "cynical Negrophile whose theories
of social and political equality were responsible for a long
Z&Pitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, January 8 , 1903; Letter
of an unidentified post office official, February 23, 1903,
Ibid.. pp. 30, 33.
OQ
The New York Times, January 6 , 1903.

55
list of problems ranging from the outbreak of Negro outrages
to the servant problem in the South."

The Louisville Courier-

Journal claimed that the method used by the citizens of Indian
ola to oust Minnie Cox from the post office was "merely a re
sponse to t^e extremism of the President" regarding the race
question.

The Savannah Morning News declaredi "To make a per

son postmaster who is objectionable to the community is not
in keeping with republican institutions» ... the rule of the
majority»

... the principles of local self-government.

One Southerner charged the President with "stirring up a fren
zy of race feeling such as the South had not exhibited since
Reconstruction" and another claimed the closing of the post
office as being the next logical step in Roosevelt’s treatment
of the South.

Finally» Harper’s Weekly expressed hope that
31
Mr. Roosevelt "will recall the order."
The President did receive support for his action in sev
eral Northern journals such as the New York Tribune and the
Washington Evening Star, both commending the government’s ac
tion in attempting to forestall any further attempt at "law
lessness,"

The Nation exclaimed that Roosevelt "rings true

^^•Southem Press on the Indianola Incident," Literary
Digest, XXVI (January, 1903), 71-72; Gatewood, p. 82.
^^William Garrott Brown, "President Roosebelt and the
South," Independent, LIX (November 9» 1905), 1086-1089; The
New York Times, January 7, 1903; Harper’s Weekly, XLVÎ (Jan
uary 17, 1903 ), 87.

56
again in the matter of the post office....
The rowdy white element in the community, whose AngloSaxon chivalry towards / “Mrs. Cox*s^7 sex is reserved
for white women exclusively, has tried to drive her out
of office simply because of her color. The prosecution
of the offenders belongs ... to the community, and the
President's action is a proper bringing to bear of pres
sure to that end. Southern regeneration from lynching
must come from the South itself; but the Federal Govern
ment should not withold its moral influence when its own
offices are threatened."3^
The Outlook stated that the attack on Mrs. Cox “had its ori
gin in a political cabal“ because the President was naming
Democrats to office in the South.

Agreeing that the Govern

ment was bound to protect its officers, its editor, Lyman
Abbott, concluded that the Post Office Department had not de
prived the citizens of Indianola the facilities of the United
States mail, “... it appears that the citizens are simply de33
priving themselves of these benefits,*
The New York Evening
Post viewed the President's action as “simply an act of jus-tice ,.. but for it he deserves great commendation,* and the
Buffalo Express predicted that Roosevelt's course “will be
approved by all who believe in law and order."
32%he Nation, LXXVI (January 8 , 1903), 21.
33"The Indianola Case," Outlook, LXXIII (January 24,
1903), 188-189.
^^The New York Evening Post and Buffalo Express quoted
in the Cleveland Gazette, January 24, 1 903 .
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The Negro press hailed Roosevelt for his defense of the
Negro postmistress*

At first skeptical of his appointment

policy in the South* the black community commended the Presi
dent for closing the office and for appointing William Crum
to the Charleston collectorship.

Both events helped to rein

force the faith they held in the President since his dinner
with Booker T. Washington.

The Boston Guardian stated that

the President, "like Lincoln is taking the right step at the
right time."

His action in the case of Mrs. Cox and his at

titude toward Dr. Crum "are eminently satisfactory to colored
Americans.

All fair-minded citizens must uphold the president

in these cases." ^

Perhaps Harry G. Smith of the Cleveland

Gazette best expressed the attitude of the Negro communityt
The Roosevelt policy ... is the only correct one un
der the law* is fair and honorable, and while we do not
always agree with the president in all things he does that
affect our people* we cannot but honor and give him full
credit for the stand he has taken in the Crum and Cox mat
ters, as well as for the principle and policy enunciated
as a result of the same. The prejudiced southern jackass
can bray to its heart's content, but it will be in vain*
because there is at last a man in the White House as presi
dent who has the courage of his convictions, right or
wrong.36
In Washington, Senator McLaurin came to the defense of
the citizens of Indianola.

His initial concern was over the

^ % h e Boston Guardian, January 10, 1903.
^^The Cleveland Gazette, January 10, 1903*
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distance that members of the community had to travel to receive
their mail.

With the mail being sent to Greenville, the peo

ple of Indianola had journey thirty miles.

The Senator wrote

a letter to Postmaster-General Payne requesting that the mail
be sent to Heathman, a town only four miles away from Indianola.
More convenient for the citizens, it would also be at no ex
tra expense to the Government.

McLaurin notified Payne that

the people of Indianola had employed a person to carry their
mail to Heathman and had directed their correspondents to ad
dress them at Heathman.

"While I have not express authority

to do so," wrote McLaurin, "I take the liberty in behalf of
the people of Indianola to propose that whatever extra expense
the Government incurs ... /~it__7 will be paid by the people of
37
Indianola." ' Payne replied to McLaurin that it was impossi
ble to have the mail sent to Heathman because the post office
was only a fourth-class office and was "not in any manner equip
ped for handling mail to the amount which would be received"
from Indianola.^®

Having failed to change the office, McLaurin

conferred regularly with Payne and Roosevelt in an effort to
have the Indianola post Office reopened with a white postmaster
in charge.

The President was persistent in keeping the office

closed until the citizens allowed Mrs. Cox to assume her duties.
^^Anselm J. McLaurin to Henry C, Payne, January l6 , 1903,
in "Resignation of the Postmaster," p. 32,
Henry C. Payne to Anselm J. McLaurin, January 21, 1903,
Ibid.
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Failing to win any concessions from Roosevelt, the Senator
took his fight to Congress,
On January 15# 1903 McLaurin rose in the Senate and stated
that "the white people of Mississippi don't want negro post
masters appointed to give them out their mail,"

Rejecting

the notion that Mrs. Cox had been forced to resign or that any
threats had been made against her, the Senator referred to the
President's public explanation of the affair as "a slur upon
the high-toned, chivalrous, industrious ,,, and law-abiding
people" of Indianola,

The President was not without his sup

porters and Senator John C. Spooner of Wisconsin took to his
defense,

"It is as idle as the wind," Spooner declared, "to

cavil upon the proposition that this was not a forced resig
nation,

It is altogether evasive to dwell upon the 'polite

ness' of the request for /~Mrs, Cox's_/ resignation.

It was

the power behind it which constituted the duress; it was the
fact that that power was executed by white citizens of that
county, and that this person against whom it was directed was
colored."

Spooner referred to the white citizens who forced

Mrs, Cox to resign as a "brutal and lawless element" of that
community.

To the Senator, the President had acted on the

principle that the Federal Government must exercise its con
stitutional authority and administer its affairs "without ob
struction and without local duress applied to its officials.
^^Congressional Record. 57 Cong., 2d sess,, pp. 853-854,
1174-1183; The New York Times, January 25» 1903; Gatewood, pp.
79-80.
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The debate continued in Congress over the Indianola af
fair.

Strong opponents of the President, such as Senators

John Bankhead of Alabama, Edward Carmack of Tennessee, and
Benjamin Tillman of South Carolina, were calling Roosevelt’s
closing of the post office a "tyrannical and unconstitutional
act.**

Senator Bankhead condemned the President’s action as

being disgusting and amounting to anti-"lily white** conduct.
Senator Tillman asserted that the appointment of a Negro to
even a minor post vfâ.s "the match which has touched off an
electrical line of thought, reaching to the remotest bonds of
this country."

Whenever the Southern people were against an

issue, their protests ware treated, according to Tillman, with
"contumely and contempt" by the P r e s i d e n t . I n the House of
Representatives, Congressman Edgar D. Crumpaker of Indiana
introduced a resolution to investigate the entire Indianola
affair and Postmaster-General Payne sutmitted all relating
hi
documents to Congress,
The Indianola incident became an important issue in
Mississippi politics.

In the elections of 1903, Governor

Longino was running for the Senate and his opponent was the
incumbent. Senator Money.

Due to illness. Money was absent

during the debate in the Senate over Indianola.

Upon his re-

Congressional Record, 57 Cong., 2d sess., pp. 25112 5 6 0 Î Francis B. Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillingi South Carollnian (Baton Rouge* Louisiana Sia'Ee University Press, Ï 9 W ) ,
p. 416 .
^^The New York Times, January 20, 1903 .

61
turn in March, he delivered a speech in the defense of the
citizens of Indianola.

He effectively mixed his defense with

lengthy segments on the general inferiority of the Negro smd
the implications of the Washington-Roosevelt dinner.

Ilp

His

opponent. Governor Longino, became the victim of the communi
ty’s outrage over the incident.

He was accused of appointing

Negroes to office and was the subject of a circular, distri
buted throughout the town, charging him of having "Negro
blood" in his veins,

Longino refused to admit that the racial

question was an issue in the campaign, declaring that he would
not appeal to race prejudice to obtain office,
The most outraged and antagonized citizen of Mississippi
over the closing of the post office in Indianola was James K.
Vardaman,

The cousin of Senator Money and the editor of ths

Greenwood (Miss.) Commonwealth, Vardaman was an ardent champi
on of white supremacy.

He had previously run twice for gov

ernor, defeated in 1895 by McLaurin and in 1899 by Longino,
Nevertheless, he was determined to succeed in 1903 and the
Indianola crisis provided him with an ample theme to appeal
to the racist convictions of the white population of Mississippi,
In the autumn of 1902 Vardaman delivered several speeches in
Indiahola where he "chided the people for tolerating a negro
k2

Congressional Record, $8 Cong,, 1st sess., pp. 123-133;
Gatewood, p7 8 3 .
^^Albert D. Kirwan, Revolt of the Rednecks t Mississippi
Politics, 1876-1923 (Gloucester, Mass.* Peter Smith, 1964),
î>p. 1 3 ^ - 1 5 ^

62
wench as postmaster" and expressing his view that her presence
was because of Roosevelt's "referee system."

In an editor

ial in the Commonwealth, Vardaman lashed out at the Presidenti
It is said that men follow the bent of their genius and
that prenatal influences are often potent in shaping
thoughts and ideas of after life. Probably old lady
Roosevelt, during the period of gestation, was frighten
ed by a dog and that fact may account for the qualities
of the male pup which are so prominent in Teddy ,,,, I
am disposed to apologize to the dog for mentioning it.^5
In 1902 the passage of the primary law, where the selec
tion of a party's nominee was made by the voters rather than
by convention delegates, aided Vardaman's campaign.

A candi

date's personality and oratory were now essential to capture
the nomination and these two factors were deeply imbedded in
the editor from Greenwood.

By exploiting the Indianola affair

and appealing to anti-Negro sentiments among white Mississippians, Vardaman, along with Senator Money, was elected in

1903.4*
Despite the existence of such demagoguery and negrophobia, Roosevelt never entertained the thought of retreating from
^Gatewood, p. 71.
4-^Kirwan, Revolt of the Rednecks, p. 153.
^*Ibid., p. 1 32 , Also see Clara Lopez, "James K. Varda
man and lEHe Negro; The Foundation of Mississippi's Racial Pol
icy," Southern Quaterly, III (1 965 )» 168 -1 7 1 .
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his original position.

He closed the post office not for the

Negro vote, for this was not an issue involving race.

The

citizens of Indianola had denied the authority of the Federal
Government and must be reprimanded for such defiance.

Writing

to Clark Howell, editor of the Atlanta Constitution, Roosevelt
stated that "to connect either

... appointments /~in the South_/

... or ray actions in

upholding the law at Indianola, with such

questions as 'social

equality*and 'negro domination* is as

absurd as to connect

them with the nebular hypothesis or the

L'y

theory of atoms."

In another correspondence, Roosevelt clus

tered labor strife, the Northern Securities case, and Indianola
as being "three facets of the same crystal."

"The sick Wall

Street man ... the labor leader ,., and the white man who at
tempts to act outside the law against a colored man must all
three be made to understand that the law applies to them as
well as their fellows," asserted the President,
Roosevelt was following precedent in his ordering the
Indianola post office closed.

In fact, Edgar Wilson reminded

Postmaster-General Payne that similar incidents had occurred.
President McKinley had closed an office in Pickens, Mississip
pi, because of the refusal of the people to accept a colored
postmaster, and it remained closed for nearly a year. Wilson
^^Theodore Roosevelt to Clark Howell, February 24, I9 0 3 ,
Letters, III, p. 431.
^®Roosevelt to Oswald Garrison Villard, July 2 5 , 1903t
Ibid., p. 5 3 1 .
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also recalled that President Cleveland issued an order to close
an office in Missouri because its patrons refused to accept a
•’white” postmaster named under his administration.^^

Under

such circumstances, Roosevelt asserted that he would "under no
consideration ... refrain from doing what I did in closing the
Indianola post

o f f i c e .

The post office at Indianola remained closed until 1904.
Roosevelt had intended to keep it closed as long as the white
citizens refused to accept Mrs. Cox as postmaster.

However,

certain events unfolded that convinced him to reopen the office.
In 1903 James K. Vardaman was elected Governor of Mississippi
and this signified that Indianola residents were determined
to prevent Mrs. Cox or any Negro from serving as postmaster.
In January, 1904, the Mississippi legislature passed a reso
lution attacking Roosevelt's "wilful nullification of the Con
stitution ... and the laws of Congress" in closing the Indian
ola post office.

Mrs, Cox notified the President that she

would not be a candidate for reappointment.

Roosevelt could

have kept the office closed but this would have involved legal
complications since Indianola was a county seat and thus re
quired postal facilities.

The President decided to reopen the

post office with a white postmaster, but he would not consider
^ % d g a r S. Wilson to Henry C. Payne, January 1 7 , 1 9 0 3 ,
in "Resignation of the Postmaster," p. 33*
^^Theodbre Roosevelt to Richard Watson Gilder, February 7,
1 9 0 3 , Letters, III, pp. 420-421.
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any applicant for the position who had "been in sympathy with,
or had anything to do directly or indirectly" with the forced
resignation of Mrs. Cox.^^

On the recommendation of Edgar Wil

son and Inspector Charles Fitzgerald, Roosevelt appointed Wil
liam B. Martin, the chairman of the local Democratic executive
committee and one of Mrs. Cox's bondsmen, who remained "her
staunch friend throughout the whole trouble."

Finally, Post

master-General Payne reduced the Indianola post office from
third-class to fourth-class, stating that the receipts for
1903 -190 ^ were not sufficient to be considered for presiden

tial status.
Mrs. Minnie Cox returned to Indianola following her stay
in Birmingham and shortly after, she and her husband organized
the Delta Penny Savings Bank of Indianola and purchased a large
plantation near the town, "worth $35*000 or $40,000."

Booker

Washington kept Roosevelt informed about the Coxes and the Presi
dent was delighted over their progress.

"It is a curious cir

cumstance," Roosebelt wrote Owen Wister, "that while objection
was made to this black family at the head of the post office,
no objection is made to the black man being president of a
bank in the saune town.
The Indianola Post Office Affair served as another inci
dent where Roosevelt came in direct conflict with the "Negro
Gatewood, pp. 8 6 -8 7 .
^^The New York Times, January 28, August I 6 , 1904.
^^Roosevelt to Owen Wister, June 31» 1906, Letters. V,
pp. 309 -3 1 0 .
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Problem."

He never understood why he angered the South by his

closing the office, just as he did not understand its hostili
ty over his entertaining Booker T. Washington at the White
House.

Perhaps the reason was that he shared racial views of

white Southerners.

He was not trying to establish "social equal

ity" or "Negro domination."

All he was asking was the chance

to apply his "great rule of righteousness" and reward those
black men and women who are "well-educated, intelligent and
honest" and who are "propertied and of good character."^
^^Theodore Roosevelt to Owen Wister, April 27, 1 9 0 6 ,
Letters, V, p. 228,

CHAPTER IV
WILLIAM D. CRUM AND THE CHARLESTON COLLECTORSHIP
In the Autumn of 1902 the Lily White Republicans moved
against the Negro “with an aggressiveness that was compared
to that with which the white supremacy Democrats had driven
him from political life."

After launching their campaign of

disfranchisement in the Southern States, the color line was
drawn and Negro delegates were barred from Republican conven
tions.^

Roosevelt, seeking political reform in the Southern

Republican party while destroying the political machines of
Mark Hanna, initiated his program of appointing Gold Democrats
and ex-Confederate soldiers to Southern patronage positions.
He also included a few Negroes who had been recommended to
him by Booker T. Washington.
The President acted first in Alabama with his appoint
ment of Judge Thomas G. Jones.

Then he refused to reappoint

a lily white district attorney and replaced him with a Gold
Democrat on the recommendation of James S. Clarkson, former
Surveyor of the Port of New York, and Henry C. Payne, the
C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-193.?
(Baton Rouge I Louisiana State University Press, 195Ï), pp.
463-464; Thomas R. Cripps, "The Lily White Republicans, the
Negro, the Party, and the South in the Progressive Era,"
(Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Maryland, 196?), Chap
ters III and IV.
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Postmaster-General.

Both Clarkson and Payne had become Roose

velt’s political advisors.

The President's next maneuver» oc

curring again in Alabama, was the removal of the Collector of
Internal Revenue for anti-Negro activities.

Protest was very

slight among white Southerns over these two incidents.

Roose

velt's next move, however, created a storm that spread through
out the South.

It occurred in Charleston, South Carolina, and

-it^nvolved^^the-appointment ut Dr.

illiaso^D. Crwn to th^e Col

lectorship of the Port of Charleston.

This appointment was

both a manifestation of Roosevelt's displeasure with the lily
whites and ah effort to promote his belief that educated and
propertied Negroes should be given the opportunity of playing
a part in American politics.
A Charlestonian by birth, William D. Crura was the young
est of seven children in a family of German-African descent.
His grandfather was a German who had emigrated to South Caro
lina early in the nineteenth century and upon arrival angli
cized his name from Krum to Crum.

William's father, Darius,

had inherited a sizable plantation near Orangeburg where the
Crum family grew up.

Following the Civil War and the death

of their father, the family fortune was depleted and the older
sons migrated North in search of work.

They had agreed upon

securing William an education and with their help, he gradu
ated from the Avery Normal Institute, a school sponsored by
the American Missionary Association in Charleston,

He studied

briefly at the University of South Carolina, then went to medi-

69
cal school at Howard University where he received an M.D, d e 
gree in 1881.

After establishing a medical practice in Char

leston, he married Miss Ellen Craft who, like himself, had
been b o m free and had enjoyed a formal education.

By 1900

the Crums were among the most prominent members of the black
community in Charleston.

Aside from practicing medicine, Wil

liam was actively engaged in Republican political affairs in
2
South Carolina.
______
Crum was selected as the Republican County Chairman of
the Charleston district in 1890 %nd was elected to the Republi
can National Convention in 1892 as a delegate for James G.
Blaine of Maine.

Upon instructions from the convention, Crum

shifted his allegiance to Benjamin Harrison, who secured the
nomination for the second time.^
Harrison, during his administration, showed no opposi
tion to appointing Negroes to Federal offices.

He expressed

his feelings concerning the Negro in the South in a speech on
the Senate floor in 1886, stating that he was "one of those
who feel that the colored race in the South since the war has
been subjected to indignation, cruelties, outrages, and a re
pression of rights such as find no parallel in the history of
^ h o * s Who in America^ 1912-1913 (Chicago, 1912); Willard
B. Gatewood, "William D. Crum: A Negro in Politics," Journal of
Negro History, LIII (October, 1968), p. 302.
^The New York Times, November 28, 1902.
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L
civilization."
Toward the end of his administration, Harrison came un
der pressure from Negroes concerning their condition in the
South.

T. Thomas Fortune, editor of the New York Age, called

upon him to carry out the party's pledge, made during the cam
paign of 1888, to help the Negro cause and to avoid President
Hayes* policy of **conciliating, bowing, and scraping, and apol5
-ogizing and supplicating the white man^of the South,”
Harri
son attempted to give Negroes what they were requesting and
proceeded to appoint them to Postmasterships in Southern cities,
initiating this action in 1892 with the appointment of Crum in
Charleston.
Opposition stirred among the white citizens of Charleston,
becoming so bitter that the President withdrew the nomination
upon Crum's request.

Crum acted from the conviction that with

drawal of his name would relieve Harrison of embarrassment and
avoid the bitterness that would rise in the community by the
appointment of a colored man to the office of Postmaster.^
Two years later Crum was selected as the Republican can
didate for the United States Semate, as an effort to combat the
attempt by lily whites to eliminate the Negro from the poliVincent P. DeSantis, Republicans Face the Southern Questiont The New Departure Years, 1877-189? CBaltimore* Johns Hop
kins Press, 1 9 5 9 ), p. 222.
^Quoted in DeSabtis, p. 222.
^The New Yprk Times, November 28, 1902,
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tical scene in South Carolina.

Crura’s candidacy, however, was

little more than a symbolic gesture, for his opponent was Ben
jamin Tillman, master of South Carolina's Democratic Party and
staunch defender of white supremacy.

By a majority of ^ to 1,
7
Tillman was elected by the legislature to the Senate.
When Theodore Roosevelt took office he found John G. Cap
ers "already installed as the nominal head of the Republican
O
organization" in South Carolina,
Capers, the son of an Epis
copal Bishop, was originally a Democrat but left the party in
1896 to support McKinley.

He was rewarded with the appoint

ment of District Attorney.

He was later appointed by Hanna

to the Republican National Committee, where he assumed the role
of "Republican boss."^

In the election of 1900, he officially

joined the Republican party, campaigning for McKinley and Roose
velt.

Although Capers was appointed by Hanna, Roosevelt accep

ted him and "ruthlessly threw out all of the old republican
politicians."^^
Roosevelt made it clear that he objected to any attempt
to eliminate the Negro from participation in party affairs.

7

Francis B. Sirakins, Pitehfork Ben Tillman* South Caro
linian (Baton Rouge* Louisiana State University Press, 19 W ) ,
p. 2?2; Gatewood, pp. 306 -3 0 7 ,
O
Theodore Roosevelt to Carl Schurz, December 24, 1 90 3 ,
Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 vols., (Cam
bridge* Harvard University Press, 1952), III, p. 681.
^Gatewood, p. 308.
^^Roosevelt to Carl Schurz, December 24, 1903, Letters,
III, p. 681* See also John M. Blum, The Republican Roosevelt
(Cambridge* Harvard University Press, 1954? reprint ed.. New
York* Antheneum, 296?), p. 45.
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Capers, who shifted his allegiance from Hanna to Roosevelt,
publicly committed himself to a biracial party in South Caro
lina.

Despite Capers* position as “patronage referee,“

Roose

velt continued to consult with others regarding appointments
in South Carolina.

Among these was Booker T, Washington, who

suggested Crum for the Collector of Internal Revenue.

Roose

velt had already designated Louis Blalock, a white manufacturer
and a strong proponent of the President's policies, to fill
the vacancy.

He assured Washington that he would be happy to

consider Crum for “any other position which became available.*
Roosevelt's patronage program had to this time failed to
serve its announced intention of giving hope to Negroes.

The

President turned to Washington for advice in appointing a col
lector to the Port of Charleston, to succedd R.M. Wallace, who
died in September, 1902.

During a visit to the Charleston Ex

position early in 1902 Roosevelt had discussed appointments
with white politicians of both parties but neglected to con
sult with Negro Republicans.

They were convinced that the

President's ears had been "poisoned against their interests.
However, this accusation proved to be wrong for on the recom
mendation of Washington and the approval of Capers, Roosevelt
appointed Crum Sollector of the Port of Charleston.

Emmett J. Scott to Booker T. Washington, October 5»
1 9 0 1 , in Emmett J. Scott and Lyman Beecher Stowe, Booker T.
Washington* Builder of a Civilization (Garden City, N.Y.t
Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1 9 1 6 ), pp. 53-5^»
l^Gatewood, p. 310.
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The announcement came early in November, 1902 and be
gan a new era of harmony among South Carolina Republicans .
It was also the signal for a long struggle between Roosevelt
and the South.

Led by Southern white Democrats, the citizens

of Charleston were determined to defeat Crum's nomination and
to persuade the President to abandon such a "reckless and ir13
responsible course."
------ The opposition was initiated by Mayor James A. Smyth of
Charleston and James C. Hemphill, editor of the Charleston
News and Courier.

Both men were familiar with Roosevelt new

Southern policy and expressed their concern over the matter.
Smyth's main opposition to Crura was based on certain specific
charges that tended to show his unfitness for the office.

The

mayor contended that the proposed postmaster appointment in
1892 was the fulfillment of a promise made by Harrison for
Crum's shifting his allegiance.

Crum "proved recreant to his

i il

obligation."

Spyth also asserted that opposition to Crum

was expressed in Charleston for the simple fact that he was a
colored man.

"We have sworn never again to submit to the rule

of the African," the mayor explained to Roosevelt, "and such
an appointment as that of Dr. Crum to any office forces us to
protest unanimously against this insult to the white blood,
l^Gatewood, p. 311,
^^The New York Times » November 28 , 1902,
^^Theodore Roosevelt to James Adger Smyth, November 26,
1902, Letters. Ill, p. 384.
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Hemphill accused Roosevelt of taking advantage of the
death of a native white citizen of South Carolina to name Crum
as his successor, "not by and with, consent of the Senate «..
but by and with the advice of Booker Washington and the negro
preachers and politicians of the country." He expressed con
cern that Crura was a colored man and "that in itself ought to
bar him from office."

Hemphill contended that Negroes were

not engaged in commercial pursuits in Charleston and would not
come in contact with him, while ninety per cent of those who
had business there were white.
Roosevelt answered Smyth and Hemphill with an "Open Let
ter" that was written on November 26 and was released to the
press for publication the following day.

In reference to

Smyth's accusation that Crum was "unfit for office,"

the Presi

dent assured the mayor that he would give the charges made
against Crum the "utmost consideration .,. and shall go over
them carefully before taking action."

He had "absolutely no
17
intention of appointing unfit men to office." '
It was to Hemphill's objection that Crum was a Negro that

Roosevelt directed his attention.

How influential Charleston

ians "could have gained the idea" that he had said he would
not appoint a "reputable and upright colored man to office
^^James C. Hemphill, "President,,the South and the Negro,"
Harper's Weekly, LIII (January 9, 1909), 10.
^^Roosevelt to James A. Smyth, November 26, 1902, Letters,
III, p. 384; The New York Times, November 28, 1902,
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when objections were made solely on account of color," he con
fessed, "was entirely beyond comprehension."

Since his visit

to Charleston, he averred, several Negroes had been appointed
in the South.. However, "the great majority of appointments
in every State have been white men."

In South Carolina "to

the four most important positions ... I have appointed three
men and continued in office a fourth, all of them, white men t h r ^ ^ f ^ h e m originally gold Democrats - two of them ,.. the
sons of Confederate soldiers,"

Roosevelt affirmed that he

could not consent to take the position that "the door of hope the door of opportunity - ... be shdt upon any man, no matter
how worthy, purely upon the grounds of race or color."
The speculation that the Crum appointment would promote
"Negro Domination" did not enter the matter, according to the
President.
er.

He believed that the issue raised was much broad

It was a question of "whether it was to be declared that

under no circumstances shall any man of color, no matter how
upright and honest, no matter how good a citizen, no matter
how fair in his dealings with all his fellows, be permitted
to hold any office under our government."

On this, the Presi-

dentiidtated that he "certainly could not assume such an atti
tude."

He concludedÿ " ... it is a good thing from every stand

point to let the colored man know that if he shows in marked
degree the qualities of good citizenship ... then he will not
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be cut off from all hope of similar reward.*
When the letter was made public the Charleston News and
Courier declared that Roosevelt “failed to understand the South.**
“The President,“ the News maintained, “is not vicious; he sim
ply is ignorant.“

William Jennings Bryan wrote in his Common

er that if Roosevelt had “genuine courage#* he would appoint
"some reputable negro" to a position in a Northern state,

Bryan

felt that the President was deliberately insulting the South.
It was “hardly probable,“ he concluded, “that Mr. Roosevelt
would dare appoint a negro ... in any Republican community in
a Northern state."

In view of these attitudes from Charleston

whites and Democratic political aspirants, Roosevelt was more
determined than ever to support Crum for the position.
Opposition to the Crum appointment was not limited to the
South.

The moderate New York Times expressed its concern over

the matter, calling it “unjustifiable" and “distasteful and
offensive to ninety-nine-hundreths of the persons having busi
ness to do at the Custom House.“

There was no advantage for

the administration or the Government to force an act that em
bittered an entire community against the President.

“The color

ed race, either individually or as a whole, had nothing to gain
^Roosevelt to Smyth, November 26, 1902, Letters, III,
pp. 384-385; Roosevelt to Robert G. Rhett, November 10, 1902,
Ibid., pp. 375-376; The New York Times, November 28, 1902,
^^Bryan quoted in Letters, III, p. 385».
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by obstinate persistance in a policy which intensifies race
feeling and confirms the resolve of the whites of the South to
resist by every means in their power the political advancement
of the blacks."

The Times believed that Roosevelt was using

the power of appointment to "efface the distinction" between
the white Southerners and a race which they universally regard
ed as inferior.

"In this attempt the Administration is dashing
20
its head against a granite wall." '
Before sending Crum's name to the Senate for confirma

tion, Roosevelt conferred with Washington and requested him
"to probe every aspect of the case" in an effort to determine
the validity of the charges made regarding Crum's unfitness for
office.

Receiving the information he requested, Roosevelt con21
eluded that the only real objection to Crum was his color.
The President submitted Crum's name to the Senate for
confirmation on January 5* 1903 and it was referred to the
Senate Committee on Commerce for action.

Chaired by Senator

William P. Frye of Maine, the Committee was composed of ten
Republicans and six Democrats.

There was no assurance that

the nomination would be reported favorably since there was
speculation that the two Republicansmembers from the West,
Senators John P. Jones of Nevada and George C, Perkins of
^®The New York Times, November 29, 1902.
21
^
Theodore Roosevelt to William H. Brawley, December 3,
1902, Letters, III, p. 387; Gatewood, p. 313.
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California, were expected to vote against a favorable report
to the full Senate.

When the committee did vote it rejected

Crum by an 8 to 7 vote, with New Hampshire Republican Senator
Jacob Gallinger absent and Jones and Perkins shifting to the
po
Democrats,
When informed of the results, Roosevelt became
enraged over what he considered to be insincerity on the part
of the Republican members of the committee.
Prior to the committee vote, the black community was
divided over the issue.

The Afro-American Council, the lead

ing Negro organization of the country at that time, conferred
with Republican Senators in behalf of Crum.

Bishop Alexander

Walters, the chairman of the Council, confessed that their
fight for Crum’s nomination was not "made because of his color."
He continued» "Dr,.Crum is a man of character, has every quali
fication for the position, and ... no valid objection has been
23
offered against the appointment."
On the other hand, some Negroes believed that the nomi
nation should be withdrawn.

An unnamed black delegation -"some

of Dr. Crum’s friends" - called upon the President and request
ed that he withdraw the nomination for "reasons not connected
with Z~him__7 hut with what they considered as the good of the
colored race."

Roosevelt informed them that if Crum withdrew.

pp

The New York Times, March 6, 1903
^^Ibid., February 4, I9 0 3 .
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he would "accede to his request" but he could not ask him to
do it.
The President felt that in the Crum Case he "had a right
to expect the Senate to act one way or the other on the appoint
ment."

He requested Pryfi "not to leave it unacted upon when
Pit
the Senate adjourns."
In spite of Roosevelt's plea, the Sen

ate refused to act on the nomination.

It had seemed apparent

that the people of Charleston were willing to wage an all-out
campaign to defeat the nomination and it was having its affects
on the Senate.
The fight against the confirmation on behalf of the citi
zens of Charleston was taken up by Senators Benjamin Tillman
and John L. McLaurin,

Any efforts to give Negroes office "was

bound to incur the animosity" of Tillman.

Roosevelt's Northern

attitude toward the black man seemed especially designed to in2<
flame men of the Tillman type.
Late in January, 1903, the South Carolina Senate and House
of Representatives passed a resolution protesting the nomina
tion of Crum to the Charleston Collectorship.

The appoint

ment was stated as being "detrimental to the commercial inter
ests of the principle port and the chief city" of the State of
South Carolina.

The Legislature declared that Roosevelt's ac-

2ii
Roosevelt to William P. Frye, February 14, 1903, Letters,
III, p. 425.
^^Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman, p. 415.
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tion was “in disregard of the sentiment and wishes" of the citi
zens of Charleston and called upon their Senators "to exercise
their earnest efforts to prevent the confirmation of the nomi
nation.
In Tillman*3 case the resolution was unnecessary, for
he had already decided to do whatever was desired by his con
stituents in the case.

As for McLaurin, it was undeterminable

whether he would take any action in the matter.

The two Sen

ators were in constant disagreement over previous issues and
it was known that McLaurin*s relationship with the Administra-.
tion was very close.

Roosevelt at one time intended to appoint
27
him to a judicial position, but McLaurin declined.
The people of Charleston were given a chance to be heard
at a Senate hearing before the Committee on Commerce on January
22, 1 9 0 3 . The delegation for the people consisted of Senator
Tillman, Mayor Smyth, James C. Hemphill, and A.C. Tobias, Pres
ident of the Charleston Merchant's Exchange,

Speaking in be

half of Crum were ex-Senator P.B.S. Pinchback of Louisiana and
Whitefield McKinlay, Booker Washington's close friend and strong
est supporter in the national capital.
Tillman stated that the real objection to Crum was that
he was a "nigger."

Charleston people would not say he was not

^^The New York Times. January 19, 1903.
^^Roosevelt to Marcus Hanna, October I6 , 1901, Letters.
Ill, p. 1 7 6 ; Roosevelt to Booker T. Washington, November 9,
1 9 0 1 , Ibid., p. 194; The New York Times. January 19, 1903.
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gentlemanly or capable.
and was no doubt honest.

He was, in fact, an "educated nigger,"
If he were a white man he would be

alright but he was not, and that was all there was to it,

Til

lman argued that the people of Charleston had their ideas, and
it was foolish to try to reform them by doing the things that
were objectionable to them.

He concluded* "Oil and water will

not unite.
Mayor Smyth reaffirmed his objections based on the sim
ple reason that colored people did not do any business before
the Custom House and were not entitled to the office of Collec
tor.

In Crum's defense Pinchback and McKinlay spoke briefly,

saying that he was one-eighth colored and seven-eighths white ;
that he was well-educated; and that there had never been any
29
criticismaof his ability or integrity.
On March 4 the Senate refused to confirm the nomination
of Dr. Crum and on the following day Roosevelt sent his name
back to the Senate for consideration.

"The more I have thought

it over," he expressed to Washington, "the more convinced I
have been that Crum must be appointed."

If the Senate did not
30
act, he would "appoint Crum as soon as it adjourned,"
pO

The New York Times, January 23, 1903.
29 Ibid.
^^Roosevelt to Washington, March 4, 1903, Letters, III,
p. 438.
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Roosevelt called a special session of the Senate on
March 5»

The first communication presented was the nomina

tion and request for the nomination of Crum to the Gollectorship at Charleston.

It was expected that Roosevelt would re

nominate Crum, but no one had been prepared for its receipt
so early during the special session.

While Democrats in the

Senate presented a solid front in opposition, many of the lead
ing Republicans were reputedly against the nomination, taking
the view that the President should not force a Negro upon a
community that did not want him.

As a result, the session ad

journed without acting on the nomination, and Roosevelt was
forced to make the first of three successive recess appoint
ai
ments of Crum as Collector,
After making the first appoint
ment, Roosevelt told Crum to "keep in close touch with Mr, Cap
ers" and admonished him to "administer your office with pro
bity and efficiency and with such tact and judgment that no
32
cause of complaint can be found against you,""^
The Senate once again refused to confirm the appointment,
when it returned in session, and oface again Roosevelt renewed
the appointment.
office.

On the third appointment Crum was to assume

Upon notice of this action, Stephen E. Barnwell, an

employee in the Custom House, immediately sent in his resigna^^Blum, The Republican Roosevelt, p. 4^; The New York
Times. March 6, 1903.
^^Roosevelt to William D. Crum, March 26, 1903, Letters.
Ill, p, 459.
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tion stating his objection to working under a Negro.

Also Miss

Martha Washington, of the family of the first President, re
tired from her position as clerk.33
Roosevelt's theory of recess appointments was the center
of attack for Senator Tillman.

Always welcoming the opportunity

to turn his arguments on the Negro question into a constitution
al debate, Tillman challenged the President's theory of " con
structive recess.**

He declared that Crura's appointment was "a

very slight, insignificant incident" compared with the "great
constitutional question" involved in the application of the
Senate's right to confirm Presidential appointments,

Tillman

demanded that the Senate take Roosevelt "by the throat" and

3if.

"stop dawdling around here neglecting its duty."^

The Treasury Department held up the personal account of
Crum, refusing to pay him on the grounds that he could not re
ceive compensation until his appointment had been confirmed by
the Senate.

Secretary Leslie Shaw held that nothing other than

judicial determination could settle Crum's status and while hold
ing office under a recess appointment he could not be paid,
Shaw sent a letter to the Senate asserting that only the judi
ciary could determine the authority of Crum's position.

Until

^^The New York Times, March 22, 1903.
3^Congressional Record, 58 Cong., 2d sess., p. 1106; Simkins. Pitchfork Ben Tillman, pp. 417-418.
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then the office was to be “held in abeyance" until confirma
tion.^^
Upon receiving the letter from the Secretary» Tillman
immediately introduced a resolution, asking for more specific
information from Shaw,

He stated Shay's letter was ambigious,

and that it failed its object.

He asserted that the Secretary

had “with great adroitness, dodged the issue.“3^
Two months before the Republican Convention, Roosevelt
wrote Senator Nelson Aldrich, Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Finance and one of the most influential Republicans, and in
sisted upon action on the Crum case.

He felt "not only that

Crum was entitled to confirmation," but that "politically it
would be a bad thing for the Senate to refuse to vote one way
or the other upon his nomination."

He told Aldrich that the

Republican party was “being taunted with insincerity and timid37
ity in the matter."
Congress refused to confirm the nomination on December 6 ,
1903 and Crum was reappointed to the position and took the oath

of office on January 9, 1904.

It was more than evident that

3c
^^Congressional Record, 58 Cong., 2d sess., p. 1302; The
New York Times, January 29, 1904.

^^Congressional Record, 58 Cong., 2d sess., p. 1105; The
New York Times, January 3 0 , 1904.
37Roosevelt to Nelson W. Aldrich, April 16, 1904, Letters,
III, p. 774 .
~
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the President was determined to get Crum into the Càllectorship.

Opposition increased along with Roosevelt's persis

tence over the matter.

The New York Times, for example, de

clared: "The Crum Case affords a remarkable illustration of
Mr, Roosevelt's dogged determination to have his own way, even
38
though people and Senators oppose him."
The Parker Consti
tution Club attacked the President, charging him with "a usur
pation of powers of the Senate and with something more than a
technical violation of the Constitution."39
Roosevelt's determination carried him to the decision of
having the Senate meet again in special session.

However, this

was to no avail and his hopes dwindled when once again the Sen
ate failed to make the confirmation.

The President reappoint

ed Crum for the fourth time on April 28, 1904 and received posi
tive assurance that the Senate would take up the case immediate
ly on reconvening and that it would be disposed of finally.
Senator William B. Allison of Iowa, the Chairman of the gommittee
on the order of business in the Senate, declared that the Crum
Case "would be pressed to conclusion regardless of the other
business.
3®The New York Times, April 28, 1904.
39ibid,, October 2?, 1904,
40ibid., April 29, 1904.
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By December, 1904, Roosevelt was "at wits end" on what
to do over his Southern policy in general, and the Crum appoint
ment in p a r t i c u l a r . H e concluded that the entire blame had
to rest with the South "for failure to meet ^ h i s _ 7 effort half
way."

He confessed that it may have been better "not to have

originally nominated Crum for the Charleston Collectorship" but
that personally he felt he was right.

Even if he was wrong,

"to say that the South's attitude is explained by

this act_7

is to say that the South is in a condition of violent chronic
hysteria.
In December news leaked out of Washington that Senator
Tillman had returned to South Carolina due to illness, thus
giving up the fight.

It was also reported that the Senate Com

mittee would vote favorably on the issue.

On January 5» 1905»

the Committee authorized a favorable report on the nomination
and on January 6 Crum was confirmed.

On that same day, follow

ing a debate of a dozen Senators, the Sënate confirmed the nomi
nation of William D. Crum as Collector of the Port of Charleston.^
When Crum was confirmed, the editor of the Coloured-American expressed the significance of the appointment to the black
community*

"The Negro had witnessed his greatest political

^^Roosevelt to James Ford Rhodes, December 15* 1904, Let
ters. IV, p. 1 0 7 2 .
^^Roosevelt to Henry S. Pritchett, December 15» 1904, Ibid,
IV, pp. IO7O-IO7 I; Roosevelt to Owen Wister, April 2 7 , 1906 ,
Ibid.. V, p. 462.
^^The New York Times. January 6, 7» 1905.
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triumph in twenty years.

...Under a general of less courage

and honour than Roosevelt, history would read differently.

It

has been thoroughly established that the law recognizes no man
by the colour of his skin ...."
Roosevelt's appointment of William Crum to the Collector
ship of Charleston played a significant part of his Southern
policy.

This policy attempted to achieve certain goals* im

prove and strengthen the Republican party in the South; secure
his nomination in 1904; and recognize the merits of those blacks
of property and good standing.

Crum came to symbolize the new

breed of Negro that Roosevelt wished to cultivate.

His appoint

ment was a part of his plan to undermine the Southern political
machine which supported Hanna.

In June, 1904, Roosevelt received

the unanimous endorsement of the Republican Convention and severa
months later, the greatest popular majority of any President un
til that time.
The Crura appointment was a great political victory for the
President.

The New York Times summed up the entire affair when

it stated* "The President's reasons for appointing Dr. Crum
seemed to him worthy enough and important enough to justify
overriding the objections of the Senate,

Mr. Roosevelt is so

accustomed to winning his battles that he may make a small
^ h e Coloured Ame r i c ^ quoted in John Hope Franklin,
From Slavery to freedom* A History of American Negroes (New
York* Random House, 194?), p. 43^.
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account of the Crum victory.

The matter is not a trivial one,

however.
William Crum served his position as Collector of the Port
of Charleston until March, 1909 when William Howard Taft secured
his resignation.

Both Roosevelt and Taft concluded that reap

pointing Crum would revive the struggle that had previously
occurred.

When Roosevelt learned of Crum’s willingness to sur-

render his post he called it "first-rate."
^^The New York Times » December 12, 1904.

^^Roosevelt to William Howard Taft, February 26, 1909»
Letters, VI, p. 1538.

CHAPTER V
RECONCILING THE SOUTH
Theodore Roosevelt's primary political concern during
his first administration was to reform the Republican party
in the South, in order to secure his nomination in 1904,

In

the process, he would secure enough delegates and destroy the
old Hanna-dominated Republican political machines.

This major

effort culminated in 1904 with the President's renomination
at the Republican National Convention and his victory in the
presidential contest.
As his second term began, Roosevelt realized that in the
process of winning support, he had alienated white Southerners
with his efforts to recognize prominent Negroes in the South.
He was now determined to bind the sectional wounds that he had
helped inflict and direct his attentions toward reconciliation
between the North and the South.

Anti-Negro sentiment was

flourishing and the President responded by refusing to speak
out against disfranchisement, "Jim Crowism" and mob violence.
In 1905 he made an extensive tour of the South with the sole
purpose of winning the affections of the white population.
He was conspicuously silent following the Atlanta race riots
in 1906 and in the same year, summarily discharged 167 black
soldiers from the United States Army for alleged participation
89
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in the Brownsville affair.

During the course of his second

administration, Theodore Roosevelt demonstrated that sectional
reconciliation was more important than racial reconciliation.
On February 13» 1905 the President addressed the New
York Republican Club in commemoration of Abraham Lincoln.

In

his speech, Roosevelt devoted his attention to the race prob
lem that existed and the principles that should be applied in
the solution to it.

This was his first public statement on

the subject since his election.

He had failed to mention any

thing during his Inaugural Address of 1905 on disfranchise
ment in the South or whether he would support the movement to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by calling for a reduction
of Southern representation in the House of Representatives.^
This omission signaled the beginning of his efforts to recon
cile the South with the rest of the nation.

However, in his

Lincoln Day Speech, the President outlined the race problem
as that **of so dealing with the man of one color as to secure
him the rights that no one would grudge him if he were of
2
another color,*
There was no immediate solution to the problem, but
Roosevelt felt that an ultimate solution could be reached only
Theodore Roosevelt, "Inaugural Address of 1905," The
Works of Theodore Roosevelt, 20 Vols. Hermann Hagedom, ed.
(New York* Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925)» XV, pp. 267-269.
2
Roosevelt, "Address at the Lincoln Dinner of the Repub
lican Club of the City of New York, February 13, 1905," Works.
XVI, pp. 343 -3 5 0 .
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by an effort "to secure to each man, whatever his color* equal
ity of opportunity, equality of treatment before the law,"
Roosevelt charged that the vices of "laziness, shiftlessness
and criminality" among Negroes were more of a hindrance to
their race than "all acts of oppression put together."

He

admonished blacks to condemn crime when committed by Negroes,
and to cooperate with local authorites to bring guilty members
of their race to swift justice.

Failure to do this, the Presi*

dent continued, would make Negroes the "worst enemy of their
own people as well as the enemy of all people."

Roosevelt

contended that the social question "must ... be left to the
people of each community to settle for themselves, as in such
a matter no one community, and indeed no one individual, can
dictate to any other."

"There must be no confusing of civil

privileges with social intercourse."

The President conceded

that blacks should have an equal opportunity and the "suffrage
based on character and intelligence for black and white alike."
He then concluded his address with a special appeal to the South;
I believe in the Southerner as I believe in the
Northerner. I claim the right to feel pride in his great
qualities and in his great deeds exactly as I feel pride
in the great qualities and deeds of every other American,
For weal or for woe we are knit together; and we shall go
up or down together; and I believe that we shall go up and
not down, that we shall go forward instead of halting and
and falling back, because I have an abiding faith in the
generosity, the courage, the resolution, and the common
sense of all my countrymen,^
^Roosevelt, "Address at the Lincoln Dinner," Works, XVI,
pp. 3^3-350; The New York Times, February 14, 1905; "The Presi
dent and the Negro," Outlook,£XXIX (February 18, 1905)» 4l6-417,
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Several months following his Linoln Day Address, Roose
velt made preparations for his Southern tour with the purpose
of winning the South for the Republican administration and
bringing about a better understanding between himself and the
Southern white people.

This indeed was to be a difficult task.

To white Southerners, Roosevelt had committed unpardonable sins
during his first administration, and many considered the Presi
dent the "blackest* of black Republicans,

He had insulted them

on three occasions to win approval from the Northern black com
munity* the Crum appointment, the closing of the Indianola Post
Office, and more seriously, inviting Booker T. Washington to
dinner and supposedly ^proclaiming to the world his belief in
social equality.*^
Roosevelt believed that reconciliation toward the South
was perhaps one answer to the Negro problem.

In the fall of

1906 he wrote Harvard President Charles W. Eliot* "I have been

at my wits* end in knowing how to deal with this negro problem,"
He believed the situation was bad wherever there were "large
bodies of negroes" North or South.
South,"

"Things are hideous in the

He added* "I am certain that what I have done has been

all right, yet often the results have been most unsatisfactory;
and while I have in different States tried different experiments,
none of them have come out so I am really pleased,"

Roosevelt’s

^"The President and the South," Nation, LXXXI (November 2,

), 352.

1905
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next ”experiment" was to travel to the South and make a direct
appeal to white Southerners,^
The Southern press voiced mixed reaction when it was learn
ed that the President was to tour the South,

The Atlanta Jour

nal stated that the only influence at work in bringing the Presi
dent to the South was the existence of "a few Republican office
holders,"

Fearing that Roosevelt would not be received cordial

ly by the Southern people and not extended the courtesy that
"the great office of President of the United States .,. should
receive," the Journal expressed hope that the visit would be
cancelled or delayed,

"We are impressed with the belief that

this man ,,, has purposely derided and scorned the best senti
ment and the best traditions of all southern people .., and we
cannot think there will be an overwhelming desire on the part
of ^ S o u t h e m e r s J 7 to receive him around the hospitable board
of southern homes,"

The Houston Chronicle aspired that the

President "will do nothing to give offense to a Southern com
munity any more than he would to a Northern community, ,., that
the sentiments and even what he considers the prejudices and
the hereditary antipathies of Southern people will be respect
ed and that .,, he will regard the preferences of Southern com
munities and not do anything to cause irritation or arouse sec
tional bitterness,"

The Charlotte Observer

declared, with

^Theodore Roosevelt to Charles W. Eliot, September 28,
1 9 0 6 , quoted in Horace S. and Marion G. Merrill, The Republican
Command, 1897-1913 (Lexington* University of Kentucky Press,
1 9 7 1 ), p. 2 3 6 .
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somewhat less intensity, that "despite the fear which many
Southerners have that the President may continue to stir up
the race problem by appointing negroes to office, there is no
perceptible bitterness toward him.

On the contrary, he is

generally regarded as an honest and straight-forward man who
intends to do right, and whose wrongful acts are all mistakes,
In September, 1905» T. Thomas Fortune, editor of the
New York Age, expressed the sentiment of many Negroes against
the President's proposed Southern tour.

Fortune believed that

Roosevelt would lose nothing if he should cut out all of the
trips "except the visit to Tuskegee Institue where he would
be among true friends and where nothing would likely occur in
words or acts to prejudice him against Afro-Americans,"

If

the President proceeded with his planned visit throughout the
South, Fortune asked that he seize the opportunity to denounce
lynching, discrimination against blacks, and condemn the South
ern disfranchisement constitutions which were so detrimental
to black political participation,^
In October, Roosevelt left for his Southern tour.

The

excursion carried him through eight Southern States - Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Arkan
sas and Louisiana, with special stops at Tuskegee and the Florida
The Atlanta Journal, Houston Chronicle, and Charlotte
Observer quoted in "Will Southerners Welcome Mr, Roosevelt?,"
Current Literature, XXXVIII (January, 1905), l4-l6.
^The New York Age, September 28, 1905.
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Baptist Academy,

In speech after speech, Roosevelt paid homage

to Lee and the Confederacy and praised the Southern people for
loyalty to their traditions.

He sent roses to Stonewall Jack

son's widow and had himself photographed with Negro servants
of the Bulloch family in Georgia.

While he spoke on many nation

al issues, the President failed to mention anything concerning
Southern disfranchisement or the increasing Jim Crow legislap
tion which was rapidly spreading throughout the South.
Roosevelt had accepted an invitation to speak at the
Florida Baptist Academy, a small industrial institution simi
lar to Tuskegee.

This caused the white citizens of Jackson

ville to make arrangements to keep the President from address
ing Negroes of the city,

J. Douglas Wetmore, a prominent law

yer of the city and one of the two black members of the city
council, wrote to the President's secretary, William Loeb,
and informed him of the situation stating that the Reception
Committee made no provisions for blacks in their general plans
of entertainment for the President.

When Loeb received the

complaint, he wired the Committee and requested some type of
recognition for blacks.

The Committee responded that to change

their original plan would cause "embarrassment" among the white
^ e n r y P. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, A Biography (New
York* Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1932), p. 371» The New York Age.
October 26, 1905; "The President's Southern Tour," North Ameri
can Review, GLXXXI (November, 1905)» 796-800; C. Vann Woodward,
Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge* Louisiana
state University"%ess, 1951)» pp. 465-466.
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citizens of the community.

Nevertheless, arrangements were

made for Roosevelt to address the academy following his sched
uled speech to the white population of Jacksonville.

Because

he was running on a tight schedule, however, the President
was only able to be present at the Academy for ten minutes. 9
Roosevelt delivered a speech to the students and faculty
of Tuskegee Institute on October 24, 1905 . While he issued
moral injunctions to Negroes and praised Southern civilization
throughout his tour, it was at Tuskegee where the President
devoted considerable discussion to the question of the Negro's
place in Southern society, and to what they must do to eventual
ly enter into the possession of those freedoms that most Ameri
cans accepted as a matter of course.
Roosevelt urged both the white and the black population
to encourage the Negro to make himself a citizen of the "high
est type of usefulness."

He asserted the belief that the South

"offered opportunities for blacks in economic development that
were not offered elsewhere in America."

Because of the scar

city of labor, "it is the part of wisdom for all who wish the
prosperity of the South to help the negro to become ,.. useful
to himself, and therefore to the community in which he lives."
The President reminded his audience that economic development
was the major hope of Negroes because "the professional and
^August Meier, Negro Thought in America, 1880-1915» Racial
Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington (Ann Arbor» University of Michigan Press, 1963)» p. 301; The New York Tiroes,
October 16, 1905; The Cleveland Gazette, October 21, 1905; The
New York Age, November 2, 1 9 0 5 .
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mercantile avenues to success are overcrowded.”

He emphasized

the importance of an industrial education, coupled with train
ing in agriculture and household duties.

It was primarily in

these three areas where "the Negro can at present do the most
for himself and his white neighbor."

Roosevelt asserted that

Negro education was "in the interest and for the protection
of the white man" for "ignorance is the costliest crop that
can be raised in any part of this Union."

"It is not only the

duty of the white man," explained the President, "but ... /~in_7
his interest, to see that the negro is protected in property,
in life, and in all his legal rights."
Roosevelt expressed his concern over lynching in the
United States.

"Lawlessness ... is not confined to any one

section," he stated, "lynching is not confined to any one sec
tion."

He gave praise to the "countless thousands of high-

minded private citizens" who have aroused public opinion against
lawlessness and especially against lynching.

Directing himself

to the educated black community, he declared that "You are in
honor bound to join hands in favor of law and order and to war
against all crime, and especially against all crime by men of
your own race; for the heaviest wrong done by the criminal is
the wrong to his own race."

He called on the men and women

educated at Tuskegee to lead their fellow citizens toward "sober,
industrious, lawabiding lives."

"The colored people have many

difficulties to pass through, but these difficulties will be
surmounted if only the policy of reason and common sense is
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pursued."
Roosevelt emphasized the importance of moral and indus
trial education for the progress of the black community.

"The

race cannot expect to get everything at once; it must learn to
wait and bide its time; to prove itself worthy by showing its
possession of perseverance, of thrift, of self-control."

Speak

ing to both races, he concluded*
The hope of advancement of the colored man in the South
lies in his steady, common-sense effort to improve his
moral and material condition, and to work in harmony with
the white man in upbuilding the Commonwealth. The future
of the South now depends upon the people of both races
living up to the spirit and letter of the laws of their
several States and working out the destinies of both
races, not as races, but as law-abiding American citizens.^
The President's Southern tour accomplished its primary
objective in bringing about a better understanding between
himself and white Southerners and served to increase sectional
reconciliation.

Southern editors, such as Clark Howell of the

Atlanta Constitution and Henry Watterson of the Louisville
Courier-J o u m a l » expressed approval of Roosevelt's direct
appeal to the South.

Watterson completely reversed himself;

in 1902 he had called the President "infinitely a worse enemy
of the white men and women of the south than any of the radiRoosevelt, Works, XVI, pp. 351-355» William H. Harbaugh,
ed., The Writings of Theodore Roosevelt (Indianapolis* BobbsMerill do., ïnc., 1^6 7 ), p p . 199-204; The New York Times, Octo
ber 2 5 , 1 9 0 5 ; "The President and the South," Nation, LXXXI
(November 2, 1905)t 352.
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cal leaders of the past."^^

William Garrott Brown called the

President’s tour a "bolder and more direct challenge to the
Americanism, the sense of nationality, of the Southern people
than any ... earlier presidential visitations,"
been any conversion on /~the_7 subject

"If there has

of race_/, " concluded

Brown, "it is rather the President than the South that has
12
seen a new light."
To emphasize the spirit of reconciliation, Roosevelt pur
posely avoided reference to any subject that might irritate
Southern whites.

He passed through Georgia during the bitter

ly contested disfranchisement campaign, but he never spoke about
the movement in his public addresses.

He made one reference

against mob violence in Little Rock, Arkansas, but his remarks
were more of a reaction to the impropriety of the statements
of Governor Jefferson Davis.

The rebuke to Davis came when

the Governor, following an introduction to the President, "ven
tured to say a good word for the fiendish institution."

Davis

stated that lynching was caused by the rape of white women by
black men and intimated that the "only good Negro was a dead
Negro."

Roosevelt turned to the Governor and declared that the

effect of "one heinous crime by another heinous crime was to re
duce the man doing it to the bestial level of the man who com^^Woodward, Origins of the New South, p. 465»
William Garrott Brown, "President Roosevelt and the
South," Independent, LIX (November 9» 1905)» 1086-1089.
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mitted the bestial crime."

He informed Davis that "three

fourths of the lynchings were not for rape at all but was for
other crimes," and reminded him that, as a representative of
the law, he owed it to "humanity to free the United States
13
from the menace and reproach of lynch law."
The Negro reaction to the President's Southern tour was
one of disillusionment.

J. Max Barber, editor of the Voice of

the Negro, conducted a canvass of influential Negroes and twen
ty five black newspapers to ascertain their opinion on Roose
velt's trip.

Teh per cent voiced approval, but the remainder

were highly critical of the President's activities in the South.
W. E. B. DuBois condemned Roosevelt's silence on disfranchise
ment: "... if men like Theodore Roosevelt dared not speak the
truth, who shall?"

Booker T. Washington refused to reply to

Barber's survey, but he did approve of the President's conduct.
After all, was not the President reiterating the philosophy of
self-help?^^

The New York Age charged Roosevelt with the

"grave sin of omission" and believed that "no good would come
of it to the black South.
The theme of reconciliation was further reflected in
Roosevelt's appointment policy.

Following his inauguration

^^The New York Age, November 2, 1905.
^^Voice of the Negro, December, 1905 quoted in Woodward,
p. 466.
^^The New York Age, November 2, 1905.
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in 1905 » he initiated a general appointment policy for the Fed
eral Government.

There was now to be a "uniform policy of re

taining the incumbents in office during satisfactory service.**
The policy would hold "irrespective of the length of service
of the incumbent and would apply to all branches of the federal
government."

Nine months later, Roosevelt removed most of the

Southern blacks appointed by McKinley through the application
of a "two-term tradition,"

According to this doctrine, those

officeholders who had served for more than eight years would
not be reappointed.^^
The President received strong criticism from the Negro
press for his failure to speak out against lynching on his
Southern tour,

Roosevelt had purposely remained silent on the

subject for fear of alienating the people to whom he was appeal
ing for support.

The problem did exist, however, and he knew

its seriousness and was aware thajs silence would not cure law
lessness,

One event seemed to accelerate the dire need for

action on the subject and cause the President to face the prob
lem* the Atlanta Riots of 1 9 0 6 .
Violence against Atlanta Negroes erupted on September 22,
1906 and lasted for three days.

Three major factors caused the

racial disturbance on that evening.

Hoke Smith and Clark Howell

had just finished a hard campaign for Governor, with both stand
ing on firm ground against Negro suffrage.
l&The New York Times, March 11, 1905»

Two Atlanta news-
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papers, the News and the Georgian, had contributed to the racist
campaign via "yellow journalism" in their stories concerning
race relations in the city.

And there existed a deep jealousy

among the white citizens of Atlanta toward the well-educated
and prosperous Negroes who had established themselves as promi17
nent citizens within the community. '
On Saturday September 22, the News and Georgian reported
that five white women had been assaulted by Negroes during the
past week and that one of the assaults had occurred just prior
to the release of the Saturday evening editions.

The News ran

five such editions with large type proclaiming "THIRD ASSAULT"
and "FOURTH ASSAULT."

Competition between the News and Georgian

for circulation was keen; yellow journalism dramatized each in
cident, and the result was an increase of racial tensions in
Atlanta.

Following the latest edition of both papers on that

Saturday evening, white mobs formed to patrol the streets and
began dragging Negroes off streetcars to beat and kill them.
The police attempted to control the rage, but they were too
late.

Negroes raced into the Decatur Street slums seeking pro

tection and others fled to the post office, where at least one
^ T h e most detailed account of the Atlanta Riot is Charles
Crowe, "Racial Massacre in Atlanta, September 22, 1906 ," Journal
of Negro History, LIV (April, 1969 ), 150-173» For contemporary
accounts see **The Atlanta Massacre," Independent, DCI (October 4,
1 906 ), 799-800; "Pacts About the Atlanta Murders," World's Work,
XIII (November, 1 906 ), 8147-8148; "The Atlanta Riot, A Southern
White Point of View," Outlook. LXXXIV (November 3» 1906), 557;
Booker T. Washington, ^Ÿhe Golden Rule in Atlanta," Outlook,
LXXXIV (December 15. 1906), 913-916.

103
black man died on the steps before he could reach the door.
Another victim fell from blows delivered by the mob under a
monument of Henry Grady.

At two-thirty in the morning the

Governor called out the militia.
violence continued.
little effect.

For three more days sporadic:

Negroes mounted fitful counterattacks with

By the end of the riot at least twelve blacks

were dead and over seventy wounded.
The black community was enraged by the mob attacks.

The

Cleveland Gazette and the Washington Bee called for a national
investigation into the disturbances.

Harry Smith of the Gazette

contended that Roosevelt should be more concerned about the con
viction and punishment of the "guilty Georgia barbarians" than
he was about American Jews* protest to the Russian Czar as a
result of the Kishenef Massacre, since blacks were United States
citizens and were "butchered on American soil."

1A

Booker T. Washington was in New York when the Atlanta
riots broke out.

Through the New York Age, the Negro leader

gave Atlanta’s Negroes advice on how the affair should be handled,
urging the "best white people and colored people" to unite in
their efforts to stop the disorder.

He cautioned blacks to

exercise self-control and not to make the fatal mistake of
attempting to retaliate but to "rely upon the efforts of proper
19
authorities to bring order out of confusion."
Washington
^®The Cleveland Gazette, September 29, 1906.
19
The New York Age, September 27, 1906.

104travelled to Atlanta and •’gathered together his frightened peo
ple amid the smoking ruins of their homes, soothed, calmed, and

20

cheered them.”

He surveyed the damage done by the riots and

later published an optimistic account in Outlook prophesying
advancements and understanding between the races as a result
of the riot.^^
Roosevelt failed to act on the Atlanta riot, to the dis
may of the black community.

He viewed the disturbance as a

civil matter, not warranting federal intervention.

A group of

newspaper editors in Atlanta and former Governor Andrew J. Montegue of Virginia approached the President and requested that
a commission be appointed to investigate and make recommenda
tions on the Southern Negro problem.

The proposal was insti

tuted by Clark Howell, editor of the Atlanta Constitution.
These Southerners urged Rossevelt to announce in his December
Annual Message of 1906 his intentions in appointing such a com
mission.

The President considered the proposal seriously but

decided against mentioning it in his message.

He explained

his reasoning to Howell: ”I am very much afraid that a certain
extreme element here in the North would misunderstand that rec
ommendation and hail it as having what would be in reality a
sinister party purpose; and I am almost equally afraid that an
on
Emmett J. Scott and Lyman Beecher Stowe, Booker T. Wash
ington: Builder of a Civilization (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
Page, and Co., I916 T» p. 26.
21
Booker T. Washington, "The Golden Rule in Atlanta," Out
look. LXXXIV (December 15, 1906), 913-916.
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exactly opposite element in the South, but an element no less
radical and no less prejudiced, would make the same mistake."
Roosevelt then suggested that a "first-class southern Senator
or Congressman" introduce the bill and he would follow by
"heartedly backing it up,"

As a result the bill was never

mentioned by Roosevelt in his message, nor was it proposed by
22
any member of Congress,
In his Annual Message to Congress in 1 906 , Roosevelt did
refer to the Negro lynching problem.

He stated that "the great

est existing cause of lynching is the participation, especial
ly by black men, /~in_/ the hideous crime of rape - the most
abominable in all the category of crimes, even worse than mur
der."

In attributing a greater "perpetration" of rape to Negroes

than to white men, Roosevelt presumably did not consider it rape
for a white man to force his intentions on a helpless Negro
woman, nor did he take into consideration how easy it was for
a black man who accidehtly touched a white woman to be accused
of rape.

He did recognize that "when mobs begin to lynch for

rape they speedily extend the sphere of their operation and
lynch for many other kinds of crimes,"

He asserted that "two-

thirds of the lynchings are not for rape at all" and that "a
considerable proportion of the individuals lynched are innocent
of all crime,"

In the President's judgment, "the crime of rape

should always be punished with death, as in the case with murder,"
22

Theodore Roosevelt to Clark Howell, November 5» 1906,
Elting E. Morison, ed,. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 Vols,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), V , pp, 4#7-488.
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and "assault with the intent to rape should be made a capital
crime, at least in the discretion of the court."
phasized the necessity of "justice under the law,"

But he em
Roosevelt

continued: "There is no question of 'social equality' or 'negro
domination* involved; only the question of relentlessly punish
ing bad men." Every colored man should realize that the worst
enemy of his race is the negro criminal, and above all the
negro criminal who commits the dreadful crime of rape."

He

urged that "respectable colored people must l e a m not to harbor
criminals.
Roosevelt linked the problem of crime with the need for
more education for Negroes,

He felt that education would les

sen the possibility of crime and believed "the best type of ed
ucation for the colored man, as a whole" was that given at such
schools as "Hampton and Tuskegee," where "young men and young
women are trained industrially as well as in the ordinary public
school branches."

He added that "hardly any of them become

criminals," especially of "the form of that brutal violence
24
which invites lynch-law."
In his address to Congress, Roosevelt confronted the issue
of lynching, as requested by the black community, but what he
said did not concur with their sentiments on the matter.

Be-

^^Roosevelt, Works, XV, pp. 351 ■*354; Harbaugh, ed.. The
Writings of Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 204-208.
2L

Roosevelt, Works, XV, pp. 354-355*
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lieving that reconciliation toward the South was of the utmost
importance, he sided with the arguments of white Southerners
and placed the responsibility on the black community.

Further

more, he expressed concern over the sheltering of black crimi
nals by members of their own race, without taking issue with
white Southerners who sheltered their criminals, especially
following the execution of lynch-law.

Prior to his address to

Congress, Roosevelt expressed this sentiment* **I speak of the
grave and evil fact that the negroes too often band together
to shelter their own criminals /land this_y action had an un
doubted effect in helping to precipitate the hideous Atlanta
race riots.

I condemn such attitude strongly for I feel that
25
it is fraught with the gravest danger to both races."
Roosevelt's direct appeal to white Southern sentiment

during his second administration was in the effort of "winning
the South."

But while he moved closer to the South, he moved

away from the black community.

His lack of response to lynch

ing, disfranchisement, and the Atlanta riots only proved to
Negroes that sectional reconciliation was more important to
the President than racial reconciliation.

When Roosevelt sum

marily dismissed l6? black troops in Brownsville, Texas, for
alleged participation in a raid on that town, the black com
munity fully realized that the man in the White House was no
^^Roosevelt to Silas McBee, November 27, 1906, Letters,
V, p. 509.
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longer their friend.

Black dissatisfaction with the President's

decision reached its zenith, and for the first time a disaffec
tion from the Republican ranks appeared as a serious consequence
of his appeal to the white South.

CHAPTER VI
THE BROWNSVILLE AFFAIR

When Theodore Roosevelt returned from his "Southern tour"
he had gained the admiration and support of the South.

With

his silence following the Atlanta Riots of 1906 and his accep
tance of the Southern argument on lynching, announced in his
annual message to Congress in the same year, it was apparent
that the President had formulated a new policy toward the South,
This policy was confirmed by an act that further alienated the
black community.

In October, 1906, Roosevelt summarily dis

missed members of the Twenty-fifth Infantry Regiment of the
United States Army, because of alleged participation in the
"Brownsville A f f a i r . B e c a u s e these particular soldiers were
Negroes, all hope and confidence that the black community had
once held in Roosevelt was shattered.
The details of the Brownsville Affair can be found in
Report on Brownsville Affray, U.S. Senate, 59th Cong., 2d sess..
Doc. 1537 pt. 1, Vol. XI, ser. no. 50?8; Joseph B. Foraker,
Notes of A Busy Life, 2 Vols. (Cincinnati: Stewart and Kidd Co.,
1917 ), II, pp. 2 3 1 -3 2 7 ; Ann J. Lane, The Brownsville Affair:
National Crisis and Black Reaction (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1971); Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt,
pp. 458-464; Emma Lou Thombrough, "The Brownsville Episode and
the Negro Vote," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIV
(December, 1957)» 469-493: James A. Tinsley, "Roosevelt, For
aker, and the Brownsville Affray," Journal of Negro History,
XLI (January, 1956), 43-65; John D. Weaver, The Brownsville
Raid: The Story of America's Black Dreyfus Affair (New York:
W.W. Norton, 197^7.
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Around midnight on August 13» 1906, a number of men,
estimated to be between ten and twenty, ran through the main
street of Brownsville, Texas, shooting at random.
lasted approximately ten minutes.

The "raid*

One man was killed and two

more were injured.
Two weeks prior to the raid, companies B, C, and D of
the First Battalion of the United States Twenty-fifth Infantry
arrived at Port Brown, located just outside of Brownsville.
The Twenty-fifth Infantry, composed of l6? black troops under
the command of Major Charles W. Penrose, had been stationed
at Port Niobrara, Nebraska, for more than two years.

The

soldiers were originally ordered to travel to Austin, Texas,
but the order was rescinded by the War Department at the re
quest of the white officers of the Twenty-fifth.

They feared

that racial tension in Texas would flourish with the presence
of black troops.

When news arrived in Brownsville that the

Twenty-fifth was to replace the white troops stationed at
Port Brown, complaining citizens immediately wired Washington
requesting that the orders be changed.

Secretary of War Wil

liam Howard Taft replied that racial tension existed through
out the country and claimed that the black troops were "quite
as well disciplined and behaved as the average of other troops."
Refusing to change the orders, the War Department sent the
Twenty-fifth Infantry to Brownsville.
2

It arrived on July 28,

"Report on Brownsville Affray," Senate Documents, 59 Cong,
2d sess., no. 155» P. l6lO (hereafter cited as "Report on Browns
ville Affray")I Lane, The Brownsville Affair, p. 14.
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Relations between the white citizens of Brownsville and
the Negro troops had already deteriorated prior to the raid.
In at least two incidents Negroes were pushed or struck down
by whites because of "disrespectful behavior."

On the day of

the raid, a complaint issued to city and military officials
stated that a Negro soldier had attempted to rape a white
woman in the town.
Circumstantial evidence linked the soldiers to the raid.
It was claimed that because of the harassment that the troops
were receiving, the attack was made as a revenge against the
white citizens of Brownsville.

Several citizens alleged that

they recognized, by sight or by voice, the raiders to be Negro
soldiers.

The area attacked was adjacent to the enlisted men's

barracks and was separated only by a low wall.

Empty shells

were discovered along the route of the attack and were immedi
ately assumed to have been fired by the new Springfield rifles
that the troops possessed.

3

The white officers of the Battalion initially assumed
that the troops were innocent and that the raid was a local
matter.

On the day of the attack. Mayor Fred J. Combe called

upon Major Penrose and advised him to keep his troops confined
to the Port because of the rape allegation.

When the raid

occurred, Penrose believed it was an attack against the Fort
and called for defensive positions.

After several soldiers

^"Report on Brownsville Affray," p. 446; Tinsley, "Roose
velt, Foraker, suid the Brownsville Affray," p. 44.
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were ordered to town to investigate the occurrence, and return
ed with Mayor Combe, the officers realized that the troops were
being accused.

They refused to believe the accusation until

Combe returned the following morning with several exploded
shells, cartridges and clips, the type used by the men in the
battalion.

With this evidence, the officers concluded that

some of their men must have been involved in the shootout.
The day after the raid, the Mayor appointed a committee
of four to select a Citizens Committee of fifteen townspeople
to investigate the raid.

When the Citizens Committee began

its deliberation, it assumed the black troops were guilty of
the shooting.

It was the committee's job to determine which

of the soldiers were involved.

Twenty-two witnesses, all

citizens of Brownsville, appeared before the committee.
Eight identified the raiders as black soldiers.

Five of the

eight asserted that they actually saw and recognized blacks.
The remaining three testified that they recognized the black
k
soldiers by their voices.
On August 15 the committee telegraphed President Roose
velt their conclusions and the President responded immediately
by ordering Major August P. Blocksom, Assistant InspectorGeneral of the Southwestern Division, to Brownsville to take
charge of the investigation.

Blocksom recommended that the

^"Report on Brownsville Affray," pp. 445-446; Lane, pp,
18-19.
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troops be removed from Port Brown because of the tension that
existed in the town.

By August 25 the battalion was on its

way to Port Reno, Oklahoma Territory, where Blocksom completed
his inquiry.

He filed his report on August 29 and charged an

unidentified number of the battalion with the actual guilt of
the raid and the remainder with banding together in a "con
spiracy of silence" to shield the guilty.

Blocksom asserted

that the troops wished to gain revenge for the harassment com
mitted against them by the white citizens of Brownsville.

He

concluded his report by recommending that the entire battalion
be discharged from the Army if the "conspiracy of silence" was
not broken.^
Roosevelt received Blocksom's report and gave it his
approval.

On October 4 he ordered General Ernest A. Garlington,

the South Carolina Inspector-General, to Port Reno, specifying
that the troops be informed that unless those who had knowledge
of the raid and its participants came forward, every member of
companies B, 0 and D would be discharged without honor.

On

October 22 Garlington submitted his report:
After due opportunity and notice, the enlisted men
of the Twenty-fifth Infantry have failed to tell all that
is reasonable to believe that they know concerning the
shooting. If they had done so, if they had been willing
to relate all of the circumstances - instances preliminary
^For the complete report of Major Blocksom see "Report
on Brownsville Affray," pp. 425-450.
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to the trouble - it is extremely probable that a clue suf
ficiently definite to lead to results would have been dis
closed. They appeared to stand together in a determination
to resist the detection of the guilty;^therefore they should
stand together when the penalty falls.®
By November 5 Roosevelt had read Garlington*s report,
agreed with its conclusions, and ordered Secretary Taft to carry
out the recommendation.

Execution of the order began November

1 6 , and ten days later the last member of the battalion was

discharged without honor from the United States Army.
The dismissal of the three companies of the Twenty-fifth
Infantry was a crucial blow to the black community in general
and to the black soldiers in particular.

Roosevelt insisted

upon punishing the innocent to condemn the existence of a "con
spiracy of silence."

With the dismissal, the President removed

the most distinguished black soldiers in the United States
Army.

Members of the Twenty-fifth had service ranging from

six to twenty years.

One soldier in particular. Sergeant Mingo

Sanders of Company B, personified the harm Roosevelt had in
flicted with his order.

Sanders had served in the Twenty-

fifth continuously for twenty-six years.

Because of his over

seas duty time, less than eighteen months after his dismissal
he would have been entitled to retire on three-quarters pay
with all of the rights and allowances provided by law for men
who served for more than thirty years.

Under such circumstances.

Ibid., pp. 445-448; "Committee Report of Military Inves
tigation; Just Act; Discharging Negro Troops," Outlook, LXXXIV
(December 11, 1906 ), 810-812.
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it was doubtful whether Sanders would have sacrificed his en
listment to participate in the Brownsville shoot up, yet he was
among the l6? men dismissed by the President's order.
Rodsevelt realized that there would be objections to
his order from black Americans, but he was unprepared for the
storm of protest that erupted.

The response of blacks was one

of extradordinary outrage and anger.

The Negro had suffered

injustice, intimidation, disfranchisement, and lynching, but
the source of these inflictions came from irresponsible racists.
Now the attack came from Theodore Roosevelt, a man viewed as
a friend to the black race and held in reverence not equalled
since Lincoln.

Who was the Negro to turn to for help when the

man in the White House, the man who had entertained Booker T.
Washington, closed the Post Office in Indianola, and fought
for the appointment of William Crum in Charleston, South Caro
lina, had now turned against him?
The most significant comments and criticisms of the black
community came from the editorial pages of the Washington Bee,
the Cleveland Gazette, and the New York Age. When the dismis
sal order was issued, W. Calvin Chase of the Bee declared that
Roosevelt and his advisors held a profound prejudice against
the Negro.

Chase contended that the President sought the

^Joseph B. Foraker, "Testimony in the Brownsville Inves
tigation," North American Review, CLXXXVII (April, 1908), pp.
551-552; "Again the Black Battalion," Current Literature, XLII
(February 4, 190?), 132-135.
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"heàrty approval of Southern rebel opinion" with his order.
Harry C. Smith of the Gazette denounced the President's action
as an "undeserved and unmerited triumph of Southern prejudice"
Q
against the black race.
The Gazette and Bee were usually anti-administration, and
their protests were to be expected.

But the New York Age, the

most distinguished Negro paper, was controlled by Tuskegee and
the criticisms that flowed from the pen of its editor, T. Thomas
9
Fortune, alarmed Roosevelt.
Fortune's initial reaction to Brownsville was not a criti
cism of Roosevelt's decision, but a warning to "any black man
who offered to enlist in the United States Army to fill the
place of the innocent members of the Twenty-fifth."

Such men.

Fortune wrote, "should be hated and shunned by the Afro-American
race at large ^ f o r _ 7 if we cannot get justice in the army, we
are not compelled to enter it."

As the events of Brownsville

unfolded, the Age took a progressively harder stand against
Roosevelt.

Fortune later referred to the President's order of

dismissal as "executive lynch law," and charged Roosevelt with
being a Democrat.
O
The Washington Bee, November 10, 1906; The Cleveland
Gazette, January 12, 1957.
% h e Age was an important organ for molding Negro opinion
and even more an expression of Negro opinion favorable to poli
cies advocated by Booker T. Washington. See Emma Lou Thombrough
"More Light on Booker T. Washington and the New York Age," Journa.
of Negro History, XLIII (January, 1958)» 34-49.
^®The New York Age, November 8, 29» 1906? February 21, 190?
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Booker T. Washington found himself in a peculiar situation.
The black community, hearing of the dismissal, speculated about
Washington's role in the decision.

Washington personally did

not agree with the President's order but he could not criticize
"his friend" without jeopardizing his relationship with Roose
velt.
Publicly, Washington remained noticeably silent about the
Brownsville dismissal, but privately he attempted to get the
order rescinded.

The Tuskegeean had advance knowledge of the

President's decision to discharge the troops and had written

asking him to reconsider the order.

Roosevelt repliedi "I

could not possibly refrain from acting as regard these colored
soldiers.

You cannot have any information to give me privately

to which I could pay heed ... because the information on which
I act is that which came out of the investigation itself."

11

Washington turned to Secretary Taft and urged him to
hold up the discharge until the President returned from his
trip to Panama.

"I have never in all my experience with the

race, experienced a time when the entire people have the feel
ing that they now have in regard to the administration," ex12
plained Washington.
^^Theodore Roosevelt to Booker T. Washington, November 5#
1 9 0 6 , quoted in Emma Lou Thombrough, "The Brownsville Episode
and the Negro Vote," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIV
(December, 1957)» P* 474.

^^Washington to William Howard Taft, November 20, 1 9 0 6 ,
quoted in Ibid., p. 475.
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Taft was also approached by Mary Church Terrell, the wife
of Judge Robert H. Terrell, and a member of the District of Col
umbia Board of Education.

After waiting nearly six hours, she

was ushered in to see the Secretary of War and she requested
him to withold execution of the order until the soldiers were
given a trial, so that the innocent "shall not be sent forth
branded as murderers."

After Mrs. Terrell left, Taft cabled

Roosevelt, stating that he would withold the execution of the
order until he heard from the President.

"Discharge is not

to be suspended unless there are new facts of such importance
as to warrant you cabling me!," replied Roosevelt.

Outraged

over the protests he was receiving, he continued* "I care
nothing whatever for the yelling of either the politicians or
the sentimentalists.

The offense was most heinous and the

punishment I inflicted was imposed after due deliberation.
All I shall pay heed to is the presentation of facts showing
the official reports to be in whole or in part untrue, or
clearly exculpating some individual man.

If any such facts

later appear I can act as may deemed advisable, but nothing
has been brought before me to warrant the suspension of the
14
order, and I direct that it be executed."
13
Mary Church Terrell, "Secretary Taft and the Negro
Soldiers," Independent, LXV (July 23, 1908), 189-190.
^^Theodore Roosevelt to William Howard Taft, November 21,
1906, Elting E. Morison, ed.. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt,
8 Vols. (Cambridge* Harvard University Press, 1952), V., p. 498.
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Taft believed that a suspension of the order would con
vince people of the fairness of the hearing by granting a re
hearing.

Writing to his wife, Taft informed her that "the

President is worked up on the subject and does not propose to
retract from his position,"

He did not believe that Roosevelt

had quite realized "the great feeling that has been aroused"
on Brownsville.^^

Although Taft had no part in the decision

to discharge the troops, he asserted that the order was "en
tirely justified."

However, he felt that a rehearing would be

the best method to clarify a matter "where a decision is ques
tioned."

He later commented to his brothers "If a rehearing

shows that the original conclusion was wrong, it presents a
dignified way of recalling it; and if it does not, it enforces
the original conclusion."^

When Roosevelt refused to con

sider the idea, Taft stood by his chief and refused to question
or criticize the action.

The Secretary of War, according to

his biographer, "was really an innocent victim of Roosevelt's
17
impetuosity."
Roosevelt's determination to dismiss the troops brought
further attempts to rescind or modify the order.

Prominent

W i l l i a m Howard Taft to Helen H. Taft, November 21, 1906,
quoted in Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard
Taft: A Biography, 2 Vols. (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc,,
1939)» I.» pp. 324-323.
^^Taft to C.P. Taft, January 1, 190?, quoted in Ibid., p. 32:
l?Ibid., p. 323.
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white officials, such as Massachusetts Governor Curtis Guild,
Jr., wired the President stating that black citizens believed
that members of the War Department's investigating team were
prejudiced toward Negroes and that Roosevelt had acted upon
their prejudice.

Angered by this accusation, Roosevelt replied

that prejudice played absolutely no part in his decision.
"The action was precisely such as I should have taken had the
soldiers guilty of the misconduct been white men instead of
colored men."

He continued*

When the discipline and honor of the American Army are at
stake I shall never under any circumstance consider the
political bearing of upholding that discipline and that
honor, and no graver misfortune could happen to the Ameri
can Army than failure to punish in the most signal way
such conduct as that which I have punished ....^
Writing to Silas McBee, Roosevelt asserted that he was
"angered and indignant at the attitude of the negroes and of
the shortsighted white sentimentalists" as to his action.

The

Twenty-fifth Infantry "took action which cannot be tolerated
in any soldier, black or white, in any policeman, black or
white, and which, if taken generally in the army, would mean
not merely that the usefulness of the army was at an end but
that it had better be disbanded in its entirety at once."
Roosevelt believed that the pressure being exerted against him.
^®Roosevelt to Curtis Guild, Jr., November 7, 1906, Let
ters, V., pp. 489-490.
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"not only by sentimentalists but by the northern politicians"
19
was an effort "to keep the negro vote."
Roosevelt's decision to dismiss the Negro troops coincided
with the upcoming Congressional and State elections of 1906.
He soon became the victim of another attack - he was charged
with playing politics with the Brownsville decision.

The dis

missal was ordered on November 5 but not issued until after the
November 9 elections, when Republicans retained control of the
House of Representatives.

The Waterville (Maine) Sentinel

stated that in many northern districts black voters had held
the balance for the Republicans because of their personal de
votion to the President.

"It was a case of 'we are coming

brother Theodore, three hundred thousand strong' but they would
have been coming in different temper had they known that on
brother Theodore's desk was an order to disgrace and humiliate
the entire colored ^pregimentJ7 of the 25th Infantry."

The New

York Herald surmised that had news of the order been received
six hours earlier, "it would have caused the Republican major21
ity in the House of Representatives to drop from 59 to 14."
Other papers pointed out that the President's son-in-law,
Nicholas Longworth, re-elected to Congress in Ohio, benefitted
tremendously from Roosevelt's delay in issuing the order.

Had

^^Roosevelt to Silas McBee, November 27» 1906, Letters,
V, p. 509.
20
The Waterville (Maine) Sentinel, November 26, 1906,
quoted in Lane, The Brownsville Affair, p. 80.
^^The New York Herald, November 23» 1906, quoted in Tinsley,
"Roosevelt, Foraker, and the Brownsville Affray," p. 4?.
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one-half of the Negro vote been switched, Longworth would have
lost the election in Cincinnati.

A similar shift of Negro votes

in the New York State gubernatorial race would have meant defeat
22
for Charles Evans Hughes.
At the Abyssinian Baptist Church,
Reverend W. Bishop Johnson, pastor of the Second Baptist Church
(colored) declared;
The President's decree was signed the day after the
election. He shot us when our gun was empty. But we have
two years to work, and our slogan shall be “a Republican
Congress to protect our people in the South, a Democratic
President to resent the insult heaped upon us." Thus shall
we answer Theodore Roosevelt, once enshrined in our hearts
as Moses, now enshrined in our scorn as Judas.
Roosevelt continually denied any political play involved
in the entire Brownsville proceeding.

He wrote to Silas McBee;

"As you know I believe in practical politics, and, where possible,
I always weigh well any action which may cost votes before I
consent to take it; but in a case like this, where the issue is
not merely one of naked right and wrong but one of vital con
cern to the whole country, I will not for one moment consider
the political effect."
^^insley, p. k?.
^^The New York Times, November 19» 1906; also quoted in
Lane, p. 80 and Tinsley, pp. 4?-48.
p jI

Roosevelt to Silas McBee, November 21, 1906, Letters,
V, p. 498.
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During his first term in office, Roosevelt provoked a
substantial amount of criticism from the Southern press for
his defense of the Negro.

With the Brownsville raid and his

subsequent action toward dismissal, the President received
genuine support from the South and was commended by its press.
The Nashville American, for example, called the order "the most
praiseworthy thing the President has done," and contended that
the soldiers should have been "discharged without their heads."

25

The New Orleans Times~Democrat asserted that black troops were
"menaces to the country and ... a disturbing influence wherever
they were stationed."

The paper favored the elimination of all

Negro companies from the Army as the "proper and only solution
to the problem."

26

Northern editors generally assumed that a few of the
soldiers were indeed guilty.

What they condemned was the man

ner in which Roosevelt punished the accused.

Many believed that

he had acted unjustly in punishing the men of the Twenty-fifth
Infantry without benefit of court-martial.

The Washington

Post argued that "while the President's power to discharge a
soldier cannot be questioned it is not conferred for purposes
of punishment.

Punishment is suppose to follow a trial."

The

New York Sun observed, "By the old law the individual is entitled
^^The Nashville American quoted in Tinsley, p. 48.
26
The New Orleans Times-Democrat quoted in "Again the Black
Battalion," Current Literature, XLII (February 4, 1907), p. 134.
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to trial and must be proved guilty.

By the new law the penalty

falls on a number of men collectively, because they 'appear*
to an investigating or prosecuting officer to 'stand together,•
and to escape the punishment thus imposed by wholesale the in27
dividual must prove his innocence."
The black press assumed
the soldiers had perpetrated the raid, with many of the papers
justifying it.

The Cleveland Gazette believed that the men
28
acted "in defense of their lives."
The black press defended
the soldiers in some way and criticized the severity of the
punishment.

It was not until the Constitution League of the

United States and Senator Joseph B. Foraker began their inves
tigations into the affair, that the black community came to be
lieve that the soldiers were innocent.
The Constitution League, an interracial organization
formed shortly before the Brownsville affair to attack disfran
chisement and other forms of discriminatory practice, submitted
a report to Congress on December 10, 1906, stating that the
evidence indicated that the soldiers were innocent.

Spirited

by John E. Milhollard, the organization sent its own investi
gator, Gilchrist Stewart, to Brownsville and Port Reno and was
soon notified that the facts in the case did not justify the
charge.

Stewart declared that much of the "evidence accepted

^The Washington Post, November 7» 1906; The New York Sun,
quoted in the Washington Post, November 24, 1906; also quoted in
Tinsley, p. 47.
pa
The Cleveland Gazette, January 12, 190?.
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as incriminating the soldiers is incompetent, flimsy, and biased,
or expressions only of opinion of witnesses."

Stewart turned

upon General Garlington and Major Blocksom and charged them
with "preconceiving the guilt of the soldiers and denying them
29
a fair trial."
The Constitution League report was hastily drawn and con
tained bias in favor of the soldiers as strong as the bias of
which it complained.

The significance of its statement, how

ever, was the impact it had on Senator Foraker, provoking him
to examine the President's action more closely and to call for
30
a full Senate investigation.
The action of Senator Foraker in the Brownsville episode
projected the incident into the political arena and it assumed
national importance.

Foraker mobilized the widespread outrage

of the black community into a lengthy but unsuccessful campaign
against Theodore Roosevelt.

Foraker denied that Brownsville

played any role in his political aspirations, though his eye
was on the Presidential nomination in 1908, and the Brownsville
affair presented an opportunity to undercut Roosevelt's support
for Taft.
In December, 1906, Foraker introduced a resolution in
the Senate calling upon the War Department to make available
29"Report on the Brownsville Affray," p. 222; Tinsley,
p. 50.
Joseph B. Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life, 2 Vols. (Cin
cinnati: Stewart and Kidd Co., 1917), II, pp. 234.
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all information concerning the Brownsville incident.

He be

lieved that the testimony on which the President acted upon
was "flimsy, unreliable and insufficient and untruthful...."
In a heated exchange on the floor of the Senate, he defended
his resolution, charging that the soldiers were entitled to
a trial if their discharges rested upon a "conviction that a
31
felony had been committed."
Foraker*s resolution was adopted.
In response to the resolution, Roosevelt sent a message
to Congress on December 19» 1906, defending his position and
justifying his dismissal, without honor, of the three black
companies.

He had ordered the discharge "in the exercise of

my constitutional power and in pursuance of what, after full
consideration I found to be my constitutional duty as Commander
in Chief of the United States Army,"

He stated that he "re

sented with the keenest indignation" any efforts to draw a
line based upon the birthplace of members of the Department's
investigating team, an answer to critics who pointed out that
General Garlington was from South Carolina.

He declared that

the same action would have been taken had the soldiers involved
been white.

Roosevelt presented in length the "facts" of the

Department's report and asserted that the soldier's act "was
one of horrible atrocity," and so far as he was aware, "un
paralleled for infamy in the annals of the United States Army."
^Iporaker, Notes of a Busy Life, II, pp. 234-236.
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He continued*
The evidence proves conclusively that a number of
soldiers engaged in a deliberate and concerted attack, as
cold blooded as it was cowardly; the purpose being to ter
rorize the community, and to kill or injure men, women and
children in their homes and beds or on the streets, and
this at an hour of the night when concerted or effective
resistance or defense was out of the question, and when
detection by identification of the criminals in the United
States* uniform was well-nigh impossible ... / “the crime
was_/ supplemented by another, only less black, in the
shape of a sucessful conspiracy of murder.
Roosevelt explained that this discharge from service was not
a punishment.

"The Punishment meted for mutineers and murders,"

the President proclaimed, "is death."

He regretted that it was

impossible "to have punished the guilty men" but warned the
black community not to defend their guilty members for they
"were laying up for themselves the most dreadful day of reckon
ing."^^
In the Senate, Foraker effectively challenged much of
the President's message and a debate followed on a new resolu
tion, calling for a full scale investigation of Roosevelt's
actions.

Recognizing that the evidence was insufficient, Roose

velt sent Assistant Attorney-General Milton D. Purdy to Browns
ville for further investigation.

Purdy's review contained no

new evidence but it replaced Blocksom's original statement with
^ "Report on Brownsville Affray," pp. 1-9; "Discharge of
Negro Soldiers," Independent, LXI (December, 1906), 1531-1532;
Foraker, Notes, II, pp. 236-239.
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a comprehensive coverage of all the evidence, along with the
witnesses' statements presented in the form of sworn affidavits.
On January 14, 190? Roosevelt sent another message to the Senate,
offering in detail the evidence of shells, cartridges, as well
as the eyewitness reports, so that "the fact that the assail
ants were United States soldiers ... would be conclusive ... if
not one soldier had been seen .., and if nothing were known save
the finding of shells, clips, and bullets."

The President

accompanied the Purdy report with an order rescinding the part
of his original order which debarred the ex-soldiers from appoint
ment in the civil service.

"This action convinced many doubt

ful Senators that the Pr^ident had strong legal support for
34
his stand and that he was acting in good faith."
With the tide slowly turning in his favor, Roosevelt look
ed to the Senate vote on the Foraker resolution as a test of con
fidence.

Writing to his son Kermit, the President stated that

Brownsville "is really not any of the Senate's business."

He

was uncertain how the vote would turn out but expressed hope
that "those /~who_7 support me will win; but if they do not,
it will not make the slightest difference in my attitude.

3*5

Roosevelt's chief spokesman in the Senate, Henry Cabot Lodge,
^^Quoted in Lane, The Brownsville Affair, pp. 137-138.
^^Tinsley, p. 5 2 .
^%oosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, January 19, 1907, Let
ters. V, pp. 557-558.
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was joined during the later stages of the debate on the Foraker
resolution by John C. Spooner of Wisconsin and Philander C. Knox
of Pennsylvania, and the Republican leadership forced Foraker
to amend his resolution so that neither the "legality nor the
justice" of the President’s act was questioned.

On January 22,

1907 the Senate passed the resolution calling for an investi

gation by the Committee on Military Affairs.

Foraker was a

member of the committee,
Roosevelt was sincerely disturbed with Foraker for in
troducing his resolution for another investigation.

This be

came apparent on January 26 when the two met head on at the
Gridiron Club dinner.

Foraker arrived at the dinner unaware

that Roosevelt was to address the Club.

During his speech,

the President spoke about legislation for regulation of cor
porations and railroads, and the Brownsville investigation,
subjects on which the two men were in basic disagreement.
Roosevelt contended that the Senate Brownsville investigation
was purely "academic," and denounced those who had challenged
his authority.

Following his speech, the toastmaster of the

Club, Samuel G. Blythe, feeling that "the hour for bloody
sarcasm /~had_7 arrived, ... took the liberty of calling upon
37
Senator Foraker for some remarks."
What followed was a rare
^^Tinsley, pp. 52-53.
^^Ibid., pp. 53-5^5 Foraker, Notes, XI, pp. 249-257;
Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 462; Everett Walters, Joseph
Benson Foraker: An Uncompromising Republican (Columbus; The
Ohio History Press, 1948), pp. 238-240; Lane, pp. 147-148.
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public confrontation between the President and a United States
Senator.
Although Foraker was unprepared, he immediately launched
into a defense of his stand on Brownsville.

He called Roose

velt's order illegal, unconstitutional, and unjustifiable.

He

spoke of Mingo Sanders, and the President's insistence upon
punishing the innocent with the assumed guilty.

Foraker be

lieved that "the President knew / ”Sanders_7 was as innocent of
offense against the law of any kind whatever from what had ap
peared in the newspaper accounts of the affair."

He asserted

that his purpose for calling an investigation was not that of
a "demagogue to secure negro votes."

He was seeking "to pro

vide the troops with an opportunity to be heard in their own
defense ... to the end that if it should appear that injustice
38
was done it might be righted."
No sooner had Foraker finished, than Roosevelt jumped up
and began a short but bitter rebuttal.

He emphatically stated

that if the Senate passed a resolution to reinstate the soldiers,
he would veto it; if they passed it over his veto, he would pay
no attention to it.
ident.^9

"I welcome impeachment," exclaimed the Pres

He then left the dinner abruptly, leaving no time for

discussion.
3®Poraker, Notes, II, p. 251.
39lane, pp. 147-148.
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Foraker won the sympathy of the crowd that evening.

He

had been attacked by the President before a large and rather
influential gathering.

He was cheered for his courageous de

fense.
On the following day, Roosevelt reflected on the previ
ous night,in a letter to Albert J. Beveridge*
Foraker ought not to have been called upon to speak;
but, as he was called upon, I do not blame him much for the
speech he did make. I was in two minds what to say in an
swer; I was inclined to make a Berserker speech myself and
go over the whole business, and perhaps this would have been
better; but in the few minutes I had to decide I concluded
that I would merely make a flat contradiction of what he
had said, point out the fact that I and not he would pass
judgment upon the case, and that I should absolutely dis
regard anything except my own convictions, and let it go
at t h a t . W D
Relations between the President and Senator Foraker strain
ed following the Gridiron Dinner.

Roosevelt was determined to

eliminate the Senator from political life.

He refused to ap

point a lawyer, recommended by Foraker, for a newly created
district in Ohio.

The Senator had recommended Judge John J.

Adams for Roosevelt's consideration, and he assumed that, inas
much as he was senior senator from Ohio and a member of the
Senate Judiciary Committee and that the judgeship in question
was for the Southern District of Ohio, the President would com
ply with his recommendation.

Roosevelt's failure to appoint

^^Roosevelt to Albert J. Beveridge, January 2?, 190?,
Letters, V, p. 571.
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Adams indicated to Foraker that relations with the President
were strained beyond repair.
On March 11, 1908, the Committee on Military Affairs com
pleted its investigation of the Brownsville affair and issued
its results.

As expected, its report was divided into majority

and minority opinions.

The majority report held that the shoot

ing at Brownsville was done by some of the soldiers but the tes
timony did not identify the particular soldiers involved.
report confirmed the President's convictions.

This

It was signed

by all five Democrats on the committee and four of the Republi
can members.

These four Republicans also recommended the pas

sage of a bill that would extend for one year the President's
authority to re-enlist any member of the Twenty-fifth who could
prove his innocence.
Four Republicans, including Senator Foraker, subscribed
to a minority report, stating that the testimony taken was un
satisfactory, indefinite and conflicting in its nature.

It

failed to identify the particular individuals who participated
in the shooting and failed to prove that a "conspiracy of si
lence" existed among the soldiers.

Senators Foraker and Mor

gan G. Bulkeley of Connecticut offered a second minority re
port which claimed that the weight of the testimony showed that
none of the soldiers participated in the shooting.
For details of the Senate report see; "Report of the
Senate Committee on Military Affairs," Senate Documents, 60 Cong.,
1st sess.. Report no. 355» pt. 1, vol. II, ser. no. 5219; Lane,
pp. 33-52Î Tinsley, pp. 55-58.
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Roosevelt accepted the majority report without reserva
tion.

He felt that the committee's results "conclusively show

that the murderous assault in question was committed by various
soldiers, probably ten to twenty in number."

The Foraker opin

ion, to the President, amounted "simply to a proposal to con
done murder and perjury in the past and put a premium upon per
jury in the future by permitting any murder/~er_/ or perjurer,
who will again perjure himself, to be restored to the United
42
States Army...."
He would "refuse to sign" the bill and "re43
fuse to obey if it were passed over my veto." ^He referred to
it as "academic" and believed that if it received a two-thirds
vote in each House, "which is not possible,"it would be clearly
unconstitutional and I should pay not the slightest heed to it."
Roosevelt reaffirmed his executive position*
No law can take my power of appointment or force me
to make appointment, any more than I could by Executive
order decree that I had the power to make appropriations.
The Legislature cannot usurp the functions of the Executive
any more than the Executive can usurp the functions of the
Legislature.44
The choice of the two bills was left to the Senate.

If

they selected the minority report, Foraker would be successful
^^Roosevelt to Francis Emroy Warren, March 9» 1908, Let
ters, VI, pp. 966 -9 6 7 .
43
^^Roosevelt
^Roosev
to Ernest Hamlin Abbott, March 12, 1908,
Ibid., p. 9 6 8 .

^^Roosev
^^Roosevelt to William Alden Smith, April 24, 1908, Ibid.,
pp. 1016 -1017 .
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in embarassing the President and would enhance his chances at
securing the Republican nomination.

However, a canvass of Re

publican Senators showed that he could receive the support of
only thirty-five colleagues.

With this knowledge, Foraker de

cided that more would be gained if consideration of his bill
were delayed until December, 1908,
In the summer of 1908, however, Roosevelt authorized a
secret investigation of the Brownsville matter.

Feeling For

aker *s pressure, the War Department hired Herbert J. Brown, a
Washington journalist, and William B. Baldwin, head of a Negro
detective agency in Richmond, to discover the guilty members
by circulating among the ex-soldiers.

Brown and Baldwin re

ported that one of the soldiers, Boyd Conyers of Monroe, Geor
gia, had confessed his guilt and had provided the names of the
other participants.

Upon receiving this information, Roosevelt

sent it directly to the Senate.

However, Foraker was prepared.

The Senator held sworn affidavits from Conyers.and several in
fluential white citizens of Monroe, denying the story.

Sheriff

E. C. Arnold, who was present during Brown and Baldwin's inter
view with Conyers, stated that when the detectives failed to
receive a confession out of Conyers, "Brown asked him to give
the names of some of the baseball players and also the names
of the most reckless and turbulent members of his company.

This

Conyers did ... and these names ... Mr. Brown ... says were furTinsley, pp. 58-59.
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nished him by Conyers as the ones participating in the shoot
ing.

Roosevelt spent $15*000 on this private investigation

and, outside of the Conyers story, could not present any fur
ther evidence.

But because of this secret investigation For

aker was able to push his bill through Congress,
In December, 19 O8 , Roosevelt stuck to his original posi
tion in another message to Congress, but recommended that the
Secretary of War be empowered to reinstate any soldier within
a year if "he felt them to have been innocent."

When the

second session of the Sixtieth Congress opened. Senator For
aker introduced another bill calling for the creation of a
Board of Inquiry to reinstate the soldiers.

Under presiden

tial pressure, he agreed that the Secretary of War appoint
the members of the Board.

The Senate passed the bill on

February 23» 1909» and the House of Representatives followed
suit four days later.

Roosevelt ultimately signed the bill
48
on March 3» one of his last official acts.
The Court of Military Inquiry began its investigation

on May 4 and continued it until April» 1910.

On April 6 it

issued a report which concluded that the raid had been per
petrated by a small group of the black soldiers but the guilty
members could not be found.

No new evidence was discovered.

^^Congressional Record, 60 Cong.» 2d sess., XLIII, p. 800;
Tinsley» ppT 59~6o.
^^lane » pp. 138-139
^®Tinsley, p. 59.
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and consequently the Court inquiry employed previous testi
mony and investigations.

The Court qualified fourteen of the

men for reenlistment, and by August 13» 1910, eleven of the
fourteen had reenlisted.

The official record of the Browns

ville affair had closed.
A period of sixty-six years elapsed before the Browns
ville case was reopened.

On September 28, 1972 the United

States Army announced that the records of the 16? black sol
diers discharged without honor by Theodore Roosevelt had been
cleared.

Army officials asserted that the disciplinary action

in the case was the only documented case of mass punishment
in its history.

Secretary of the Army Robert P. Proehike de

clared the action "a gross injustice.
The Brownsville affair profoundly shocked the black com
munity and Roosevelt's assertion of his constitutional power
to dismiss the soldiers crystallized its opposition toward him.
While those close to the administration did all in their power
^^Tinsley, p. 6 l.
^^The New York Times, September 29» December 31, 1972.
Historians have offered varied assessments of the Brownsville
Affair. John D. Weaver, The Brownsville Raid contends that the
evidence pointed to the innocence of the black troops. He ar
gues that some local vigilantes, angered by the black soldiers
presence, staged a shootout. Ann J. Lane, The Brownsville Af
fair cautiously concludes that the case against the soldiers
was not proved. Henry P. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt; A Biog
raphy, pp. 458-464,is critical of Rooseveltsand William H. Harbaugh. Power and Responsibilityt The Life and Times of Theodore
Roosevelt, pp. 303 -30 Ô, condemns Roosevelt*saction but is less
sympathetic than Pringle to Foraker's defense of the soldiers.
George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, 1900-1912, pp.
2 1 2 -2 1 3 , assumes the guilt of some of the soldiers and has no
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to supress the criticisms of Roosevelt, others gathered in
lectures, meetings, conventions and socities to denounce the
policies of the President on Brownsville,

Black Americans,

for the first time, openly criticized Roosevelt and threaten
ed a "wholesale defection of Negro votes from the Republican
party.
criticism for Roosevelt's action. James A, Tinsley, "Roose
velt, Foraker, and the Brownsville Affray," concludes that
there is doubt about the soldiers guilt and is critical of
Roosevelt's methods. Rayford W. Logan, The Betrayal of the
Negro, pp. 345 -3 4 7 , suggests that Rooseveltfs dismissal of
the black troops stemmed from a further desire to propitiate
the South.
^^Thombrough, "The Brownsville Episode and the Negro
Vote," p. 4 6 9 .

CHAPTER VII
BROWNSVILLE, TAFT AND THE
ELECTION OF 1908
On election eve of 1904 Theodore Roosevelt decided to
give up the Presidency upon the completion of his second term.
This critical decision left the field wide open for Republican
presidential hopefuls.

Many Republicans believed that Roose

velt would receive the support of the party if he chose to run
again in 1908.

To most members, both conservative and progres

sive, any other candidate was considered “a poor second choice."^
There were several prominent men who might be considered as
serious candidates for the nomination.

Charles Evans Hughes,

the Governor of New York, and two of Roosevelt's cabinet mem
bers, Secretary of State Elihu Roottand Secretary of War William
Howard Taft, were among the frontrunners.

Governor Hughes, how

ever, showed an independent temperament and disagreed with Roose
velt's political patronage policy in New York.
into an alliance with the President's enemies.

This forced him
2

Both Root and Taft were in basic agreement with the Presi
dent's handling of domestic and foreign affairs.

It seemed ap-

^George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the
Birth of M o d e m America, 190 O-19T? (New York* Harper anà'"Brothers,
Ï93FT Î962TTPP. 1 8 0 ; 2 2 6 . ---2
William H. Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility* The Life
yid Times of Theodore Roosevelt TNew York: Farrar, Straus and
budahy, 19SÎ; Collier Books, 1963 ), pp. 323-333*
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parent that either man, if selected, would continue his poli
cies.

Root, however, was in bad health, and was considered

too close to Wall Street to carry on in the Rooseveltian image
as "trustbxister. ”

By 190? the Secretary of State had become

much too conservative on financial matters and his support of
corporate interests.

Secretary Taft was therefore the man

chosen by the President as his successor.

For two years Roose3
velt worked to secure Taft*s nomination and election.
Taft
was popular with the American people and he fully agreed with
the President's policies, but he lacked the enthusiasm and
ambition for the presidency.

He often expressed the thought

that he was not a politician, and only wished to be recommend
ed for a position on the Supreme Court.

Roosevelt, on the con

trary, was determined to groom his man for the office of Presi
dent.

Since Roosevelt was also the head of his party, the re-

lunctant Taft was assured the nomination at the Republican Con
vention,
Roosevelt and Taft both realized the necessity of con
trolling the Southern Republican delegates if Taft was to re
ceive the nomination, and this involved a direct appeal to the
black community.

Taft wanted to appeal to southern racial sen

timent as well, and in August, 1906, the Secretary delivered
the "Key Note" address to the North Carolina Legislature in
Greensboro.

In his speech, Taft outlined his views on problems

3
Mowry, p. 227.
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that existed in the South,

He stated that he would support

judicial review of disfranchisement but would not give his
consent to efforts to reduce Southern representation in the
House.

He indicated his disposition to acquiesce in the poli

tical situation which confronted Negroes, "subject only to
the judicial rather than federal legislative action."
The Brownsville affair played a significant role in
Taft's campaign for the Presidential nomination.

As Secretary

of War at the time of the dismissals, Taft was automatically
linked with Roosevelt’s decision.

White Southerners whole

heartedly approved the President’s action and this guaranteed
support for his Secretary of War.

On the other hand, the in

cident proved detrimental to Taft’s chances of winning support
from black Americans.

It appeared that Senator Foraker would

secure t^ye Negro vote in payment for his defense of the black
troops.
Roosevelt was aware of the discontent of the Negro com
munity over his decision to dismiss the troops.

Though he

would not change his position, he was concerned about the
chances of a large defection of black votes.
nitely hurt Taft’s chances in 1908.

This would defi

The hostility expressed

by the black press toward Taft’s candidacy was due to Browns
ville, though the dismissal was the President’s order, with
4

"The Candor of Secretary Taft," Current Literature. XLI
(August, 1906), 127; Henry P. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt. A
Biography (New York* Harcourt, Brace and Go., 19^2), pp. 127»

Î4ÏT

I4l
Taft merely following his chief's instructions.

Roosevelt knew

that his Secretary must be cleared of involvement in the deci
sion.
Writing his son Kermit in October, 1908, Roosevelt ex
pressed optimism about Taft's chances of winning the election;
"The surface indications are certainly our way and I am inclined
to think that we shall carry the election...."

He contended

that "the defection in the Negro vote ... is real" but would
only be important "if the election is very c l o s e . I n a let
ter to Charles Evans Hughes Roosevelt confessed that the Gover
nor "will gain some votes that Taft won't ... some negroes and
some misled and rather bigoted evangelical Protestants who ob
ject to Taft."6
Because of his involvement in Brownsville, Taft was opposed
by such anti-administration papers as the Cleveland Gazette and
the Boston Guardian, as well as by prominent Negro leaders such
as W. E. B. DuBois and the Niagara Movement,

It was therefore

imperative for Roosevelt to claim responsibility for the deci
sion and have Taft exonerated for his issuance of the dismissal
7
order.'
Theodore Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, October 20, 1908,
Siting E. Morison, ed.. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 Vols
(Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 19^2j, VI, pp. I303 -1304 ,
^Roosevelt to Charles Evans Hughes, October 14, 1908, Let
ters, VI, p. 1286.

7
The Cleveland Gazette. January 11, 1908; The Boston G\iardian, February 15, 1908; A u ^ s t Meier, Negro Thought in America,
1880-1915; Racial Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington
(Ann Arbor; University of MicKigan Press, 1963 }, p7 lB5T
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Roosevelt at first was not aware that Taft suffered from
the Brownsville decision.

"I had always supposed that every

one knew that the whole Brownsville business had been carried
on under my personal supervision," declared Roosevelt.

"When

I get angry my impulse always is to move up as close to my an
tagonist as possible; and if there was the slightest doubt on
the subject I was exceedingly anxious that everybody concerned
should know that I not only accepted but claimed the entire reO
sponsibility for the affair."
Roosevelt conferred with Henry C. Corbin over the prob
lem of Brownsville and Taft's candidacy.

Corbin, who was de

voting his time to the Taft campaign following his retirement
from the array, explained to the press that "any credit or blame"
in the affair "cannot in any way be laid to Mr. Taft."

He

asserted that Roosevelt issued the order to dismiss the troops
and sustained that order in spite of Taft's request that it be
suspended.

To document his explanation, Corbin released the

President's cable to Taft, ordering the Secretary of War to
issue the dismissal.

Corbin concluded^ "Of course, the Browns

ville Affair is going to be paraded in the campaign," but, "the
colored vote ... will be for Taft."

Roosevelt, concurring with
Q

Corbin's statement, announced that it was "absolutely correct."
Q
Roosevelt to John Hayes Hammond, August 8, 1908, Letters.
VI, p. 1163.
9
Moris
Morison,. ed..
., Letters ____
of Theodore Roosevelt. VI, p. Il63n;
The New York Times, August 8 , 1908.
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Booker T. Washington was noticeably silent over the Browns
ville incident.

Failing to persuade Roosevelt to rescind the

order of dismissal, the Negro educator believed that the best
way to handle the affair was to ignore it and "watch the con
troversy slowly c r u m b l e . B u t as opposition mounted against
the President, Washington was aware that it was also projected
at him.

He wrote to his friend, Charles Andersoni "... the

enemy will, as usual, try to blame me for all this.

They can

talk; I cannot, without being disloyal to our friend, who I
mean to stand by throughout his administration."^^
Washington was aware of the damage that might be done if
opposition to the President led to a defection from the Repub
lican party.

The protests from the black community were jeop

ardizing his leadership and influence, but he was determined
to offset them.

One method was to continue recommending Negroes

for patronage positions to the President.

Roosevelt was also

cognizant that by appointing blacks to office, he would be
presenting evidence to Negroes that he was not against the color
ed race because of Brownsville.

With the hope of winning black

support, the President, upon conferring with Washington, made
it known that he was considering the appointment of Ralph W.
Tyler of Columbus, Ohio to the position of surveyor of the port
Ann J. Lane, The Brownsville Affair (Port Washington,
N.Y.i Kennikat Press, inc., 1971), P. 71.
11
Booker T. Washington to Charles Anderson, November 7,
1 9 0 6 , quoted in Emma Lou Thornbrough, "The Brownsville Episode
and the Negro Vote," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIV
(December, 1957), p. 475. Anderson, an ardent supporter of Wash
ington and Roosevelt, was appointed by the President as collector
of internal revenue in New York.
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of Cincinnati.

Tyler was a part-time journalist and secretary

to Robert Wolfe, owner of the Columbus Ohio State Journal and
the Columbus Dispatch, both of which opposed Senator Foraker.
The appointment of Tyler would also damage Poraker’s political
support in Ohio.

But Roosevelt soon changed his mind about

Tyler's appointment, after protests by white Republicans in
Cincinnati.

The President's son-in-law, Nicholas Longworth,

protested that the naming of a Negro to a post in his district
would mean his political ruin.

Roosevelt also feared that the

appointment would be detrimental to Taft's candidacy in Ohio.
Tyler was subsequently appointed Fourth Auditor in the Navy
Department "where his presence would not offend white voters
and where, it was hoped, he would be useful in keeping Negroes
12
faithful to the Republican party."
Washington recommended other appointments to Roosevelt,
and the President appointed two black lawyers, William H. Lewis
of Boston, and S. Laing Williams of Chicago, as special attor
neys for naturalization affairs in their respective cities.
Washington also suggested to Taft that Negroes be allowed to
qualify as bandmasters in colored regiments.
1?
Thornbrough, p.
Washington called on the services
of Tyler to write a series of editorials supporting Roosevelt's
decision in the Brownsville affair. The leading editorial was
entitled "The Brownsville Ghouls," depicting the critics of Roose
velt and Washington as "human ghouls, worthless parasites who rep
resent nothing save selfish avarice." See The New York Age, Oct
ober 17, 1907; Meier, Negro Thought in America, p. 229.
13
Thornbrough, pp. h80-48l.
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Throughout 190? and 1908 the black press continued to
report news of meetings and petitions protesting the dismis
sal of the troops.

In addition to the protests, Negro organi

zations were proclaiming their support for Senator Foraker, at
Secretary Taft's expense.

In the spring of 1908 the anti-

Taft movement took organizational form with the establishment
of the National Negro American Political League of the United
States.

Included in the League were representatives from the

Afro-American Council, the Niagara Movement, and the Constitu
tional League.

These three organizations had opposed Roose

velt's choice of Washington as spokesman for the black communi
ty.

They were all in disagreement with the Negro educator's

conservatism and with his willingness to compromise where the
14
rights of Negroes were concerned.
The Afro-American Council, which replaced Fortune's de
funct Afro-American League in 1898, came under the control of
Washington after the turn of the century and maintained a concilitory and moderate tone.

But as the repercussions of Browns

ville mounted, Washington became concerned over his declining
influence within the Council.

A split between Washington and

Bishop Alexander Walters over Brownsville led to the Council's
support of Foraker.

By 1908 Walters had joined the Niagara

Lane, The Brownsville Affair, pp. 83-84. Washington
often referred to his critics, especially members of the Niag
ara Movement, as "the enemy" and "the opposition." See Meier,
Negro Thought in America, pp. 115-116, 171-189.
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Movement in an effort to swing the Negro vote away from Taft.

14

The Niagara Movement, established in 1905 to oppose Wash
ington’s leadership, denounced Roosevelt’s actions and endorsed
Poraker.

Washington’s unwillingness to criticize the President

publically on Brownsville induced many of his supporters to
flee to the radical camp,^^

At the 1908 conference in Oberlin,

the Niagara Movement presented an address to the black community;
We say to voters; Register and vote whenever and
wherever you have a right.... Remember that the conduct
of the Republican party toward negroes has been a disgrace
ful failure to keep just promises. The dominant Roosevelt
faction has sinned in this respect beyond forgiveness. We
therefore trust that every black voter will uphold men like
Joseph Benson Poraker, and will leave no stone unturned to
defeat William H. Taft, Remember Brownsville, and estab
lish next November the principle of negro independence in
voting, not only for punishing enemies but for rebuking
false friends.1/
But this potential disaffection from the Republican ranks
quickly dissolved.

Senator Poraker failed to gain the presi

dential nomination, and once out of the race adopted a concili
atory tone, stressing the importance of party unity.

Republi

cans throughout the country, when confronted with the Browns
ville issue, called attention to the Democratic record in race
^ ^ m m a Lou Thombrough, "The Afro-American League, 188?1908," Journal of Southern History, XXVII (September, 1961),

492- 512.
^^Elliot M. Rudwick, "The Niagara Movement," Journal of
Negro History. XLII (July, 1957). 177-200.
^^Quoted in Lane, The Brownsville Affair, p. 79.
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policy.

Many Democrats endorsed Roosevelt's discharge of the

black troops, and William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic Presi
dential candidate in 1908, defended the disfranchisement of
Southern blacks.
ma.

The Negro was definitely faced with a dilem

A few leaders did support Bryan* Bishop Walters, William

Mohroe Trotter, the militant editor of the Boston Guardian and
one of Washington's most severe critics, and W. E. B. DuBois,
spokesman of the Niagara Movement.

But on the whole, the black

community had no other choice but to remain where they were
politically.

A majority of the Negro press had fallen in line

with the administration and now supported both Washington and
the Republican party.

As one historian has asserted, the black

community, "genuinely aroused and temporarily united, found no
way to channel effectively its expressions of outrage and anger.
Its leaders, initially unanimous in criticizing the President's
action, ultimately succumbed to mounting pressures that urged
18
return to loyal republicanism."
Negroes returned to the party of Lincoln but the Browns
ville affair had left an indelable impression on their minds.
In 19 O8 William Howard Taft quickly assumed his predecessor's
accomodating and paternalistic attitude on the race question,
Roosevelt assured Lawrence Abbott that the new President "will
not make a Garrisonian issue on the question of Negro suffrage"
^®Lane, p. 167 . For an analysis of the Negro vote in
19 O8 see Thombrough, "The Brownsville Episode and the Negro
Vote," pp. 4 9 2 -4 9 3 .
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and will "carry out the theory upon which I have acted" in re19
gard to appointments.
Upon leaving office, Roosevelt bequeath
ed to his successor his adviser on Southern and Negro policy,
20
Booker T. Washington,
It did not take long for the black community to realize
that they were to receive very little from the new President.
In his Inaugural Address Taft spoke to the South and the Negro,
declaring that he would not appoint Negroes when it was "objec21
tionable to Southerners."
Determined to continue the course
of reconciliation, the President visited the South after his
election and made several speeches, one of which he entitled
"The Winning of the South."

In this pronouncement he "reiter

ated the shibboleths of White Supremacy;" "the best friend that
the southern Negro can have is a southern white man;" "the his
tory of Reconstruction was "painful;*" "the fear of federal en
forcement of social equality was "imaginary;*" and “there was
nothing inconsistent between the Fifteenth Amendment and South
ern safeguards against "domination ... by an ignorant elector22
ate" - that is, disfranchisement."
^^Theodore Roosevelt to Lawrence Abbott, October 6, 1908,
Letters. VI, pp. 1276-1277.
20

Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., Booker T. Washington and the
Negro's Place in American Life (Boston; Little, Brown and Co.,
p7 T 5 7 .----------- --------

^^Elliot M. Rudwick, W. E. B . DuBoist Propagandist of the
Negro Protest (New York: Atheneum, 1969),p. 12b.
22
C. Vann Woodward, The Origins of the New South, 18771913 (Baton Rougei Louisiana State University Press, 1951)»
p. 468.
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Taft believed that Roosevelt had not advanced the cause
of the Negro by appointing him in southern communities where
his presence was bitterly resented.

Writing to W. R. Nelson,

he declared* “I am not going to put into places of such promi
nence in the South, where the race feeling is strong, Negroes
whose appointment will only tend to increase that race feeling;
but I shall look about and make appointments in the North and
recognize the Negro as often as I can....**^^
The Negro problem in the South was just as perplexing
to Taft as it was to Roosevelt, but Taft believed that **in
many of the States ^ t h e Negro question__/ is a mere ghost of
a past issue."

He did not "propose to raise it again except

in a discussion with the negroes themselves as to their course
in the matter,"

He wrote to a friend* "My own judgment is that

the best thing for the negroes is to allow the present status
to continue until the Republicans can control some of the
Southern States, and this will bring about an equal enforce24
ment of the laws of eligibility for voting."
Taft initiated his southern policy by removing blacks
from federal offices in the South.

In Virginia he removed a

postmaster who had held a position in Yorktown for more than
William Howard Taft to W. R. Nelaion, February 23, 1909»
in Henry P. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft,
2 Vols. (New York* Farrar and Rinehari, Inc., 1939), I, pp. 389390.
24
Taft to Mabel Boardman, August 21, 1908, quoted in Hor
ace S. and Marion G. Merrill, The Republican Command « 1897-1913
(Lexington* University of Kentucky ^Yess, 1971)» p. 275.
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twenty-five years» and who had enjoyed the support of a ma
jority of the white citizens of the community.

He substitut

ed the son of a Confederate s o l d i e r . I n South Carolina,
Taft secured the resignation of Dr. William D. Crum, whose
appointment as Collector of the Port of Charleston had repre
sented the high-tide of Roosevelt's efforts to appeal to black
Americans in defiance of Southern and lily white sentiment.
Booker T. Washington was able to have Crura appointed as Min
ister of Liberia, where the Charlestonian served until his
PA
death in 1912.
Southern whites applauded Taft's policy of replacing
black officeholders, and white Republicans revitalized the
lily white movement throughout the South,

In Texas, Cecil

Lyons, Republican National Committeeman, served notice on
all black officeholders in Texas that upon the expiration
of their terms they should not expect to be reappointed;
their places would be filled by white citizens.

Similar in-

^^The Cleveland Gazette. July 10, 1909.
The New York Age, October 7, 1910; The Cleveland
Gazette. June 18, 1910; Willard B. Gatewood, "William D.
Crum* A Negro in Politics," Journal of Negro History, LIII
(October, 1968), 301-320; Pringle, The Life and Times of
William Howard Taft, I, pp. 389-390; Theodore RoosevelT“to
william H. Taft, Pebruary 26, 1909, Letters, VI, p. 1538.
For details of Crum's service as Minister of Liberia see
James A, Padgett, "Ministers to Liberia and Their Diplomacy,"
Journal of Negro History. XXII (October, 1937), 50-92.
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cidents occurred in Louisiana and Florida.

27

In 1910 Taft asserted, in a letter to William G. Brown,
that he remained firm in the view on Negroes that he had earli
er expressed.

“In my inaugural address," he wrote, "I attempt

ed to foreshadow a policy of not making Southern appointments"
to Negroes.

"I have based the principle on the proposition

that public servants, the discharge of whose official functions
aroused public prejudice necessarily interferred with the effec
tiveness of their work smd so the public was deprived of that
which it was entitled to - an efficient service."

He told

Brown that he now had "another ground upon which this princi
ple can be sustained," and thought that maybe it "is a ground
that is higher than the other."

Taft reasoned that appoint

ment of Negroes to positions in the South, "instead of help
ing the race, retards the growth of that race in its associa
tion with the whites."

To the President, the Southern white

was the best friend of the Negro, and by appointing blacks to
office, he would only jeopardize "the benefit that is to derive from the friendship and protection of the Southern whites."
The growing lily white sentiment, coupled with increased
segregation of Negroes in several federal government buildings.
The Cleveland Gazette, July 3» 1909; The New York Age,
July 1, 1909 . For lily white activities in the South see Thomas
R. Cripps, "The Lily White Republicans: The Negro, the Party,
and the South in the Progressive Era," (Ph. D. Dissertation,
University of Maryland, 1967 ), pp. 331-336.
^®Taft to William Garrott Brown, November 3» 1910, quoted
in Merrill, The Republican Command, p. 315»
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turned many blacks against the leadership of William Howard
T

a

f

t

.

william Monroe Trotter charged that Taft had done

more to foster and "encourage race prejudice and race antagonism than any man in the history of the United States.*•
The leaders of the National Negro Committee, precursor of
the NAACP, met in the summer of 1909 and passed resolutions
asking the President and Congress to "compel Southern states
to abide by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth A m e n d m e n t s . E v e n
the Washingtonians were disappointed with Taft.

Fred Moore,

editor of the New York Age, opened his column to anti-admini32
stration writers.^
Washington himself became somewhat dis
enchanted with the President, not so much because of his poli
cies, but because Taft ceased to confer with him regularly.
Though discouraged, Washington continued to stand by the ad
ministration.
As the election year of 1912 approached, the black com
munity once again found itself in a serious dilemma.

The Re

publican administration of William Howard Taft had neglected
^^August Meier and Elliot M. Rudwick, "The Rise of Seg
regation in the Federal Bureaucracy, 1900-1930," Phylon,
XXVIII (Summer, 196?), 178-184.
^^The Boston Guardian, October 29* 1910; Meier, Negro
Thought in America, pp. 113. 165.
^^Rudwick, W. E. B . DuBois, pp. 125-126.
^^The New York Age, January 27, March 10, 1910; Meier,
Negro Thought in America, p. 229.
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them, thus opening the possibility of deserting the party.
But what alternatives were offered?

The Democratic party

was about to name Woodrow Wilson as its candidate, but Wilson
was a Southerner,

Theodore Roosevelt was to return from Afri

ca to find the Republican party not to his liking, and, fail
ing to recapture the nomination, to launch the Progressive
Party with the hopes of attracting the support of disenchanted
Republicans and Southern Democrats,

And Taft was to receive

the Republican nomination to round out the field.

The black

community was left to decide upon and support one of three
candidates, each with a strong chance of winning the election.
The determining factor would be the candidates themselves, and
how they would appeal to the Negro,

CHAPTER VIII
THE LILY WHITE PARTY AND THE NEGRO*

1912

Theodore Roosevelt's entrance into the 1912 Presidential
election presented a peculiar situation for the American people
in general, and for black Americans in particular.

The Repub

lican party, under the leadership of William Howard Taft, had
moved too far to the right of the political spectrum for many
of its constituents.

When Roosevelt returned from his trip to

Africa he was dismayed at the conservatism of the party and at
Taft's leadership.

He attempted to sway the party toward what

he thought was the progressive mood of the country.

Failing

to capture the nomination from the President, the Rough Rider
bolted the Republican Convention and called for his supporters
to gather in Chicago to launch the Progressive party.

Thus,

the election of 1912 became a three-way contest between Roose
velt, Taft and Woodrow Wilson.
The black community had returned to the ranks of the Re
publican party in 1908.

The performance of President Taft, how

ever, had proved to many Negroes that he was not concerned with
their plight.

But where were they to turn?

The Democratic

nominee, Woodrow Wilson, a Southerner, was viewed as posessing
all the traits and prejudices of that section of the country.
Many members of the black community therefore turned to Roose
velt and joined the Progressive ranks.
15^
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Upon Roosevelt’s declaration of candidacy for the Repub
lican nomination in February, 1912, his campaign managers or
ganized black headquarters in the North and sent representa
tives to the South to convince Negro delegates to disregard
their pledges to vote for Taft at the nominating convention.
These representatives travelled through the South charging
Taft with establishing the rule that no Negroes could hold
office against the objection of Southern whites; removing al
most every black officeholder from prominent positions; and
encouraging Southern members of the Civil Service Commission
to travel throughout the South seeking whites to apply for
positions in the Civil Service normally held by Negroes.
The Roosevelt managers made progress in the South.

The

Jackson Evening News erroneously reported that Booker T. Wash
ington was using his influence among black delegates from Mis
sissippi to switch their allegiance from Taft to Roosevelt.
Charles Banks and Perry W, Howard, the former a close friend
of Washington, indicated that they were going to cast their
ballots for Roosevelt despite instructions for the President.
This led the Taft administration to believe that it would be
difficult to hold the Mississippi delegates to their initial
2
pledge.
Senator Joseph M. Dixon of Montana, Roosevelt’s cam^The New York Age, May 16, 20, June 13» 1912,
^The New York Age, May 30, 1912; August Meier, Negro
Thought in America, 1880-1915 (Ann Arbor; University of Michigan Press, 1963), p. 148.
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paign manager in New York and Chicago, reported to the Colonel
that he was "anxious to see the bubble pricked of *a solid south,**
3
and believed it could be done.
Writing to L. L. Wrenn, Dixon
declared* "The reports from North Carolina are coming in over
whelmingly for Roosevelt.

We are going to get Texas sure, and

... many other places in the South like Tennessee and Kentucky,
4
wherever there is a militant White Republican party*..."
Booker T. Washington and his supporters were faced with
a critical test of political loyalty when Roosevelt entered in
to the fight for the Republican nomination.

Washingtonians had

worked closely with both potential candidates.
to remain loyal to Taft during the contest.

Washington chose

The President was

in control of the Republican party and Washington believed that
Roosevelt would not be able to undermine Taft's strength at the
National Convention.

Contrary to a statement printed by the

Jackson (Miss.) Evening News, he exerted his influence in favor
of Taft.

Washington kept Fred Moore of the New York Age loyal

to the administration, and sent editorials to Moore in behalf
of the President's nomination,

Washington also secured the

support of W. Calvin Chase of the Washington Bee.

When Roose

velt announced his candidacy, the Bee declared that the decision
was unfortunate and doomed to failure.

Chase contended that

Taft was entitled to renomination by the Republican party by
^Joseph M. Dixon to Theodore Roosevelt, February 11, 1912,
Joseph M. Dixon Papers, University of Montana Archives, Missoula,
Montana.
^Dixon to L. L. Wrenn, March 6, 1912 1 Dixon to T. M. George,
March 6, 1912, Dixon Papers.
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every rule of reason, and went on record as standing "unequiv
ocally and uncompromising for his renomination."

The editor

asserted that he would do all that was within his power to
"bring about such results."^
Ralph W. Tyler, author of the famous editorial "The
Brownsville Ghouls," continued to support the President.

Using

the same methods employed during the 1908 campaign, Tyler wrote
a series of editorials to influence the black community to vote
for Taft.

His most influential article appeared in the Wash

ington Bee and was entitled "A Crisis."

Tyler began by noting

that in the Republican Convention of 1908, a resolution had been
introduced in favor of reducing the representation of the South
in the convention, but had been defeated "because Taft had op
posed it,"

He urged the black delegates selected to attend

the 1912 convention to "stand loyally to those instructions
they had received from their legislature."

If not, he warned,

they would "lend credibility" to white newspaper charges that
black Southern delegates were for sale.

The editorial con

cluded by declaring that deserting Taft would "hasten a Crisis
that would reduce Southern representation in the Republican
convention," thereby eliminating all blacks from future con
ventions .^
^The Washington Bee, March 2, 1912,
^The Washington Bee, June 8, 1912.
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While Washington auid his supporters were working among
Negroes on behalf of Taft, the President made efforts to gain
black support.

He invited five black Presidential appointees
7
to the White House to discuss the "Negro Question,"
His
policies in the South, lynching, Jim Crow street cars, and
segregation in the government bureaucracy were reviewed.

Taft

stated that he deplored mob violence and declared that his
statement on Negro appointments in the South, contained in
his Inaugural Address, had been misinterpreted.

The delega

tion requested that the President restate his Southern policy
"so as to leave no room for ambiguities or doubt" among black

8

Americans.

Taft increased his activities to capture the Negro vote.
In an address at Howard University, he asserted that he favor
ed higher education for blacks and condemned lynching.

The

President, however, made it clear that Negroes could expect
little in the way of anti-lynching legislation from his admin
istration, contending that the courts could not "enforce laws
against lynching unless public opinion was on its /~sic__7 side.
He was furthermore convinced that lynching resulted from the
"slowness of justice to operate," and matters could only be
9
improved by making the courts "more expeditious."
^Those present were William H. Lewis, Assistant Attorney
General, Ralph W. Tyler, Auditor of the Navy, Henry Johnson, Re
corder of the Deeds, James G. Napier, Register of the Treasury,
and Whitefield McKinlay, Collector of Customs at Georgetown.
g
The New York Age, January 25» 1912; The Washington Bee,
January 27, 1912.
^The Washington Bee, April 13, 1912.
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The pre-convention fight between Taft and Roosevelt for
delegates continued throughout the spring.

Senator Dixon was

assured that Roosevelt would carry North Carolina and Texas,
Ormsby McHarg was sent to the South to gather support among
those Southern Republicans who feared losing their jobs through
the defeat of Taft.

In the Senate, the Roosevelt faction

started to investigate the use of political patronage in the
South by Taft and to block all appointments that were of a
"political nature."

Meanwhile President Taft ordered William B,

McKinley to "comb Dixie for Roosevelt men" in the state Republican organizations and remove them from office.
The fight over black delegate votes surfaced during the
primaries in Maryland and Ohio.

In Maryland, Roosevelt forces

were able to carry the state through what opponents called the
"illegal manipulation of the Negro vote" in Western Maryland
12
and Baltimore County.
However, in Ohio, the former President
found the black community hostile to his political ambitions
because of Brownsville.

In an address in Springfield, Roose

velt, reversing his earlier position, sought to nullify this
10
Spencer B. Adams to Joseph M. Dixon, March 5t 1912;
Dixon to Cecil Lyon, telegram, March 6, 1912; Dixon to Hiram B.
Worth, March 11, 1912, Joseph M. Dixon Papers.
11
Theodore Roosevelt to Ormsby McHarg, March 4, 1912, in
Biting E. Morison, ed.. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt. 8 vols.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 195&J, Vll, p. 516;
George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1946), pp. 226-22?.
12
Mowryv p. 267,
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opposition by stating that his dismissal of the black troops
came only after the recommendation of his former Secretary of
War.

He told his audience, composed primarily of Negroes, that

Taft was as guilty of the dismissals as he and that "Mr. Taft
should be held responsible for his action, too."

To counter

Roosevelt, Taft sent an Ohio Congressman to the state with Min
go Sanders, one of the dismissed Negro soldiers, to campaign
lii

in his interest.

Despite this effort by the President, Roose

velt defeated him in Ohio by a sizable majority.
When the Republican National Convention opened in Chi
cago, there were sixty-six black delegates present, mostly from
the South, and an overwhelming majority was instructed to vote
for Taft,

These black delegates played a crucial role as a

balance of power in the fight for the nomination.

In two of

the major struggles - the selection of the Temporary Chairman
and the seating of contested delegations - they voted with the
P r e s i d e n t . T a f t received fifty-eight of the sixty-six black
votes.

In exchange for this support, the President promised

that he would change his policy of appointments in the South
and stated that black and white Republicans would work together
^^The Cleveland Gazette » June 1, 1912.
^^The Washington Bee, August 10, 1912,
^^The New York Age, June 20, 1912; The Cleveland Gazette,
June 22, 1912; "The Delegate Contest at Chicago," Independents
LXXII (June 20, 1912), 1386 -I3 8 7 .
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to remove lily whitism.^^

The Republican Convention closed

with Taft securing the nomination and Theodore Roosevelt and
his supporters bolting.

In August the Progressive Party nomi

nated the ex-President as its candidate for President.
Roosevelt was aware of the fact that a third party con
stituted a threat to Southern Democratic solidarity.

From

the beginning he asserted that the Progressive was a National
party and declared that its appeal was made "equally to the
sons of the men who fought under Grant and to the sons who
fought under Lee, for the cause we champion is as emphatically
the cause of the South as it is the cause of the North."
was, above all, anxious to break the solid South.

He

"Really

if I could carry one of the eleven ex-Confederate States," he
17
wrote, "I should feel as though I could die happy,"
Roosevelt leaders in the South advised the Colonel that
a strong, permanent Progressive party could be built in the
South only if it were organized upon a "lily white" basis.
John M. Parker, Roosevelt's chief Southern supporter and ad
viser, offered his suggestion in a letter to the Rough Rider*
"... this should be a white men's party, recognizing the su
perior ability of the white man and his superior civilization.
16

The New York Age, June 27, 1912.

^^Theodore Roosevelt to John M. Parker, July 15, 1912,
quoted in Arthur S. Link, "Theodore Roosevelt and the South
in 1912 ," North Carolina Historical Review, XXIII (July, 1946),
p. 314.
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attained through countless centuries of struggle and endeavor,
peculiarly fitting him to lead and direct, as during all of
this long period, the negro has been perfectly content to re
main the ignorant savage devoid of pride of ancestry or civic
ambition.

The South cannot and will not under any circumstance

tolerate the Negro, and my firm belief is that a plan on these
lines, diplomatically arranged would be productive of immense
18
good."
Julian Harris of Atlanta, the son of Joel Chandler
Harris and editor of the popular Uncle Remus's Home Magazine,
expressed the desire to have a Progressive "Lily White" Party
in the South.

It was his contention that establishing the

party on this basis, would create an outlet for those white
Southerners who vote Democratic because the only other choice
was "Black Republicanism."

Harris believed that a Progressive

lily white ikrty would benefit the black community because
19
"the Negro’s best friend is the Southern white."
Roosevelt remained silent over the issue raised by his
advisers.

He did not wish to take a conspicuous stand for fear

of alienating the Negro voters in the North.

However, late in

July the Progressive state conventions in Georgia, Florida,
Alabama and Mississippi selected two separate delegations, one
John M. Parker to Theodore Roosevelt, July 24, 1912,
quoted in Arthur S. Link, ed., "Correspondence Relating to the
Progressive Party's 'Lily White* Policy in 1912," Journal of
' \ 480-490,
480.1
Southern History, X (November, 1944),
19
^^Julian
Julian Harris
Harr
to Theodore Roosevelt, August 3, 1912,
Ibid., pp. 488-490.
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white and one black, and both arrived in Chicago for the nation
al convention claiming to be the legitimate representatives of
the party,

Roosevelt was suddenly forced to take a definite
20
position on the issue.
In a widely publicized letter to Julian Harris, Roosevelt
outlined his policy concerning the Negro and southern politics.
Believing that "the Progressive movement should be made ... in
the interest of every honest, industrious, law-abiding colored
man, just as it is the interest of every honest, industrious,
law-abiding white man," Roosevelt declared that "the surest way
to render

it_/ impotent ... would be to try to repeat the

course ... followed by the Republican Party ..." in the South.
"In the Republican National Convention," he asserted, "the color
ed members have been

almost exclusively from

great majority of them have

been men

of such

the South, andthe
character that

their political activities were merely a source of harm, and
of very grave harm to their own race."

Roosevelt continuedi

The action of the Republican machine in the South ... in
endeavoring to keep alive a party based only on negro votes
... has been bad for the white men of the South, whom it
has kept solidified in an unhealthy and unnatural politi
cal bond ... and
it has been bad for the
colored men ofthe
South.... There
has in the past been much venality in Re
publican National Conventions in which there was an active
contest for the nomination for President, and this venality
20

George E. Mowry, "The South and the Progressive Lily
White Party of 1912," Journal of Southern History, VI (May,
1940), 237-247* Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive
Movement, pp. 267-268.
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has been almost exclusively among the rotten-borough dele
gates, and for the most part among the negro delegates
from these Southern States in which there was no real Re
publican party, ... in the Convention at Chicago last
June, the breakup of the Republican party was forced by
these rotten-borough delegates from the South. In the
Primary States of the North the colored men in most places
voted substantially as their white neighbors voted. But
in the Southern States, where there was no real Republican
party, and where colored men, or whites selected purely by
colored men, were sent to the convention, representing
nothing but their own greed for money or office, the major
ity was overwhelmingly antiprogressive.
Roosevelt concluded that the Progressive party would appeal
”to the best white men in the South ^ w h o J

shall create a

situation by which the colored men of the South will ultimate
ly get justice."

On the other hand, the Progressive party would

appeal for support from the better class of Negro voters in the
Northern states and welcome them to the Progressive convention
21
as delegates.
Roosevelt's position on Negro delegations

was a direct

result of the outcome of the Republican nominating convention.
He resented the role that Southern delegates had played,.

Repre

senting states that would give the Republican party no elector
al votes, they had, by remaining loyal to Taft, deprived Roose
velt of the presidential nomination.

Roosevelt further believed

that the partyhad failed to win popular support in the South be
cause of its racial identification.

By making the Progressive

party in the South "lily white" Southern Deomocrats would be
21

Theodore Roosevelt to Julian Harris, August 1, 1912,
Letters, VII, pp. 584-590. This letter is also contained in
Link, ed., "Correspondence Relating to the Progressive Party's
•Lily White' Policy in 1912," pp. 481-488,
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offered an alternative.

Furthermore, by opening the door for

Northern black delegates, Roosevelt believed that this would
secure black support in the North, where the Negro voted counted.
It was left to the Progressive prot^isional national committee
to decide whether the white or Negro delegations would be
seated at the convention.

When the committee met, Roosevelt’s

plans of exclusion of Southern black delegates were followed.
The committee passed a motion which permitted each state organ
ization to determine the legality of contested delegations.
A motion which concurred with Roosevelt’s position on black
22
participation was also carried.
In the fight over delegate seating, the committee ruled
in favor of excluding Negro delegations from the South.

The

contest in Florida was so bitter that the state was allowed to
go unrepresented.
ly bitter.

The fight in Mississippi was also particular

Prior to the convention Perry W. Howard, a Negro

from Jackson, had written to Senator Dixon asking whether the
Negro delegation would be seated at the convention.

Dixon re

plied* "It would not be possible to admit as delegates men
elected by any of the old Republican organizations.

The new

convention will not be a wing of the Republican party but will
be representative of the Progressive thought in both the old
Republican and Democratic parties* in other words, it will be
^^Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Move
ment, p. 2 6 9 .
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a new deal from the beginning.**

23

When the Southern Negro dele

gates were refused their seats at the convention» they appealed
to the credentials committee.

After a heated controversy in

that committee, the delegates were refused their seats by a vote
, oil
of 17 to 1 6 . ^
Efforts were made to introduce a plank into the Progres
sive platform dealing with the "Negro Question."

The proposal,

demanding the repeal of discriminatory laws and a guaramtee for
the Negro’s right to vote, was drafted by W. E. B. DuBois and
was carried to the convention by Joel Spingam, an official
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo
ple.

Despite the efforts of Spingam, Henry Moskowitz, and

Jane Addams to have the resolution adopted, the convention re
fused to accept the plank and the Progressives adjourned on
August 8 without reference to the "Negro Question" in their
platform,
Reaction of the black community to the Progressive con
vention was immediate.

The New York Age, once Roosevelt’s

most fervent supporter, editorialized that his exclusion of
Southern black delegates was only an "elaboration of a position
^^Perry W. Howard to Joseph M. Dixon, July 12, 1912;
Dixon to Howard, July 14, 1912, Dixon Papers.
24
The New York Times, August 7, 1912; Arthur S. Link,
"The Negro as a Factor in the Campaign of 1912," Journal of
Negro History, XXXII (January, 1947), P. 96.
^^Elliott Rudwick, W. E. B . DuBoist Propagandist of the
Negro Protest (New York» Athene tun, 1 9 6 8 ), p. 159; Link,"~^Negro
as Factor in Campaign of 1912," pp. 96-97.
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that £~hej/ had always held."

Editor Fred Moore conducted a

symposium seeking black opinion throughout the country on
Roosevelt's action.

Perhaps the general attitude was best ex

pressed by Ralph W. Tyler, who offered the mildest criticism.
Tyler believed that Roosevelt's position "invited renewed op
pression of blacks from their old uncompromising enemies in
the South," and that the exclusion of the Southern black Pro
gressives was "more cruel than any disfranchisement laws enact26
ed by any Southern State,"
Influential Bishops of the African Methodist Episcopal
and AME Zion Church cautioned their congregations against join
ing the Progressive party.

Bishop Alexander Walters of the

AME Zion Church and President of the National Colored Demo
cratic League declared that the Progressive party was "nothing
but the wail of an unscrupulous man, drunk with a mixture of
ambition and malice and determined to kill the party that
thwarted his will."

Walters warned blacks that Roosevelt was

neither a progressive nor a reactionary, but "anything and
27
everything that suited his purpose for the time being."
A mass meeting in celebration of the 121st Anniversary of
the Haitian Revolution was turned into an anti-Roosevelt rally
when Reverdy C. Ransom, editor of the AME Review, denounced
the ex-President's action and promised to fight against him
26

The New York Age, August 15» 1912.

^^The New York Age, October 12, 1912.

168
"just as hard as /^he_/ had fought for him at the Republican
National Convention."^®

And outside the black community pro

test was expressed against Roosevelt.

The Independent declaredi

"A bpll is an unwelcome apparition in a china shop, and the
Progressive party convention gave no kindlier welcome to the
negro question ... we condemn Mr, Roosevelt ,.. for refusing
the square deal for whites and blacks alike in those states
in which the white citizens shut out the colored citizen from
the ballot."29
By appealing to Southern white convictions, Roosevelt
hoped to win enough votes away from the Democratic ranks effec-W
tively to break the solid South,

However, many white Southern

ers did not believe that the Colonel was sincere in his policy
of North-South racial discrimination.

They viewed it simply

as an effort to gain Southern Democratic support on the one
hand and Northern Negro votes on the other. This was precisely
what Roosevelt desired.

Typical reaction vrais expressed by the

Nashville Bannert "The great Bull Moose leader has summarily
ejected the black mooses that hail from the sunny land of
30
Dixie from his herd."
Southern Democrats had not forgotten
that only a few years ago, Roosevelt appointed Crum in Charles
ton, closed the post office in Indianola, and entertained
28
^ The New York

October 17, 1912,

29"No Square Deal," Independent. LXXIII (August 15, 1912),
391-393.
^^The Nashville Banner, August 6 , 1912, quoted in Link,
"Theodore Roosevelt and the South in 1912," p, 318.
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Booker T. Washington at the White House.

Roosevelt campaigned

hard in the South throughout the month of September and on his
"swing around the circle" tour of the Southern states he was
received enthusiastically, proving that he was popular with
the Southern people.

However, the Colonel discovered in Novem

ber that "people often shout one way and vote another"; he re31
ceived only a small minority of votes in the South,
The black community had always remained loyal to the Re
publican party, but in 1912 there appeared to be a disaffec
tion with the party leadership.

Black leaders were now seri

ously considering the Democratic party.

Following the election

of 1908, Alexander Walters and William Monroe Trotter had re
christened the National Negro-American Political League as the
National Independent Political League.

The Independents work

ed closely with the Colored National Democratic League, of
32
which Walters was president.
W. E. B. DuBois resigned from
the Socialist party after realizing that Eugene Debs could not
win.

He denounced President Taft for his "abject surrender"

to racism and called him the worst Chief Executive in half a
century.

"Any colored man who votes for Mr. Taft," DuBois

warned, "will do so on the assumption that zero is better than
minus l."^3

The Crisis editor also viewed the Progressive party

as having no respect for Negroes because of its Lily White
31

Link, "Theodore Roosevelt and the South in 1912," p. 323.

32
August Meier, Negro Thought in America, p. 187.
^^The Crisis, IV (1912), 180-181; Rudwick, W. E. B. DuBois.
p. 159.
^
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faction in the South.

There can be no doubt that DuBois was

further disturbed over the Progressive refusal of his proposed
Negro suffrage plank.
Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic nominee in 1912, made a
bid for the large Negro vote in the North.

He personally rec

ognized the National Independent Political League and acquired
the services of Oswald Garrison Villard, editor of the New
York Evening Post and grandson of William Lloyd Garrison, as
his advisor on the race question.

He told Villard that if

elected, he would be President of all the people.

Wilson fur

ther stated that he would denounce lynching but believed that
he as President, could not help the Negro in this matter and
did not wish to give the impression that he could.

Speaking

to a delegation from the United Negro Democracy of New Jersey,
Wilson declared*
I was born and raised in the South. There is no place
where it is easier to cement friendship between the two
races then there. They understand each other better there
than elsewhere. You may feel assured of my entire com
prehension of the ambitions of the negro race and my willin^j|ss and desire to deal with that race fairly and just-

Despite these overtures from the Democratic nominee, the
black community as a whole was suspicious of Wilson and the
Democratic party.

They feared that a Democratic majority in

^^Quoted in Link, "Negro as Factor in Campaign of 1912,"
p. 88.
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Congress and an administration controlled by white Southerners
would only follow their predecessors in ignoring the black race.
They were aware that a white Democratic Southerner, James K.
Vardaman, was elected to the Senate in Mississippi in 1911 on
the platform of modification of the Fourteenth and repeal of
the Fifteenth Amendments.

But above all, the Negro feared that

Woodrow Wilson was a Southerner who had "inherited all the usual
baggage of southern racial prejudice.
Wilson received only a small vote from the black community
in the election of 1912;

The only editorial support for the

Democratic candidate from the black press came from DuBois*s
36
Crisis and Trotterfs Guardian„
The Cleveland Gazette, a de
cidedly radical paper, had supported Bryan in 1908 but in 1912
believed that Taft was the "least of the three evils" that had
a chance of winning.

Together with the Washington Bee and the

New York Age, the Gazette conducted extensive editorial and
cartoon caaipaigns against Wilson and Roosevelt and in favor of
Taft.

W. Calvin Chase of the Bae asserted that "Roosevelt had

gone further than anyone else in the propagating of anti-Negro
sentiment in the country."
will be possible for
vote for ... Wilson."

The New York Age wondered how "it
single self-respecting Negro ... to

The Age stated that the Democrat, "by

^^Linlc, "Negro as Factor in Campaign of 1912," pp. 86-87.
^^Rudwick, W. B. B. DuBolsa pp. 1^8-160.
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inheritance and absorption ... has most of the prejudices of
the narrowest type of Southern white people against the Negro."^7
In November, 1912, Woodrow Wilson was elected President,
receiving forty-one per cent of the fifteen million votes casted,
Roosevelt finished second with twenty-seven per cent of the
popular vote and Taft placed third with twenty-three per cent,
the remainder of the vote was divided among the Prohibition,
Socialist, and Socialist-Labor parties.^®

Wilson received

more Negro votes than any other Democratic presidential candi
date prior to 1912 had received.

On the other hand, Roose

velt's proscription of Negro support in the South turned most
of the militant blacks in the North away from voting the Pro
gressive ticket.

Taft, securing the support of the Washington

ians and thus » majority of the Negro press, received a large
black vote.

Historians have differed in their estimation of

which candidate received the majority of Negro support between
39
Roosevelt and Taft.
The black community, however, did not
37
The Cleveland Gazette, August 10, 17» September 28,
October 26, November 2, 1&12; The Washington Bee, August 10,
1912; The New York Age. July 11, 1912; Meier, Negro Thought
in America, pp. 188-189.
^®*The Presidential Vote," Current Literature, III (De
cember, 1912), 603 -6 0 5 ; "The National Election," Independent.
LXXIII (November l4, 1912), 1099-1100; Mowry, Theodore Roose
velt and the Progressive Movement, p. 281.
39
For example, August Meier states that 60 per cent of
the Negro vote went to Roosevelt and Arthur S. Link assumes
that the majority of Northern Negroes remained loyal to the
Republican party and voted for Taft. See Meier, Negro Thought
in America, p. 188; Link, "Negro as Factor in Campaign of 1912,
p. 99.
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hold the balance of power in the election, contrary to DuBois’s
b e l i e f . T h e entrance of Roosevelt into the race and the sub
sequent split within the Republican party assured Wilson's vic
tory in 1912,
Theodore Roosevelt's efforts to break up the solid South
by the formation of a Southern Progressive Lily White Party
failed to gain the Southern Democratic vote and only helped to
alienate many blacks in the North.

He had hoped to secure sup

port from Southern progressives and liberals but ultimately
failed when Wilson emerged as a liberal Democratic presidential
contender.

To many liberal and progressive Southerners, Wilson

was the true progressive and Roosevelt an "opportunist* and a
"demagogue.
Roosevelt sincerely believed that the white Southerner
offered the best leadership for the Negro in politics in the
South.

He stood by his convictions of the importance of doing

justice to the Negro who possesses "the intelligence, integrity,
and self-respect which justifies / ”the_7 right of political expression in his white neighbor."

He further believed that

his policy would gain the confidence of the white man in the
hn

Rudwick, W. E. B . DuBois, pp. 159-160. DuBois believed
that the 500,000 black votes would hold the balance. After the
election he estimated that 100,000 voted for Wilson,
111
Link, "Theodore Roosevelt and the South in 1912," pp,
323-324.
42
Theodore Roosevelt, "The Progressives and the Colored
Man," Outlook. 01 (August 24, 1912), 909-912,
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South.

However, by the summer of 1913, Roosevelt realized the

futility of expecting his policy to attract Southern support.
Writing to 0. K. Davis he confessed* ‘*1 think that the results
... show that as yet we are not making the slightest headway
among the Democrats of the South.

We have just got to face

that fact.
The black community found itself in a peculiar situation
with the election of 1912.

With the administration of William

Howard Taft, the Republican party completed its policy of
abandoning the Negro.

Roosevelt had shown consideration early

in his first term but decided to follow a different course in
his second.

Taft took over where Roosevelt had left off in

appealing to the white South.

And now a Southerner and a Demo

crat, Woodrow Wilson, was in the White Hoüse.

Despite the op

timism voiced by DuBois and Walters concerning Wilson's poten
tial recognition of blacks, the Democrat was to follow the poli
cies of his predecessor and the Negro was to be forgotten.

Early

in his administration, Wilson endorsed segregation of black em44
ployees in the Treasury and Post Office Departments,
As the
Wilson years progressed, the black community, once again dis
illusioned, drifted back to the Republican party.

Not until

^^Theodore Roosevelt to 0. K. Davis, September 2, 1913»
Letters, VII, p. 736n.
^^For Wilson's Negro policy see* Henry Blumenthal, "Woodrow
Wilson and the Race Question," Journal of Negro History, XLVIII
(1 9 6 3 ), 1-21; Kathleen L. Wolegemuth, "Woodrow Wilson's Appoint
ment Policy and the Negro," Journal of Southern History, XXIV
(1 9 5 8 ), 4 57-471 and "Woodrow Wilson and Federal Segregation,"
Journal of Negro History, XLIV (1959)» 158-173; Nancy J. Weiss,
^ïhe Negro and the New Freedom* Fighting Wilsonian Segregation,"
Political Science Quarterly, LXXIV (1 96 9 ), 61-79.
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the Neal Deal coalition would blacks permanently leave the party
of Lincoln.

With the fall of the Republican party in 1912, and

the defeat of Theodore Roosevelt, the age of accomodation, the
"Age of Booker T, Washington" had come to an end.

CHAPTSa IX
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE NEGROi CONCLUSION
The "Negro problem" was a persistent one for Theodore
Roosevelt throughout his years in the White House,

In his

search for a solution he was at different times opposed by
Southerners and Northerners, Negroes and whites, liberals
and conservatives, moderates and extremists.

During his

first term of office he succeeded in winning the affections
of Northern and Southern blacks by inviting Booker T. Wash
ington to dinner at the White House, appointing William D.
Crum to the Charleston Collectorship, and closing the post
office in Indianola, Mississippi,

These events aroused con

siderable optimism among black Americans and Negro leaders
referred to Roosevelt as "our President,"

Although many Negroes applauded Roosevelt and felt
indebted to him during his first years in office, the Presi
dent's interest in them was strictly rsalpolitik.

He invited

Washington to dinner to discuss not the condition of the
Negro in the South but political patronage.

Roosevelt's

selection of Washington as political advisor on Southern and
Negro policy was part of an effort to maintain Northern black
support and win over the old Bourbons who accepted Washington
as the spokesman for the black conanunity but who were, unfor
tunately for Roosevelt, not in control of Southern politics.
176
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His appointment of William D, C m m was an attempt to under
mine the strength of Mark Hanna and the Lily White Republi
cans in South Carolina,

It was no coincidence that Crum was

the top Negro Republican in Charleston.

And in Indianola,

Roosevelt closed the post office because the white popula
tion that intimidated Mrs, Minnie Cox defied the authority
of the Federal Government by forcing the resignation of a
presidential appointee.
Roosevelt's main objective in recognising the merits
of those "occasionally good" and "well-educated* Negroes
like Washington» Crum and Cox was political* to reform the
Republican party in the South,

In attempting to make the

party one of blacks and disillusioned white Democrats» he
contributed to Southern antipathy on the Negro question.
White Southerners viewed Roosevelt's appointment policy as
an attempt at establishing social equality in the South and
"Negro domination" in Southern politics.

Subsequently»

Roosevelt alienated Southern whites and failed to break the
powerful hold of the Democratic party in the South,

His

second term In office was spent trying to assuage those
white Southerners who had been offended by what Roosevelt
came to realise were a couple of rash acts.
Although Roosevelt showed signs of allowing blacks to
participate in the political process during his first years
in the White House» he failed to alleviate the serious prob
lems that affected Southern Negroes.

Disfranchisement con-
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stituti^ns were adopted in Alabama and Virginia; **Jim Crow"
became the established social system throughout the South;
and lynch law took its toll in the number of deaths of Southern
blacks.

The President failed to take any constructive action

in dealing with these problems.

After his victory in 1 9 0 4 ,

Roosevelt ignored these occurrences and became obsessed with
gaining the support and admiration of the white Southern popu
lation.
To stress the importance of sectional reconciliation,
Roosevelt toured the South and avoided making reference to
disfranchisement or lynching.

His Lincoln Day address in

1905 marked a public reversal on the Negro question by accep

ting the Southern argument on the cause of lynching and ad
monishing blacks for harboring their own criminals.

He was

silent following the race riot in Atlanta in 1906 and backed
away when Southern moderates requested a formal investigation
into the affair.

In Brownsville, Texas, he summarily dis

missed 167 black soldiers from the United States Army for alleged
participation in the "Brownsville shootup."

In 1912 Roosevelt

entered the Presidential race as leader of the Progressive
party and excluded Southern blacks from participating the par
ty's convention, thus forming a "lily white" party in the South,
Roosevelt's racial ambivalence imposed strict limitations
on what he could accomplish as President,

In regarding the

Negro as inferior he denied the belief in "equality of man,"
In recognising those blacks of "property, education, and char-
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acter" he limited his attentions to black statesmen who were
in substantial agreement with his paternal racial philosophy.
Booker T, Washington» in the eyes of the President, was the
ideal model for black advancement.

Those Negroes who disa

greed with Washington's accomodating approach in race rela
tions and fought for civil and political rights were proscribed
toy Roosevelt,

The "Negro problem" was not solved during Roosevelt's
administration.

The Washington dinner, the Crum appointment,

and the ïndiano.la Post Office incident were merely aberrations,

certainly hot the normal course of events during Roosevelt's
presidency.

Although he conducted a vigorous campaign on be

half of the Negro in his private correspondence, Roosevelt's
public achievement in race matters was mirdmal.

He refused

to exploit the full potentialities of the executive office
in the interest of racial statesmanship.

Perhaps he was

aware that the office of President was not conducive to the
championing of unpopular causes,

Roosevelt sincerely believed that the "Negro problem"
was a political problem and not a moral one.

Any moral con

sideration should be left to the moralist and reformer.

He

shared the belief among ether Statesmen in the Progressive
era that lynching and race riots were direct examples of dis
order in society and wished to bring it under control.

His

desire for order and harmony between the races appealed to
the Progressive mind on race relations.

Nevertheless, he

180
accomplished little in his attempt at racial harmony.

He was

very hesitant in using his office and exerting strong execu
tive leadership in race matters.
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